Monthly Archives: March 2010

Evil Does Not Exist?

At a recent meeting of our local Humanist group we heard two guest speakers from the Bahai faith. Their talk was interesting and informative regarding this religion, one which most of us do not know very well. I was particularly interested in one remark regarding evil and suffering in the world. One of the speakers repeated a principle of the Bahai faith that evil is the absence of good, and has no positive reality in itself. Hence, for the Bahai there is no problem of evil.

You’re probably familiar with the problem that evil in the world presents for major mono-theistic faiths. The problem can stated in terms of “Epicurus’ old questions”:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? If so, then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence evil?”

[From David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ]

The Bahai ‘solution’ to the question of evil represents one way taken by a number of advocates of religious theism in the history of this problem. A number of theologians and religious philosophers have argued that evil really does not exist, but is only the absence of positive reality.

However, for many others, including people of religious faith, this simply is not a ‘solution’. It is undeniably a fact that humans inflict evil on others. The suffering resulting from war, torture, even genocide, and gross injustice – all these are real. How can anyone be content to assert that only good things really exist (such as moral virtue and intellectual excellence) and bad aspects of life, such as evil, suffering, and ignorance really don’t exist? Surely this simply flies in the face of the facts of reality. Suffering, disease, persecution, and genocide are neither fiction, fantasy, nor illusion. They really happen to real people, whether we admit their reality or not.

Great literature and great art can bring home these unwelcome facts of life. For example, in his great novel, The Brothers Karamazov, (1879-80) Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote an emotionally wrenching exchange between two Karamozov brothers, Ivan and Alyosha (“Rebellion”). Ivan takes up the case of the horrendous suffering of children, something he cannot accept as justifiable or subject to theological, philosophical explanation. Even if someone were to prove that children’s suffering was a necessary condition for achievement of ultimate harmony, he would reject that ‘truth.’ The suffering of one innocent child cannot be justified by a higher purpose or harmony to be achieved, and certainly cannot simply declared to lack reality.

A recent PBS Drama “God On Trial” (2008) brings to life the ordeal of Jewish men imprisoned at Nazi death camp (Auschwitz) and awaiting execution. They put God on trail on charge of violating the covenant with the Jewish people. In the process we get a dramatic presentation of the indescribable evil inflicted on humans by other humans.

The implication that Ivan’s impassioned cries in the piece “Rebellion” and the profound search for meaning and explanation in face of Nazi evil by the victims at Auschwitz really do not refer to a positive reality is simply unacceptable. Resorting to the comforting belief that evil lacks reality simply will not do! When we try to make rational sense of human reality, evil and horrendous, suffering are factors we cannot wish away.

Charles Rulon: Was Roe vs. Wade a Mistake?

In this set of remarks, my friend Charles Rulon, exposes and refutes several falsehoods that we often hear concerning the landmark court decision on abortion: Roe vs. Wade.

Was Roe v. Wade a Mistake?

1. Claim: Roe v. Wade was liberal judicial activism:
Reply: If the constitutional protection of our individual rights means anything, then the freedom to decide whether or not to endure pregnancy must be deemed a fundamental right. The Roe v. Wade opinion was written by Justice Blackmun, a conservative Republican appointed to the Court by President Richard M. Nixon. Also supporting Roe was Chief Justice Warren Burger (also a conservative and a Nixon appointee) and conservative Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell.

2. Claim: Very few competent experts agreed with Roe:
False. In 1989 a “friend of the court” brief was filed on behalf of 885 American law professors who held that the right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear a child is an essential component of constitutional liberty and privacy. Trying to force women with unwanted pregnancies to be little more than breeding machines — embryo incubators against their will — is a fundamental freedom issue; it’s essentially a female enslavement or bondage issue that has no place in any 21st century scientifically literate, ethically advanced society.

3. Regarding the fact that the “right to abort” does not appear in the U.S. Constitution:
Neither do phrases like “freedom of thought” or “parenthood rights” or “liberty of association” or “freedom of marital choice”. The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates by a vote of 238 to 106 approved a resolution in 1990 expressing the ABA’s recognition that “the fundamental rights of privacy and equality guaranteed by the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution” encompasses “the decision to terminate a pregnancy.” In fact, when the U.S. Constitution speaks of persons, it is quite obviously referring to just one definition of person, those already born. For example, the 14th Amendment says that all persons born in the United States are citizens, not “all persons conceived”. Our Constitution is a living document with many amendments added over the years, not a stagnant archaic parchment steeped in the ignorance and prejudices of two hundred years ago.

4. Regarding equality under the law:
We have laws that protect us from being forced to use our bodies against our will to keep other people alive (such as being forced to give blood, or bone marrow). These laws are strongly supported by society. Yet, anti-choice activists want to force women with unwanted pregnancies to use their bodies against their will to keep unwanted mindless embryos alive. Thus, laws restricting access to abortion forcefully discriminate against women. They place a real and substantial burden on women’s ability to participate in society as equals.

5. Regarding disrespect for the law:
Restrictive abortion laws have never stopped the large majority of abortions anywhere on earth (including the U.S.) according to a 2007 study from the Guttmacher Institute and the World Health Organization. Instead, such laws have brought about widespread disrespect for the law and have criminalized millions of desperate women each year who’ve attempted to self-abort or sought out dangerous illegal abortions.

6. Regarding the claim that abortion murders pre-born babies:
Embryos are not babies. The vast majority of Americans know this. That’s why they DON’T want women who elect to abort to be sent to prison as accomplices to murder, not even for a day!

Charles L. Rulon, Emeritus, Life & Health Sciences, Long Beach City College

Stumbling Around and Mumbling about Metaphysics

…metaphysics is that division of philosophy that deals with first principles and seeks to explain the nature of being or reality (ontology), and deals with the origin and structure of the world (cosmology). It is closely related to the study of epistemology.

From Webster’s definition of “metaphysics”
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Metaphysics has also often been called “speculative philosophy.”

Question: If one attempts to clarify and explain the nature of human existence, is one doing a type of metaphysics?

The same question can be posed concerning attempts to explain what we mean by the self and mind.

Questions and issues such as those concerning “language and the world,” “science and truth,” and “religious culture and truth” may also be part of a contemporary effort in metaphysics. But this would have to be clarified.

Let’s try a working “definition” of metaphysics: for much of modern, critical philosophy: it is an attempt to sort out and clarify concepts like ‘reality,’ ’existence,’ ‘truth,’ ‘matter,’ ‘mind,’ ‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘cause-effect.’ It is a project in conceptual analysis and explication.

Traditionally, metaphysics has been the attempt to explain the nature of reality, or to give a comprehensive picture of reality; or to show all that is presupposed by our language and concepts regarding the world, or to disclose the reality that underlies appearances or the phenomenal world.

Of course, today, many hold that constructive, speculative metaphysical systems are rendered obsolete by the work of the sciences, both natural and social. (Of course!)

For a good, philosophical treatment of the subject see Bruce Aune, Metaphysics, The Elements.

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Questions and thoughts after reading Reuben Hersh’s book
What is Mathematics, Really?

Does mathematics discover truths about a super-sensible realm (Platonism) or is mathematics just a very complex, logical game (Formalism)?

Reuben Hersh points out that work in well-established regions of mathematics is much like discovering new ‘facts’; whereas innovative work that results in new theorems and new insights is akin to creative work (inventions?).

Suppose we think of math as a structure. What kind of structure is it? Is it analogous to the Himalayas and the Grand Canyon? Alternatively, is it analogous to the skyscrapers of New York City?

Mathematics is in part a structure (an object?) and in part a process. The term “object” connotes some stability and endurance.

Hersh’s discussion of the difference between object (a ‘continuant’) and process is relevant to any attempt to analyze (describe) reality. (A song and a symphony can each be understood as an “object” and, alternatively, as a process.)

On some interpretations, modern physics implies that all physical-material reality can be described as processes, that there are no such things as static objects. (..unless we allow mathematical objects).

Time is an important factor: Over a relatively short time a person may seem to be an object. (It seems correct to say that persons are entities enjoying an objective, real existence.) But over longer periods of time a person’s existence is more of a process: infant, child, youth, adult, middle aged, and oldster. (“time-worms”?)

Intuitively we take a body as an object, but more accurately it is a body-in-process.

Mathematics and religion (theology) contribute to our habit of seeing ultimate reality as a grand object, deity as an absolute, transcendent object. We then tend to overlook aspect of reality which is process.

[“Human existence is a process in which objects come and go.”]

Our reality features processes, events, happenings and constantly changing scenes.
In some cases, we see a progression, a movement towards a goal. Time plays a crucial role.

Quantum physics tells us that at the sub-atomic level the distinction between process and object-hood disappears. And at the atomic level, things (atoms) seem ambiguous between process and object-hood.
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Language and thought reify the world:
Can we say that most things that we recognize as (categorize as) objects are really objects-in-process? (Didn’t Immanuel Kant teach us that categorization precedes recognition?) For example, language categorizes things (cup, house, tree, dog) as objects having relative stability and endurance. But over a relatively longer period of time, they are more clearly processes. Time is an important factor.

We think of the human brain itself (the human nervous system) as an entity, but surely the brain (nervous system) is an organ (organism?) in process.

It is our thinking and our language that categorize the world into entities and relatively static objects. In actual reality most likely nothing is static. (No physical entity is ultimately static!)

Maybe processes-events, rather than objects, should be seen as the “constituents” of the world.
(Was this Whitehead’s metaphysical philosophy? Did Bertrand Russell also view reality this way, in one of his many philosophical phases?)

The natural universe is a vast, magnificent process. Within it, an individual life is just a very brief interlude.
(With apologies to Shakespeare: An individual life, a poor player who stumbles on stage and mumbles a few lines, a few insignificant lines, and then is extinguished.)

Is reality an interplay between limited stability and endurance, on the one hand, and process (dynamism, change), on the other?

By means of abstraction (language, concepts, mathematics) we impose the illusion of stability on a fluid reality.

The illusion of stability (and objectivity?) ignores the crucial role that time plays. [Did Plato have an aversion to time and change?]

“You cannot step into the same river twice.” (Heraclitus?) On subsequent entries, both the river and you have changed. In a strict sense of “same” the river is no longer the same and the subject is no longer the same. Endurance, stability, object-hood are relative concepts. Are they ultimately illusions?

How much stability and endurance are required to apply the term “same thing”?

Our sense faculties, our brain, and our language categorize aspects of our experience into objects (things that have stability and stand apart from our experience. (e.g. the cup and pencil on my desk, my very desk itself).

Over a relatively short period of time, one may correctly (in a practical sense) refer to such things as “objects,” having some stability and endurance. But over longer periods of time, it is more correct, more accurate, to refer to these ‘things’ as mere phases of a long process. (A some point in time, they were manufactured out of other material; for a time they have endured as familiar objects: pencil, cup, desk. But later they will break down, deteriorate, decompose, and the material composing them will become parts of other processes.)

By extension, the same can be said about our entire world (the world that we experience) and the same can be said about ourselves (humanity).
[Related notions here: entropy, slippage, “the wearing-down effect of time”]

Absolutely objective, stable, enduring existence is reserved for God, Platonic realms and mathematical ‘objects’. Here we have the “timeless” realm of theologians, Plato and Platonic mathematicians and certain metaphysicians. [Mathematical ‘objects’ are better described as “tense-less.”]

Physicists tell us that entropy is a diminishing of heat-energy-organization.

There are temporary suspensions of entropy (a temporary hold on “slippage”):
There is a modicum of stability within a context of persistent change.
There is enough stability for culture and language to take hold.
Our biological nature (nervous system), our culture and language build a working world, but underlying this is a reality of evolution, unceasing process and change.
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Some writers (e.g. Bruce Aune, Metaphysics, The Elements ) divide up the subject of metaphysics as follows:

a) Ontology – analysis of the general category of ‘being.’ Associated concepts are those of ‘reality,’ ‘existence.’ This is an attempt to say what the general nature of reality is. Sometimes it will also involve the distinction between concrete and abstract reality, and that between appearance and reality.

b) Special metaphysical issues such as those of determinism and freedom; material and mental existence; nature of personal identity; God and spiritual realms; reality and appearance.

Metaphysical philosophy cannot be advanced independently attention to epistemological issues. But many enthusiasts of metaphysics and mystery forget this.

Let me recommend a scientific metaphysics: reality is substantially what the sciences say it is.

Reality is what is disclosed by the natural sciences, historical sciences, empirical investigation and rational inquiry.

Of course, there are dissenters. Some serious and philosophically interesting; some starry-eyed, undisciplined and given to rhapsody. The world, whether object or process, is large enough for all of us.

The Expansion of Brooklyn and Puzzles about Physics

Recently I heard an exchange concerning some of the mysteries of theoretical physics. Two friends, Raul and Samuel, exchanged views on one of the paradoxes of QM found in an article, “The quantum world,” which appeared in Newsweek a few years ago.

Raul: …. how on earth can the electrons go through the slits and THEN have the blinds opened? The time for that to occur is in nanoseconds I would imagine. Can physicists really “fool” the electrons in the way described? Is it possible that the future could effect the present? That would mean the future is really already here in some sense. At any rate, it boggles the mind!

Samuel: Not only do we have a wave-particle duality, but we also have the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (uncertain what that is?). I have tried to argue with you that — with Special & General Relativity, superstrings, higher dimensions, & brane theory — the future exists (as well as ‘will exist’); I went on to argue that a Transcendent Super-Entity that existed in higher dimensions could sense the future as well as the past and thus sense/detect what ‘will’ happen & thus It knows our Future. But the future can never influence the present – otherwise, causality is destroyed!

Raul and Samuel left me in a state of bewilderment. “Higher Dimensions,” “brane theory,” and “the future already existing”?! Add this to the idea that the future can affect the present and we’re really lost?! My head was spinning!

Then I recalled Alvy’s mother and decided it was time to consult with her.

Remember her, from the Woody Allen movie “Annie Hall”?

Below is the text from the opening scene in Annie Hall when the mother has taken the young Alvy Singer to the family doctor:

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MOTHER: He’s been depressed. All of a sudden he can’t do anything.

DOCTOR: Why are you depressed, Alvie?

MOTHER: Tell Dr. Flicker. [Answers for him.] It’s something he read.

DOCTOR: Something he read, huh?

ALVY: [Head down.] The universe is expanding.

DOCTOR: The universe is expanding?

ALVY: Well, the universe is everything, and if it’s expanding, someday it will break apart and that will be the end of everything!

MOTHER: What, is that your business? [Then, to the doctor.] He stopped doing his homework.

ALVY: What’s the point?
….
MOTHER: What has the universe to do with it? You’re here in Brooklyn, and Brooklyn is not expanding!

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I like Alvy’s mother. She tells it like it is. BROOKLYN IS NOT EXPANDING and THE FUTURE DOES NOT INFLUENCE THE PAST!
So stop worrying and do your homework!

In all seriousness, admittedly quantum physics presents us with tough paradoxes. But it is a mistake to translate the language and formulations of the world of sub-atomic particles (where the arrow of time is irrelevant) to the world of macro-size objects. Our evolved brains/minds, our natural languages, and our intuitive concepts do not apply to the quantum world. Any attempt to apply them results in paradoxes and nonsense.

But this shouldn’t surprise or alarm anyone, right? Listen to Alvy’s mother!

Remarks on determinism and causal explanation

The philosophy of materialism holds that all scientific explanation is done in physical terms; but this should not be read as implying that the materialist claims that reality is structured according to a mechanistic, causal scheme. Someone advancing the philosophy of materialism does not need to assume universal causation. The propositions that reality is causally structured and that all events are linked in a universal chain of cause-and-effect are metaphysical propositions which are not principles of sciences. They can be omitted from a philosophy of materialism. So where does this leave determinism, the view that generally events are connected in cause-effect schemes?

Rather than being a metaphysical claim about the structure of the universe, determinism can be stated as a guiding principle for some scientific and rational inquiry. This principle states that, more often than not, rational inquiry or scientific investigation proceeds as the search for causal explanations. Of course, an exception must be kept in mind: a good number of the sciences, including modern physics, do not always proceed this way.

Causal explanation applies the concepts of cause and effect. As N.R. Hanson points out (see his book, Patterns of Discovery), this type of explanatory scheme is both conceptually- and theory-laden. This means that when we identify an event as cause (or consequence), we presuppose specific understanding of the relevant concepts and theories. Seeing natural events in terms of causal connections is not a simple seeing devoid of theory.

From N.R. Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery:

“..what we refer to as causes is theory-loaded from beginning to end.” (54)
“The terms of physics .. resemble “pawn,” “rook,” “trump,” and “offside”–words which are meaningless except against a background of the games of chess, bridge and football.” (57)

“Seeing what causes a clock’s action requires more than normal vision, open eyes, and a clock: we must learn what to look for.” (59) . . . The chain account [of causality] obscures this by ignoring it: it treats the world as a simple Meccano construction with observers and cameras. But causes are no more visual data simpliciter than are facts. Nothing in sense-datum space could be labeled ‘cause’ and ‘effect.’ (59) [Recall David Hume’s arguments in this light.]

“Causes certainly are connected with effects; but this is because our theories connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue. The world may be glued together by imponderables, but that is irrelevant for understanding causal explanation. The notions behind ‘the cause of x’ and ‘the effect of y’ are intelligible only against a pattern of theory, namely one which puts guarantees on inferences from x to y.” (64) . . “That happenings are often related as cause and effect need not mean that the universe is shackled with ineffable chains, but it does mean that experience and reflexion have given us good reason to expect a Y every time we confront an X.” (65)

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Norton’s point seems to be that the causal scheme is a conceptual scheme (theory-laden) which philosophers apply to nature. Like many conceptual schemes, it results as much from what we bring to experience as from the actual connections in nature. Furthermore, the scheme of universal, causal determinism is an optional model of nature, one that may or may not be correct.

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The cause-effect scheme, applicable to many real happenings in the world, is itself a conceptual scheme that humans apply in order to achieve some understanding of reality. This conceptual scheme itself is subject to rational critique and evaluation.

When it is applied to certain areas of reality, the cause-effect scheme works much like an empirical proposition. We can observe causal connections that hardly anyone would question, e.g. physical happenings like billiard ball examples, relations between temperature and pressure, sunlight and organic growth, and such.

Of course, even in the physical realm, evidence of these causal connections will vary. In some cases, few would question the claim that specific happening has an identifiable cause, e.g., the billiards ball case. In other cases, we operate on the assumption that the event in question has a specific cause(s), although we might not be able to identify the cause, for example, the result of a coin flip.

In other areas, such as those of human actions and social phenomena, although few deny general application of the cause-effect scheme, specification of cause-effect becomes even more questionable. The cause-effect scheme functions more like a presupposition of our attempts to explain things rather than following directly from observation. Hence, we might have cases in which we do not know, and have no way of learning, the actual cause(s) of the event or action, but assume that there must be such a cause. [See N.W. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Chapter 3 - Causality.]

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The claim that “all events are causally determined” refers primarily to our explanatory scheme. In order to explain and understand event ‘B’, we look for causal condition “A” which explains ‘B’. [For example, the cause of his illness was the yesterday’s insect bite.] Given an adequate knowledge of event “A” (insect bite) one could infer ‘B’ (subsequent illness). Does this imply a claim as to the nature of reality, vis-a-vis ‘B’? It could, in part, but we should not get carried away. In some cases, such as that of the insect bite and consequential illness, this connection can be established by the applicable science.

But in other cases, the connection is not so clear. For example, when “D” is ‘the decision to invade Iraq’ and “C” is ‘the set of events and conditions preceding the decision’ the causal connection is controversial. Here it is obvious that we are dealing with a conceptual issue. Given certain conceptual presuppositions and a common intellectual culture (assumptions, language), we claim (along with all those who participate in our intellectual culture) that C caused D. Have we thereby shown that ‘C caused D’? Have we shown that this “causal connection” follows from our knowledge the structure of reality? At the very least, this is a debatable proposition concerning “D” (decision to invade Iraq) and “C” (set of conditions and events preceding the decision).

How could anyone ever show that the structure of reality implies that, given “C”, it was inevitable that GW Bush would decide to invade Iraq? The proposition becomes even more doubtful, even verging on nonsense, when the claim is that everything that happens, all historical, psychological, cultural events, all individual actions and such, are inevitable. All this seems part and parcel of a metaphysical philosophy that advances certain, unexamined propositions purporting to describe the structure of reality. (?)

Other than theoretical presuppositions and philosophical assumptions, there aren’t any compelling reasons for asserting that the simple, mechanistic cause-effect scheme describes the structure of all physical reality, much less the structure of all biological, psychological, social and cultural reality.

Work in the following areas would not have advanced much if the controlling principle had been the assumption of simple, mechanistic cause-effect in all of nature: quantum physics, relativity physics, biological sciences, evolutionary theory of natural selection – genetics, etc

Much work in theoretical physics is based on mathematical models, rather than a cause-effect scheme. Any scientist relying on a strictly deterministic picture of the universe would soon find that he was unable to explain all the genuine and apparent randomness in nature, both at the quantum level and at the macro level.

Finally in the areas of the social sciences and humanities, the assumption of a simple cause-effect scheme is of limited usefulness, and the notion “ultimate inevitability” is not helpful at all. Can anyone seriously propose that we could explain such phenomena as history, culture, the arts, literary genius, religious phenomena, etc. as simply inevitable chains of causally-conditioned events?

In Defense of Ethical Naturalism

An email correspondent, call him “Sam”, argued against ethical naturalism as follows:

Naturalistic Ethical philosophy can advance conditional imperatives, but I don’t see how it could sanction a categorical imperative. Ethical Naturalists (“EN” for short) can say, “Be compassionate, because in the long run you’ll be happier,” but they cannot say “Be compassionate, period.” So ENs cannot sanction compassion in every circumstance, but only in those circumstances where the expected advantage has a realistic chance of occurring.

Many moral acts are sanctioned by law (laws against fraud). But is there anything which obligates us to obey law? Maybe the desire to be a good, honest citizen? But what do we say about situations where the desire for some other good (security, wealth, power) is stronger than the desire to be a good citizen? What, if anything, obligates our obedience to the law in those situations?

ENs (ethical naturalists) may have many reasons for wanting to seem virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. But do they have any reason that obligates them to be virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances? If they do, it’s a reason that cannot easily fit within their metaphysical framework.

Suppose that the naturalist has had some kind of intuition or intellectual insight telling him that virtue or a good will is an absolute good. He may then continue believing that he’s a naturalist, but in actuality he is no longer a naturalist. For he has presumed an absolute, and in nature there are no absolutes.

I propose a rejoinder to Sam’s claims about the limits of “naturalism.”

First, I have some doubt about his example of “sanctioning compassion”:
Can anyone or anything sanction compassion? Can we demand or obligate people to be compassionate? Isn’t compassion something you feel for others, more an aspect of your character or personality than a response to an external sanction? There is the possibility of training or educating people so that they eventually come to feel compassion for others; but genuine compassion is not something you can impose on people. At best, you might be able to sanction behavior which approximates compassionate behavior; and maybe that’s good enough.

Now, to the substance of Sam’s case:

According to Sam, naturalism lacks any grounds for issuance of categorical imperatives. It cannot impose unconditional obligations to act virtuously, but only conditional imperatives to act virtuously when doing so will result in desirable consequences.

“Naturalists may have many reasons for wanting to seem virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. But I don’t think they have any reason that obligates them to be virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. Or, if they do, it’s a reason that cannot easily fit within their metaphysical framework”
This is because, “in nature there are no absolutes.”

In short, according to Sam, moral absolutes are not available to naturalists, as naturalists. They could not justify the goal of trying to be virtuous under all circumstances.

Let’s take an example: the act of torturing babies. Naturalists could never justifiably hold that such an act is wrong in all circumstances. That would involve an absolutist sanction, which naturalist cannot support. Hence, any naturalist who holds that torturing babies is always a moral wrong is hiding some non-naturalistic principles in his closet.

I have serious doubts about this line of argument. It seems that Sam equates ‘naturalism’ with a type of consequentialist ethics which requires that all moral values be justified in terms of consequences, which will vary so much that no moral rule (such as that forbidding the torture of babies) could be unconditional. (This is a common tactic used by supernaturalists against secular moralists.)

There are a number of replies to this, of which I give two:

(1) A Utilitarian could argue for a rule utilitarianism which asserts nearly unconditional rules (for all real-world circumstances) as ultimately justified in terms of the well-being of society. It’s very hard to imagine circumstances in which the torture of infants would be admissible. The fact that you don’t get a metaphysical absolute becomes largely irrelevant on a moral plain, although it might be interesting to those prone to engage in metaphysical speculation.

(2) By nature (evolution of the tribe, kinship, parental instincts and feelings), cultural development, training, education, experience and such] — individuals come to acquire strong feelings of compassion for other human beings, especially helpless, innocent infant. These strong feelings and concerns —along with practical, rational, social considerations— lead to strong, unassailable rules against the torture of babies. It is hard (practically impossible) to imagine circumstance in which we would over-ride such moral rules against the torture of innocents. This “quasi-absoluteness” of moral rule is good enough. The philosophical observation that metaphysical absoluteness is not obtainable becomes mostly academic and irrelevant. In other words, the viability of the secular, naturalistic ethical philosophy is not much affected by the metaphysical qualms that some ‘philosophers’ might feel.

Final note: The advocate of moral transcends imagines that he possesses those absolutes which allows for genuine categorical imperatives. But these ‘absolutes’ ultimately turn out to be very human in origin, based (as they are for naturalists) on experience, conditioning, and specific, human theological interpretations of codes attributed to supernatural authority, but which can be traced to some human or group of humans. Ultimately, the ‘absolutes’ of the religious authoritarian are in the same category with the ‘absolutes’ of any human-based morality.

‘Jesus’ and NBA Legends – Can we expose the fact hidden in myth?

The teachings of the Jewish sage, Yeshua, are converted into a Hellenized doctrine, which itself is transformed a few centuries later into a Roman institution.
By analogy, a future legend converts two players, Wilt Chamberlain and Bill Russell, into a basketball miracle worker, ‘Russell-Chamberlain.’

a 21st century wag

Problem Presented:

Even a religious skeptic might allow that a person, Jesus, existed, if by ‘Jesus’ we understand the male person who lived and taught in the first century around the regions of Galilee and Jerusalem, who attracted a following, practiced a form of faith healing and was executed by authorities (Romans?). A reasonable hunch is that likely such an individual did exist, and that he is the basis for the ‘Jesus’ of the Gospels — which is a composite figure, for sure. Of course, the issue would remain as to the distance between the putative historical figure and the ‘Jesus’ depicted in the New Testament. Recall that the ‘Jesus’ of the synoptics (Mark, Matthew, Luke) is a very different figure from the ‘Jesus’ of the gospel John; and the “Christ” figure of Paul’s writings different from the prior two.

Any cursory look at relevant scholarship on the issue indicates that there are great differences between different versions of ‘Jesus’. This brings us to the problem of identity. Even when we grant that most likely there was a historical ‘Jesus’ — it is very difficult, maybe impossible, to establish which of our numerous references and descriptions might be accurate.

Supposing that could expose the historical fact regarding this person ‘Jesus’ we would have to dig through numerous strata of religious doctrine, myth, legends (oral and written), and political perspectives. Even for the dedicated, critically minded scholar-historian, the flesh-and-blood person who walked the hills of Galilee remains mostly lost in the fog cast by subsequent doctrinal and political development and historical events.

Sometimes analogies help to shed more light on the point one tries to make. Let us try the following analogies.

Inconsistent references or reports:

Suppose that you and I are reminiscing and seem to recall that we both knew a particular individual fifty years ago, call him “Bill.” I ‘recall’ that Bill was a younger school mate (a class two years behind ours) and that he was an All-State football player, but a poor student academically. But you ‘recall’ that Bill was older (graduated ahead of us), did not play football, but was an outstanding musician and consistently on the honor role. Surely our first suspicion would be that (besides having faulty memories) we’re referring to different individuals when we use the name “Bill.” A second suspicion might be that neither of us really knows what he is talking about; that each of us has constructed a fictional person “Bill” based on bits and pieces of memories that we haven’t sorted out well. Maybe the ‘Bill’ we think we remember never existed. .

Reports inconsistent with known facts:

We agree on what we remember of Bill (of fifty years ago) and we agree that he was a veteran of the war in Vietnam. But fifty years ago the war in Vietnam had not yet happened. So as we ponder this disturbing fact, we begin to suspect that the ‘Bill’ (Vietnam War veteran) that we think we ‘remember’ could not have existed, that we have confused him with someone else or are simply wrong when we refer to this ‘Bill.’

Mixing of facts, fiction, legends, and myths:

You and I have a fairly clear idea who Bill was and what he did (and did not do) fifty years ago. But then we hear some persistent stories about Bill that are circulating among the younger set, people who were too young to have known and interacted with Bill. These stories seem to refer to the same person —Bill who lived fifty years ago in our home town— but the stories describe a very different person from the Bill we knew. This other ‘Bill’ is credited with doing a number of things that we know he did not do (and could not have done). The younger folk even have a club, founded on what they see as the teachings of Bill, which has attracted many people and has done much to help people . . . . . However, despite the good works done in the name of “Bill, we conclude that, with regard to historical fact, the younger folks do not know what they’re talking about, that they have concocted a fictional or legendary ‘Bill’ loosely associated with the real Bill we knew but who (as described by the younger set) really did not exist.
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A Confusion Easily Resolved:

A few years ago an email correspondent and I discussed the merits and demerits of Kobe Bryant, Los Angeles Laker star player. I compared Bryant to Bill Russell, the Boston Celtic great who led his team to a record number of NBA championships. I felt that as a team player who could make his team mates better players and work a team into a winning outfit, Russell was incomparable. In rebuttal, my correspondent then pointed out that I had forgotten to mention Russell’s 100 point game and his 50 point scoring average. Of course, what happened was that my friend had mixed up Wilt Chamberlain’s exploits mixed with Bill Russell’s. We quickly corrected and clarified the matter.

But we could do this because Russell and Chamberlain played only forty years ago, and we were there, so to speak (both of us being over 60 years of age and long-time NBA fans). We remember from first-hand experience who these great centers were, which teams they played for, and what they accomplished. And even if our memory should fail us, we can consult plenty of other people who know about them and plenty of documentation (e.g., archived newspaper reports, books, film, etc.) to which we can refer.

The Russell-Chamberlain legend:

Imagine, however, that the situation were different. Imagine the same conversation (re. Russell and Chamberlain) taking place far in the future, when nobody existed who had first-hand experience of their playing days; and when documents and reports about them were sketchy and problematic. Imagine that we weren’t even sure that “Russell-Chamberlain” referred to one or two or maybe more individuals. Imagine further that none of the surviving reports were by first-hand witnesses to Russell-Chamberlain’s exploits, that the reports were written centuries after the Russell-Chamberlain playing days. Now add that differing reports arose from competing schools of thought (call them BB-churches”) regarding the Russell-Chamberlain question. According to one BB-church, Russell-Chamberlain really had been a great center who played for the Celtic-Warriors-Lakers, who led his team to 15 NBA championships, and who averaged 100 points a game one season. Another BB-church denies this and claims there really were two players who played for different teams and accomplished different exploits, which are incorrectly listed: one led his team to 20 consecutive NBA championships; the other was a great scorer who averaged 75 points a game for his entire career. In short, the facts are murky; and we really cannot say with great confidence that we know who Russell-Chamberlain was (or were) and cannot say what he (they) really accomplished, even when we assume that this great NBA figure(s) really did exist.

Now to add to the mystery, suppose that the most influential BB-church came about because an energetic historian-promoter, Pablo the 557th, who wrote that Russell-Chamberlain was a minor player who became an incredible coach, almost supernatural in his ability to transform mediocre teams into NBA champions. According to this BB-church, the important thing is to study the Russell-Chamberlain coaching philosophy which guarantees to transform your average team into an NBA champion-caliber team. This teaching and Pablo 557’s reports completely ignore any mention of the playing career of Russell-Chamberlain, as if this were a minor matter of no importance whatsoever. This leads some commentators to speculate that Pablo 557 did not have any knowledge of playing career of Russell-Chamberlain, and since Pablo 557 is considered the leading authority, that maybe there was no actual NBA center named Russell-Chamberlain, and that the “Russell-Chamberlain” revered by subsequent generations was an almost supernatural coach named “Russell-Chamberlain” who appeared out of nowhere.

So, in this context, how could we ever hope to unravel the mystery? How could we ever say confidently that Russell-Chamberlain really did play in the NBA or that our figure is actually two distinct players, or that our NBA figure was actually a composite of multiple players? How could we ever speak with confidence of the exploits of either one of these great NBA figures of the past? How could we say that one really did lead the Boston Celtics to 10 consecutive NBA championships? Or say that he was not a great scorer, but a great defender, rebounder, and team leader? Or say that the other one played for the Philadelphia Warriors, the San Francisco Warriors, and the Los Angeles Lakers, and really averaged 50 points a game for one NBA season, and was the only player ever to score 100 points in one game?

I submit that we would not have any basis for making such statements.

Some future scholar-historians might argue that there is evidence indicating the existence of two NBA greats, a ‘Bill Russell’ and a “Wilt Chamberlain” who have been mixed up as one individual by BB-religious tradition. Some isolated and ignored scholars might also argue (mostly in vain) that the official Russell-Chamberlain figure, venerated by the dominant BB-churches, is just an invention of Pablo 557, who was a great writer, organizer, and promoter. But the prevailing opinion would be that Russell-Chamberlain was one great coach, whose teachings only fools will ignore! The historical exploits of two NBA great centers, Bill Russell and Wilt Chamberlain, would remain hidden in the fog of history and religious propaganda.

Abortion Laws Make Slaves of Women

“Compulsory pregnancy is a form of slavery. . Prohibiting tax-funded abortions for the poor and requiring parental notification compounds violence against women.”

—John Swomley, Professor of Christian Social Ethics,
Saint Paul School of Theology, Missouri (1960-1984.)

In philosophy most of our discussions and debates on abortion focus on such issues as the status of fetus, the rights of the fetus in relation to the rights of the woman, the stage of pregnancy at which the abortion takes place, and whether destruction of the fetus amounts to the killing of an innocent person. However, such discussions, as stimulating and instructive as they may be, do not set the primary issue which preoccupies others (both in and outside the field of philosophy). They are primarily concerned about the rights and dignity of the women facing reproductive choices.

One of my regular lunch companions, CR, is a good example. CR is a retired science instructor at a local college, Emeritus in Life and Health Sciences. He makes a strong plea for the rights of women with regard to compulsory reproduction in the following remarks:
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Compulsory Pregnancy

An investment in global reproductive health care (sex education, contraception and early safe abortions) would provide one of the greatest benefits to humanity in the history of civilization. Few other measures could make such a contribution to the health and well-being of women and children, reduce poverty and improve our chances of achieving a sustainable future, yet cost each of us in the affluent world only a few dollars a year in foreign aid.

But today, the uncompromising position of the Christian Right toward women with unwanted pregnancies puts an ugly face on social justice and on the religious spirit of love and compassion. It’s a position that demeans the intelligence and moral character of women and returns them to the Dark Ages of compulsory pregnancies and dangerous illegal abortions. How long will we continue to tolerate authoritarian pronouncements from popes, bishops, preachers, televangelists and born-again politicians—essentially all MEN—MEN who are primarily concerned with the maintenance of power and ancient religious dogmas in a modern scientific world they do not want to understand?

“Power is key to understanding the
cynical manipulation of faith and the assault on reason”

—Al Gore

The United States has laws that protect us under normal circumstances from being forced to use our bodies against our will to keep other humans alive (such as being forced to give blood or bone marrow). Yet anti-abortion activists want to force women to use their bodies against their will to keep unwanted mindless embryos alive. How can any society ever expect its citizens to live in ways that are higher and nobler when it attempts to force women with unwanted pregnancies (a common reality throughout history) to stay pregnant against their will—to be unwilling embryo incubators?

Where is the social justice in forcing these women to be obligatory breeding machines? Where is the religious wisdom in placing women essentially in reproductive bondage to the state? When will all Americans finally step up to the plate and strongly endorse the right of women everywhere to be able to control their own reproductive futures—a right that is fundamental to female equality and human liberty?

CR

Humanism without Overt Atheism

The opposite of the religious fanatic is not the fanatical atheist but the gentle cynic who cares not whether there is a god or not

– Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (1951)

“God is an invention of Man. So the nature of God is only a shallow mystery. The deep mystery is the nature of Man.”

—- Nanrei Kabori (late Abbot of the Temple of the Shining Dragon, a Buddhist sanctuary in Kyoto) quoted in Shadows of our Forgotten Ancestors, by Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan

A good way to see humanism is as a philosophy that rejects the god-centered picture of reality, but also rejects the idea that overt atheism should be an essential part of that humanism. Humanism is thus seen as a philosophy whose primary focus is on the human and natural aspects of reality.

We can imagine our preferred humanist to speak as follows: “I don’t believe in a deity, but I don’t dwell on that fact. I focus my attention on science, the arts, literature, philosophy, history, technology and all other achievements of human culture. In the moral sphere, I try to do “godly” work, instead of puzzling over imagined obligation to the will of an imaginary supernatural being.”

Should a humanist espouse atheism? Many do and think that genuine humanism requires that the humanist proudly exhibit his or her atheistic colors, so to speak. Humanists do not need to reject all forms of ‘atheistic activism’ as being inappropriate to humanism; however, a humanist should not dwell on the atheistic issue.

But this should not be understood as implying that my preferred humanist espouses theism, although some do; nor should it be seen as implying that my humanist will be an agnostic concerning the question of deity, although some will be.

My preferred humanist, (call his a “critical humanism”) has moved beyond the question of belief or non-belief in deity. This humanistic perspective has progressed beyond the god-centered perspective of the past.

Much of overt atheism is still in the grip of that god-centered perspective of reality insofar as it remains tied up with the question of deity. This is the case when the primary activity is the effort to deny and disprove the existence of deity.

In religious cultures dominated by monotheistic religion, such as our culture, the idea of God has played a central role, even in periods when pockets of skepticism and non-belief appear. A person’s perspective on reality was characterized as one of belief in deity or a rejection of that belief. A person of faith has traditionally been opposed by an atheist and by the skeptic.

‘Critical humanism’ can work to shift this pivotal point of view from a god-centered, supernatural perspective — whether in affirmation or denial — to a human-centered, naturalistic perspective. A consequence of this shift is that a person’s basic perspective is no longer defined on the basis of belief or disbelief in God.

When we view humanism in this way, it can be seen as bringing about a shift in thought analogous to the Copernican shift in astronomy, which shifted our thinking from an earth-centered planetary system to a solar-centered one. Likewise, humanism can be seen as involving a shift in our thought from a god-centered perspective to a human-centered perspective. Attention shifts from the supernatural, whether in affirming or denying it, in favor of one focusing on human culture, history, human creativity and achievements; and of course, on reason, science, secular morality, mathematics and technology. *

In the context of ‘critical humanism,’ the term “atheist” is a label belonging to the god-centered culture. One could even argue that the active promotion of atheism, as a philosophy, is part of a general promotion of the old division between faith and non-faith of the old culture.

A critical humanist sees all ‘gods’ as supernatural beings invented by religious cultures acting on the religious imagination. There is no rational or moral obligation to believe in any of these imaginary beings. Neglect of the supernatural is the extent of the ‘atheistic’ position of the critical humanist.

* A critical humanist recognizes that this shift in thought takes time and not easily made by many who have lived in the grip of the old perspective. Hence, a critical humanist does not denigrate persons simply because they continue to see things from a god-centered perspective. (Analogy: the shift in paradigm, e.g., the very hard to make transformation in thought from classical physics to quantum physics; even such a genius as Einstein had great trouble with it!)