Monthly Archives: February 2010

Does ‘God’ explain anything?

There’s a debate coming up in February at Saddleback College in Orange County, Southern California.  Two fellows will debate the question “Is God the Best Explanation for Moral Values.   I rarely go to these things, but this title caught my eye:
Is God The Best Explanation for Moral Values?‏ — The begs the question by assuming falsely that ‘God’ is an explanation of values.  ‘God’ is not the best explanation because ‘God’ is not any kind of explanation for anything. Values of all kinds, along with belief in God or gods, are all human based.  If any explanation is forthcoming, it would be a humanistic explanation.  We have certain moral values because of our long experience of living and our history of valuing this or that.  ‘God’ or  belief in God has nothing to do with it; except maybe a post facto rationalization.

Anyway, I don’t have much patience with this type of ‘debate.’   Maybe some of you can find some ‘value’ in it; and then argue that that value is not explained by God.

Burden of Proof?

You and I walk into a room in which there are a bed, a chair, a small table with a vase of flowers on the table. A quick visual and tactile inspection reveals nothing else in the room. We both agree on this. [This could be taken as the ‘neutral’ position.] I adopt this ‘neutral’ position as my philosophy: The room contains nothing but two people, a bed, a chair, a table and a vase of flowers. Affirmation of this premise is consistent with me functioning well (even flourish and thrive) in the room. You, on the other hand, agree with me on the stated list of physical things in the room, but you add another unseen, undetectable item, namely, a spirit with whom you claim “interaction.” This ‘interaction’ makes your stay in the room easier and meaningful. It has pragmatic value for you. But you’re unable to show me or others (who might join us in the room) that the spirit really exists. You cannot come up with any objective, neutral evidence to support your belief.

Who has the burden of “proving” his case? Is it the theist who claims that an extraordinary entity exists? (One example of an extraordinary entity is a supernatural being who relates in some ways to humanity and who is the ground for all reality,) Or is it the non-theist (atheist, agnostic, skeptic) who finds that there isn’t any clear indication of such an entity?
What is at issue here? The issue concerns the purported existence of an entity whose existence has not been shown to be a public, common reality knowable by all, including disinterested, neutral parties. If the existence of the deity were clear and well-grounded, there would be no issue, and no need for arguments purporting to prove the existence of the deity. Given that we do have a legitimate issue for rational minds, the burden of proof is on those who claim that a deity in fact exists.

Has anyone ever been able to provide unequivocal, objective evidence clearly supporting the proposition that a deity exists? The burden of proof is on those who claim to possess this evidence. They must show that there are neutral, objective grounds for belief in a deity.

Where is the neutral position?

Many theists and the believers in religious orthodoxy will deny that they have the burden of proof because they see the neutral position as being neutral between both the existence and non-existence of a deity. Accordingly, they argue that the skeptic has to make a case for nonexistence, in light of the nearly universal belief in deity.

(Of course, in a culture in which there is universal, or nearly universal, belief in a deity, the skeptic or non-theist stands out as a non-conformist; he is seen as standing outside the mainstream. In this context, most people might believe that the burden of proof is on the skeptic to justify his drastic non-conformity. On the other hand, those who conform by affirming a deity do not have to prove anything.)

(But in a pluralistic culture like ours, in which a significant minority do not believe in a deity, and among those who do believe, there are varying concepts of deity and ambiguity regarding the proposition that a deity exists, the burden of proof should not be on the skeptic.)

So we have the common view that the skeptic must make a good case for non-existence of deity before the theistic position becomes questionable. Should we give the apologists such an advantage in the “god debate”? I think not.

I will argue for an alternative notion of the neutral position. The key is the naturalistic standpoint: We ordinarily explain events in nature and society without invoking the mysterious, unknowable supernatural realm. Any reference to the supernatural realm is problematic and usually of no real help in explaining matters. [Does this beg the question?]

Is this really a neutral position?

Some apologists claim there is no neutral position. According to them, both the view of belief in a deity and non-belief require certain assumptions. Both positions require certain “faith”; i.e., presumption that a belief system is true.
Contrary to this, the rational skeptic will argue that belief in a questionable entity requires additional assumptions or basic faith, but omission of this belief does not. How would the argument go?
Let us start by admitting that, in order to make sense of our world, people generally start with certain assumptions or presuppositions. Some examples are

• the assumptions that generally the future will resemble the past (what we learned yesterday applies to today, and what we learn today generally will apply to tomorrow);
• that generally our perceptual experience is a good guide to things and happenings in our environment;
• that questionable claims must be supported by empirical evidence or well-grounded reasoning.
• that there is a difference between fact and fiction, common public reality, on the one hand, and fantasy or hallucinations, on the other;
• Something like the “Law of the Excluded Middle”; no contradictions allowed: something cannot both be and not be (in the same sense).

[There may be more; my list is just to give a flavor of the “faith” of the secular rationalist.]

It is reasonable to say that the most ardent defender of religious faith shares these assumptions with the rational skeptic. In order for anyone to operate successfully in the world, he must operate with assumptions (or unstated presuppositions) much like these. Even believers in gods, angels, demons, and miracles do not accept every claim that others make (especially when those claims oppose their basic beliefs); they apply tests of empirical evidence and reason to them, and may even reject them on this basis. And such believers also routinely reject the fantasies of disturbed persons and the hallucinations of drunkards and mentally impaired people. Hence, my claim that even believers in gods and demons use assumptions stated in the third and fourth bullets above.
It is a set of presuppositions like these that could be called the “shared faith” of our culture. But such shared faith does not entail the beliefs of a theistic religion; nor does it entail that our traditional religious beliefs are false. The “shared faith” is neutral between theism and positive atheism (the positive claim that there are no gods whatsoever).

But the naturalism of the rational skeptic does not need any additional assumptions. A world view that omits belief in a deity is an adequate world view. In the same sense the world view of most mature people that omits belief in Santa Claus (as an actual individual) is an adequate world view. By “adequate” here I mean that the set of beliefs are good enough to enable a successful, intelligent, moral existence.
The world view of the rational skeptic is not as non-conformist as our ‘Christian’ culture suggests. Millions of people in different cultures and historical periods have operated successfully on this basis. The fact that others in theistic, religious cultures find it “impossible” to do the same does not show that a naturalistic world view is not workable; it only shows that under certain cultural, historical conditions, entire cultures have been persuaded that it is unworkable.

Reply to a friend's remarks on the nature of philosophy

Paul’s reply to my remarks regarding the function of philosophy brings out our differences concerning the role of philosophy. I surely question the claim that philosophy functions as inquiry into the nature of reality (a “super science” which dares to explore where science leaves off). Paul states:

“Familiarization with what is known in science is the first step to trying to resolve any issue in philosophy, but only the first step, it cannot tell us about what is ultimately true in areas where science has no jusrisdiction and there are many from ethics, to esthetics (axiology in general), to jurisprudence, to political claims to epistemological issues, to name a few.”

First, I question the assumption that these areas (e.g. jurisprudence, politics, epistemology) are such that “science has no jurisprudence.” Only if we limit “science” to the hard natural sciences (physics, chemistry, micro-biology) is this even close to being a plausible assumption. The social sciences and what I refer to as “scientific thought” surely have “jurisprudence” in these areas. Why not? Certainly, the “scientists” and analysts who specialize in these areas are able to tell as much about the workings in those areas as any philosopher. For example, in the field of the economics, it is economists, if anyone, who come closer to delivering any ‘knowledge’ about economics. You might deny that economists are “scientists” in any sense of the term, but that attitude probably results for the assumption that physics is the model for the sciences, and only those disciplines which resemble physics are truly scientific. Or maybe that’s not the case?

Secondly, it would be interesting to get from Paul a few examples in which philosophers provide anything resembling ‘knowledge’ or the “ultimate truth” he mentions (i.e., anything commanding anything close to the consensus that one gets in scientific fields) in these areas which philosophers patrol and in which science has no “jurisprudence.” I’m betting that all he can supply are interesting theories and points of views, some of them helpful and even insightful, but hardly anything we can all agree is knowledge anywhere close to “ultimate truth.” To the extent that a “philosopher” approximate the goal of delivering knowledge, he will more likely than not rely on the relevant sciences and proceed scientifically.
——————————-

Some thoughts to throw into the mix:
I believe that many proponents of traditional philosophy as an alternative (and noble) form of inquiry into reality fail to distinguish between inquiry and expression. Inquiry, which includes such fields as the sciences, police investigative work, historical studies, etc. can fairly be described as a form of exploration into and theorizing regarding reality (in most cases, a limited area of reality). Here the result of successful work is knowledge of some type.

Expression, on the other hand, is what we find in the general area of the humanities. Writers, poets, dramatists, artists of all kinds, … express their views of the world, or a small piece of the world and human existence. This, I believe, is the main function not only of artists and literary people, but also of much of religion and traditional philosophy (that which is other than analytical). The writer is expressing a view of things as he sees them. Yes, sometimes valuable insights result from this, and this work can perform a valuable function for people. I certainly would not deny that! A good part of what passes for “philosophy” (traditional philosophy) falls into this expressive function. Such a philosopher can serve the interests of society and provide insights into human existence the way a great novelist or artist does.

But the view which sees the philosopher as engaged in some esoteric type of exploration into reality distorts the work of such philosophy (traditional, non-analytic philosophy) as being some mysterious pseudo-science. This notion might have be applicable in earlier periods of western history, but not today.

Of course, this is just a gloss on one view of the function/nature of philosophy. It is misleading to the extent that it suggests there is one ‘thing’ called “philosophy” which can be assigned a specific function. There are different forms of philosophical work, one of which is the “secondary type of analysis and inquiry.” There’s some work in philosophy which combines analysis and expression, and some philosophers who are as much literary artists as they are critical philosophers. But none who are truly “super-scientists” exploring reality in forbidden territories, viz. territories forbidden to scientists. Although there may be some who imagine themselves this way!

It is possible that I underestimate the possibility of objective results in such areas as metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. I leave myself open to much rebuttal on your part. Finally, I don’t claim to say all that can be said on the subject. My views are open to revision, given interesting and insightful arguments to the contrary.

Mad men and philosophers – Kant’s Unfortunate Legacy

Walt Kaufmann once faulted the great Immanuel Kant for persuading generations of philosophers (primarily Germans) that serious and important philosophy must be written in the obscure, difficult style of The Critique of Pure Reason. Many years ago I studied Kant’s great work and can attest to its mind- numbing, difficult style. I used the standard translations, which cleaned up Kant’s prose significantly; but even with this help, comprehending what Kant was saying was a gargantuan task. You walked away thinking that you needed a translation of the translation; and you did. These were provided by large numbers of secondary commentaries and studies of the Critique. Even then, the results were alternative interpretations with rival schools of thought promoting one interpretation over another, and nobody really clear on what they were saying.

Anyone who reads the continental philosophers following Kant knows that Kaufmann was correct. Many of them, primarily German and French (with some notable exceptions, e.g. Frederick. Nietzsche, Albert Camus), imitate Kant in producing the type of obscure writing that surely has caused many students headaches and sleepless nights! I give you Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre (in his philosophical works where he imitates the Germans).  Can anyone really render clear, coherent interpretations of what these people are saying?

Lately I’ve had occasion to delve into another of these German obscurantist. E-mail correspondence with a retired LB City College philosophy instructor and with a group of philosophical enthusiasts (Santa Ana Meet-up) about phenomenology have moved me to open Edmund Husserl’s work, Cartesian Meditations – An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion Cairns. This is a challenge indeed, and I can only take small doses at a time. After having struggled with the first two meditations I only get vague glimmers of what Husserl propounds as his “genuine philosophy”; something to the effect that a Cartesian-like meditation, which brings about a transcendental shift in attitude (the “epoché”) and allows examination of the structures of consciousness, is the only approach to genuine philosophy and an indubitable base for the sciences. This is what he seems to say, but don’t hold me to it!

I quote some gems of Husserliana (taken out of context, of course) to give you an idea of his far-from-transparent writing style. (Of course the English is supplied by Cairns, but I’ll bet you the German is even more obscure.)

“Owing to the instability and ambiguity of common language and it’s much too great complacency about completeness of expression, we require, even where we use its means of expression, a new legitimation of significations by orienting them according to accrued insights, and a fixing of words as expressing the significations thus legitimated. That too we account as part of our normative principle of evidence, which we shall apply consistently from now on.” (Pp.13-14)

“An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as “objectless”, empty. Furthermore the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the evidence of the unimaginableness of what is presented with evident certainty. And the same is true of every critical reflection at a higher level.” (Pp. 15-16)

“With that, another fundamental trait of intentionality is indicated. Every subjective process has a process “horizon”, which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow —an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself.” (P. 44)

Had enough? Yes, these are taken out of context. But even when read in their proper context they will be not any easier to understand, believe me! This is a really bad philosophical malady, believe me!

Dr. Bernal’s prescription: Read Gilbert Ryle’s classic work, The Concept of Mind. Try at least 10-20 pages per day. If the patient persists in using such aberrant terms as “noesis,” “noematica,” “epoché,” and “transcendental ego,” increase dose to one chapter of Ryle’s cleansing treatment per day. Patient’s thinking and language should clear up in 5-10 days, and he should be able to resume his work in sane, comprehensible philosophy.

Individual state of NONexistence??

What do Schopenhauer, Mark Twain, and Richard Dawkins have in common? They all thought that it made perfectly good sense to refer to an individual prior to birth.

Consider, first a selection for Schopenhauer’s essay “The emptiness of existence”

“A man to his astonishment all at once becomes conscious of existing after having been in a state of non-existence for many thousands of years, when, presently again, he returns to a state of non-existence for an equally long time.”

What he writes is that people have been in a “state of non-existence” for thousands of years prior to having been born. Does this imply that each individual did not exist prior to birth? Then his claim is merely that at certain periods we have not existed and at other periods we have existed. This is a harmless statement. But confusion sets in if we think that if an individual is in a particular state, the implication is that the individual should be identifiable as “an individual in that state.”

A similar idea is contained in a quote attributed to Mark Twain in a recent book by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. Dawkins quotes Twain has saying that he

“does not fear death since he was dead for millions of years prior to being born and did not suffer any from it.” (See page 354 of The God Delusion).

Did Mark Twain assume an identity of ‘death’ and ‘nonexistence’? He surely suggests that some entity, namely Mark Twain, could be identified as being dead for millions of years prior to birth.

And finally, Richard Dawkins, evolutionary scientists and critic of religion, makes similar statements in his 1998 book Unweaving the Rainbow and then repeats much the same in his later book The God Delusion. He refers to the billions of people who were not lucky enough to be born.

He opens the first chapter of Rainbow book with the following observations:

We are going to die, and that makes us the lucky ones. Most people are never going to die because they are never going to born. The potential people who could have been here in my place but who will in fact never see the light of day outnumber the sand grains of Arabia. Certainly those unborn ghosts include greater poets than Keats, scientists greater than Newton. (p.1, op.cit., Houghton Mifflin Co., N.Y., 1992) [my highlighting]

And in The God Delusion he writes referring to his earlier book:

I tried to convey how lucky we are to be alive, given that the vast majority of people who could potentially be thrown up by the combinatorial lottery of DNA will in fact never be born. For those of us lucky enough to be here, ….[h]owever brief our time in the sun,  if we waste a second of it, or complain that it is dull or barren or ..boring, couldn’t this be seen as a callous insult to those unborn trillions who will never have been offered life in the first place?  (God Delusion, p. 161)

Is Dawkins telling us that there is a vast crowd (trillions) of unborn people (or “ghosts”), who were not lucky enough to get born and who can be insulted by us if we don’t appreciate our good fortune? Yes, this is what he appears to say.

Does it really make sense to refer to individuals who were in some mysterious way somewhere (in a state of nonexistence) prior to birth, as Schopenhauer, Mark Twain, and Richard Dawkins do?

Caveat: The remarks by Schopenhauer, Twain and Dawkins are just ways of getting us into the subject. Did they really believe that disembodied ghosts existed prior to birth or will exist after death? It is doubtful that either Twain or Dawkins actually believed that. However, Schopenhauer, who reportedly had great interest in the Hindu religion-philosophy, likely accepted the idea of reincarnation, hence, likely believed in a prior life. But the important point, for this discussion, is that they assume that reference to such existence is not problematic.

Preliminary sorting out:

Sometimes we opt for wordiness over succinctness and say things like “I am in a state of loneliness” when we could have said simply “I am lonely.” Sometimes it seems more appropriate, as when we say “He is a state of depression” rather than merely “He is depressed.” Although some of this practice may involve more words than necessary, it is correct and unproblematic. “Henry is in state ecstasy” implies that Henry exists and is the appropriate type of entity to be ecstatic.

Someone might qualify Schopenhauer’s statement as simply using more words than needed: that he only meant to say “Before birth I did not exist.” On this reading we don’t see him as making reference to a subject capable of a strange state of non-existence before birth. Schopenhauer merely states that he did not exist for thousands of years prior to being born and will not exist for thousands of years following his death. The problem with this ‘interpretation’ is that, in the same essay, Schopenhauer follows with these remarks:

“Of every event in our life it is only for a moment that we can say that it is; after that we must say for ever that it was. Every evening makes us poorer by a day. It would probably make us angry to see this short space of time slipping away, if we were not secretly conscious in the furthest depths of our being that the spring of eternity belongs to us, and that in it we are always able to have life renewed.”

The mention of an “eternity which belongs to us” and our ability to have “life renewed” suggest that Schopenhauer really meant to refer to a period when he was in a state of non-existence, having some kind of reality. Just as being in state of depression requires a subject who is depressed, so being in a state of nonexistence calls for a ‘subject’ who is real somehow but does not exist.

The remark attributed to Mark Twain also implies a subject’s “presence” in the period prior to birth. ‘Twain’ reportedly said that he was dead for millions of years prior to being born and he did not suffer any from it. Now we have a subject in a state of nonexistence (death?) for millions of years who did not suffer. The remark doesn’t merely state that the man called “Twain” did not exist during that long period; it suggests that ‘Twain’, as an entity of some sort, was ‘there’ and did not suffer. The implication is that an entity (a ghost? spirit?), whose temporal extension exceeds that of the earthly, mortal Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens), had a reality of some kind prior to the birth of the earth-bound Mark Twain.

Another point to notice is that both Schopenhauer and “Twain” assume that death and non-existence are equivalent. I was “dead” prior to being born, says ‘Twain’; and someday (at death) I will return to the same state of nonexistence that I knew prior to birth, says Schopenhauer. When applied to an organism (such as a human), “death” implies a preceding period of life. Generally speaking, only an organism that has lived can properly be said to die. I will someday experience death and will no longer exist; but in the 1930s I did not exist at all, but I wasn’t dead.

With the passage by Richard Dawkins, we hear about “unborn trillions” of people who were not lucky enough to get born and who will be insulted if we lucky ones who were born squander the gift of life. Obviously Dawkins was speaking metaphorically, but his metaphor has a point only if we refer to un-born individuals in some state of ‘non-existence.’ Someone might argue that he was merely referring to the fact that at any period after humans evolved many more people could have been born than were actually born. But in this case, Dawkins misleads us by making reference to those unborn “ghosts” who are “unlucky” and insulted by our lack of appreciation for the gift of life.

By analogy, the fact that Bill’s parents chose in 1945 to postpone pregnancy until 1954 (when Bill was born) allows us to say that an offspring “Billy” or “Hillary” potentially could have been born in 1945. But it does not allow us to say that a potential offspring was somehow present in 1945, who might be classified as fortunate or unfortunate, depending on our perspective of things.

On the basis of Dawkins’ own statements, the reader could justifiably conclude that Dawkins — the great evolutionary scientist and skeptic regarding fantasy and the supernatural — believes in the reality of “unborn millions” who reside in some mysterious dimensions. I’m sure that Dawkins would protest.

We see then how our three figures (philosopher, writer, scientist) apparently make reference to individuals (entities?) who existed prior to birth, and by the same pattern of thought, will exist after death of the body.

Elaboration of the skeptical response:

Any skeptic or materialist worth his salt will raise a series of questions regarding the prevalent view that, although we cannot produce proof that this picture of prior existence is factual, it is nonetheless coherent and ‘possible.’

People assume that we can coherently talk about a subject (an “I”) who has continuity beyond (both prior and following) the earthly period between birth and death. But it has not been made clear what this “continuity” consists of. Is it a personal continuity? Spiritual? The mind or consciousness? The eternal soul (of religions)? A psychological continuity: memories, tendencies, tastes and preferences?

Any philosophical examination of the key concepts and terms will result in questions regarding the continuity-unity of the subject; the way in which this subject can be identified as one and the same. In additions, there are questions about how we differentiate between different subjects in this strange, spiritual dimension. Finally there are basic questions about the place or location for these multitudes.

With regard to Schopenhauer’s man, who is purportedly identifiable as a particular being that was in a prior state of non-existence, we can ask: Was he really aware of “having been in a state of prior non-existence”? How could he identify this continuous being, who was aware of having been in a prior state? In other words, how would he show identity, continuity and unity? (“I am the same guy who was back then…”)

With regard to the “Twain” character, we have someone who allegedly ‘remembers’ a prior period of non- existence and ‘remembers’ not having suffered any from it. The skeptic could ask: How can he know he did not suffer? By having no memory of it; presumably: he does not remember having suffered. How could we verify accuracy of his memory? Why does he assimilate ‘death’ and ‘non-existence’? This seems to be a conceptual error.

Thirdly, we have the passages by Richard Dawkins in which he refers to many potential people (“ghosts”) who were never born, who were not fortunate enough to be born, and who vastly outnumber those who were born and enjoy earthly life.

By implication, we have a large set of multiple, potential people waiting somewhere (in some place) for the possibility of being born. They are such that can be differentiated from each other and counted. The easiest way of conceiving this is to think of them as quasi-spatial-physical entities located in some quasi-spatial world (place).

Questions: If there is a place where these “unborn souls” await, where is this place? How do we know about this place? If there is no such quasi-spatial place, then the realm where the souls await is purely spiritual. If purely spiritual, then how would they be differentiated as comprising multitudes? How can they be differentiated and counted?

Does Dawkins merely commit the error of moving uncritically from the premise that ‘there might have been many persons’ (potentially millions more births could have occurred)”
to asserting that “there was a vast number of potential persons” (millions of potential ‘people’)?
In other words, does he move from “possibly X could be here”
to “a possible ‘X’ is here”? If so, this is conceptual muddle. For example, while it is true that in 1960 I could have remained in Colorado instead of moving to California (which in fact happened), it is conceptually misleading and confused to say that after 1960 a potential ‘Juan’ (a “ghost”) remained in Colorado.

Because of such questions and doubts, the skeptic has reason for thinking that talk of ‘disembodied’ existence, while widespread and ‘natural’ to the most people, may not even be conceptually coherent. Hence, such existence may not point to a real possibility after all.
Concerning all this talk of disembodied existence, states of nonexistence, states of being prior to birth and after death, I prefer the attitude of Epicurus who is quoted as saying:

“Where death is, I am not. Where I am, death is not.”