Philosophy Lounge

April 22, 2013

Some Disconnect on Darwinian Evolutionary Theory

Filed under: Biological Evolution,Darwinian philosophy — Tags: , — jbernal @ 1:18 pm

Juan Bernal

The following exchange resulted when a philosophical acquaintance, call him Pablo, asserted that “the Darwinian revolution in biology … only challenged orthodox religious explanations.”  He also objected to a few other statements that I made concerning Darwinian thought.

I offer them as examples of common misunderstandings – especially among some philosophers — of some aspects of Darwinian evolution by natural selection.
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Against the claim that Darwin only challenged orthodox religious explanations,  I pointed out that many historians and commentators on Darwin argue the contrary: namely, that Darwin’s work, Origin of the Species,  faced a variety of resistance,  only part of which stemmed from religious doctrine.  Undeniably, Darwin challenged orthodox religious accounts of life on earth (origin and maintenance); and religious doctrine was a big factor in the thinking of most people.  But more importantly to the history of biological science, Darwin’s evolutionary science also challenged prevailing theories and beliefs of secular scientists and other people who did not base their views on religion at all. The idea of fixity of life species was a far broader idea than just something gotten from religious doctrine.

To this Pablo replied that he disagreed and repeated his view that

most of the scientists before Darwin thought the fixity of species were fixed because of notions got from the Old Testament. Granted, there may have been some who were not biblically influenced, but, by far, most were. Give me a few examples of those who did not get there views on species from the Old Testament. I don’t think you will find many compared to the many who did.

But doesn’t it greatly oversimplify things to say that philosophers and scientists who continued to believe in the constancy of species and in some kind of intelligent design did so only because of their belief in the Old Testament account of creation?   The philosophical and scientific situations were much more complex than that.

As Ernst Mayr, Daniel Dennett, and others have pointed out, essentialism and finalism (teleological ideas) prevailed among many scientists of the time and surely among most philosophers (since Plato and the ancients advanced that perspective on reality) even after belief in the creation story of the Old Testament had largely been abandoned. Below I include some quotes from Ernst Mayr’s great book, The Long Argument – Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought.

“Even the geologist Charles Lyell, whose work profoundly influenced Darwin — was a theist who believe that species were created by God’s hand. In all the writing s of the naturalists, geologists, and philosophers of the period, God played a dominant role. (Mayr, 12,13) . . “The reason why Lyell, like Henslow, Sedgwick and all the others of Darwin’s scientific friends and correspondents in the middle of the 1830s , accepted the unalterable constancy of species was ultimately a philosophical one. The constancy of species – that is, the inability of a species, once created, to change — was the one piece of the old dogma of a created world that remained inviolate after the concepts of the recency and constancy of the physical world had been abandoned.” (op.cit., Mayr, 17)

Under the essentialist philosophy all living species were fixed and eternal. This philosophy had long been the prevalent one and had very little to do with religious belief in creation:

“Essentialism had dominated Western thinking for mare than 2000 years, going back to the geometric thinking of the Pythagorians. . . . Essentialism, as a definite philosophy, is usually credited to Plato, even though he was not as dogmatic about it as some of his later followers, for instance the Thomists. . . .
“All of Darwin’s teachers and friends were … essentialists. For Lyell, all nature consisted of constant types, each created at a definite time. “There are fixed limits beyond which the descendants from common parents can never deviate from a certain type. . . It is idle … to dispute about the abstract possibility of the conversion of one species into another … (Lyell 1835: 162) For an essentialist there can be no evolution: there can only be sudden origin of a new essence by a major mutation or saltation.” (Mayr, 40-41)
“Virtually all philosophers up to Darwin’s time were essentialists. Whether they were realists or idealists, materialists or nominalists, they all saw species of organisms with the eyes of an essentialist. They considered species as “natural kinds,” defined by constant characteristics and sharply separated from one another by bridgeless gaps. The essentialist philosopher, William Whewell stated categorically, “Species have a real existence in nature, and a transition from one to another does not exist.” (1840, 3:626) For John Stuart Mill, species of organisms are natural kinds, just as inanimate objects are, and [kinds are classes between which there is an impassible barrier.]”
“Essentialism’s influence was great in part because its principle is anchored in our language, in our use of a single noun in the singular to designate highly variable phenomena of our environment, such as mountain, home, water, horse, or honesty. . . The simply noun defines the class of objects. Essentialistic thinking has been highly successful, indeed absolutely necessary, in mathematics, physics, and logic. The observation of nature seemed to give powerful support to the essentialists’ claims. Wherever one looked, one saw discontinuities — between species, between genera, between orders and all higher taxa. Such gaps as between birds and mammals, or beetles and butterflies, were mentioned often by Darwin’s critics.” (Mayr, 40-42)

Although these ideas were consistent with Biblical accounts of the origin and nature of living forms, essentialism was not a philosophy gotten from Biblical accounts of creation at all. It developed apart from belief in the Old Testament account of creation. Many scientists and philosophers who held to it did so independently of any belief in Genesis. Hence, they were reluctant to accept Darwin’s claim that species changed and even gave rise to new species on the basis of philosophical and what they saw as scientific reasons, not the doctrine gotten from the Old Testament.

Among these philosophers and scientists we find: British philosophers of science: Wm Whewell, JS Mill, J. Herschel — other philosophers holding to teleological views of biology: Leibniz , J.G. Herder, I Kant — scientists: German biologists of the19th century: K E von Baer, Eduard von Hartmann held the teleological concepts of biology. Natural theology (study of nature to reveal God’s design leading to perfection), with its emphasis on design (leading to perfection) was strong in England at the time of Darwin, “all of Darwin’s teachers and peers particularly Sedgewick, Henslow, and Lyell were confirmed natural theologians. This was Darwin’s conceptual framework when be began to think about adaptation and the origin of species.” (Mayr, 55) None of these philosophies: essentialism, teleology, and natural theology were simple applications of the Old Testament.

Pablo also objected to my statement that many people in Darwin’s time could simply not accept the idea that human beings – with their great mental capabilities, moral,  and religious aspirations – could be explained as evolving from earlier forms of animal life. This difficulty which characterized much of the thinking of the middle nineteenth century, and which is still present today, did not always arise from religious doctrine.

Pablo remarked:

Well, I think you’re exaggerating a bit. There were some Greek thinkers who suggested evolution so it wasn’t really that new of a suggestion.

Of course, the idea of evolution was not originated by Darwin.  But I failed to see the relevance of this to the issue of the great difficulty that many people — not only religious people — have in accepting the idea that humans evolved from earlier species. Yes, the idea of evolution has been floating around, at least since the time of Empedocles and  Epicurus.  Many people, including the grandfather of Charles Darwin, had proposed a theory of evolution. But these were mainly just philosophical ‘theories’ which did not rise to the level of scientific hypothesis, supported by empirical evidence and subject to testing, as was the case with Darwin’s theory natural selection.
Pablo also asserted that “… the notion of Darwinian evolution is far simpler and inferior a hypothesis to what was accomplished by Einstein and the founders of QM. ”
Again, I did not see the relevance of these remarks. The issue at hand was one relating to biological evolution. What do Einstein’s relativity physics and QM have to do with that?
I had also stated that scientists of the time (naturalists, geologists, etc. and even skeptical philosophers like David Hume) simply could not accept the idea that a natural, material process like natural selection could explain the presence of human life and human reality. As an example of this reluctance to apply the theory to natural selection to human beings, I noted that even Wallace, co-founder of natural selection, who could comfortably accept evolution from earlier life forms in the case of non-human animals, balked at the idea that this also might apply to humans.

Pablo replied:

I find that surprising (if true). Perhaps he wasn’t familiar with the thoughts of Empedocles (5th century B.C.E.) and others.

Again, what was the relevance here?   Neither Hume’s inability to see natural evolution as explanatory of life forms nor Wallace’s difficulties concerning Darwin’s Descent of Man had anything to do with their alleged ignorance of the Empedocles or any other pre-Darwinian evolutionary theory (of which there were numerous). Wallace, like many others since Darwin’s book on the descent of humans, simply could not fathom how a natural, materialistic process like natural selection could ever give rise to human beings with their intellectual and moral capabilities. Wallace was comfortable with a naturalistic account of the evolution of non-human animals; but with humans, he drew the line, so to speak.

April 20, 2013

Meditation on Maternal Assertiveness – By Virginia Bernal

Filed under: Social Philosophy — jbernal @ 11:15 am

Meditation on Maternal Assertiveness Upon the Birth of Her Baby To be read repeatedly in preparation for the birth.

Research-based writing, by Virginia Bernal, IBCLC

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This life within me is my child

My body nurtures him, (you can replace with “her”.)

Protects him,

Keeps him warm.

At the time of birth I will still be the best provider

Of warmth,

Protection,

Nutrition.

I will firmly request that my baby be placed on my chest,

To nest here skin to skin,

Here to set his breathing rhythm,

So my baby can best transition to life outside the womb.

In my baby’s first hour I will remember, I am the best provider

Of warmth, Protection, Nutrition.

If a nurse wants to put the baby in a warmer,

I will say,

I will keep my baby warm

Next to my skin, covered with warm blankets.

My chest will respond to baby by getting

Warmer or cooler as baby needs.

My baby’s temperature will be more stable

Being undisturbed, skin to skin with me, his mom.

If a nurse wants to take baby away to weigh and give protective medications,

I will say,

Those procedures can wait an hour or two.

Now my baby needs the protection my body gives:

Protection against the stress of separation,

Protective exposure of his immune system to all my friendly germs,

Protection that will last many years because we grow

Strong bonds of love at this our first acquaintance.

If a nurse wants to feed my baby with a bottle,

I will say,

My body provides the best first food for my baby.

By allowing my baby to rest on my chest till ready to feed,

His blood sugar will be more stable,

My first milk, colostrum, will be more available

Once he starts his first attempts to suckle at my breast.

If a nurse says she must take the baby away because it is hospital policy,

I will remember,

The hospital custom of separating mothers and babies

Is fairly new—of about a hundred years,

And despite good intentions, there is harm in doing so.

But the need of physical closeness,

Of no separation,

Has been the health-giving practice of eons of time.

If a doctor says I am too tired or sleepy due to medications I received,

I will say,

My body has labored so much, it needs

To be rewarded by feeling my baby’s weight upon my chest.

My baby and my tired body do good things for each other.

We need each other to transition to our new life.

If I am too groggy, let my partner watch over us,

Be our protector, his vital role as we grow a family.

If my family members want to hold baby in the first hours after birth,

I will say,

There will be plenty of time for you to enjoy baby.

This first hour is important for baby and me.

We need to be together for baby’s warmth, protection and nurture,

And to grow our love.

If I were to need to birth by way of cesarean surgery,

I will ask,

To have my baby as soon as possible, in the recovery room.

If my baby were to be born with serious problems,

Such as trouble with breathing,

Or severe prematurity,

Then I will resign myself to a delay, till my baby is ready for skin to skin care.

But I will not forget that whatever my baby’s condition,

Vigorous and healthy (the most likely case),

Or needing intensive care (an unlikely event),

I will not forget that my baby is mine,

And providing for his needs will be my priority, my pleasure, and my right.

In my baby’s first hours and days I will be the best provider

Of warmth,

Protection,

Nutrition.

The best provider of Love.

April 17, 2013

Contra the Moral Utility of Belief in a Soul

Filed under: critique of religion — Tags: , — jbernal @ 3:22 pm

Juan Bernal

A few weeks ago while discussing people’s belief in an immortal soul I declared that there wasn’t any evidence or good rational ground for affirming that belief.  An email correspondent  — who had previously asserted that there was good evidence for soul’s survival of the body’s death –- asked me, “Why did so many people, in the past and present, believed in soul?”  He also stated that nobody had any good grounds for thinking that people in the past, who believed in the reality of immortal souls, did not have any rational grounds for such belief.  He declared that, after all, we weren’t there when ancient cultures and peoples of past centuries adopted belief in souls; so we really could not say anything about the reasons, evidence underlying such belief.

By happenstance this very issue came up in another setting.  A book discussion group,  of which I’m a member,  has been looking at Steven Pinker’s recent book, The Better Angels of our Nature – Why violence has declined.   In chapter four (pp. 129-188), Pinker takes up what he calls the humanizing process in Western Europe and in the USA which mainly ended the routine brutality and killing of human beings that marked ancient and medieval periods.

In leading up to his account of the humanizing process that occurred in much of Western Europe starting the late 18th century, Pinker takes time to describe the incredible violence and bloodletting that often was based on irrational superstitious thinking and on religious doctrine.  These early sections of the chapter are titled “Superstitious Killing: Human Sacrifice, Witchcraft, and Blood Libel,” and   “Superstitious Killing: Violence against blasphemers, heretics, and apostates.”   Here Pinker recounts the genocides that resulted from the Catholic Crusades, and the great number of deaths that resulted from various long, bloody religious wars between European states and principalities; the high number of deaths brought about by the persecutions, tortures, and executions of non-believers by religious authorities —- all adding up to millions of people slaughtered, tortured, and executed, by the various “Reformations” (Catholic and Protestant); by the Inquisitions in Spain, Italy, and the New World.

Considering that all of this took place at a time when belief in an immortal soul was nearly universal, we surely are struck by a paradox.  Given all that brutality and bloodletting were  perpetuated by believers in an immortal soul, the question arises:  “Why do people think that belief is a good thing?  What ethical or moral value can such belief possibly have if cultures and ages in which that belief prevails are so bloody and violent, and dangerous to life and limb?

Pinker has some interesting things to say relevant to those questions. In his attempt to understand why people finally began to break the cycles of violence and death in the 17th century, and finally began to tolerated those who preferred to dissent from the prevailing religious doctrines, such as that concerning the value of an eternal soul.  He writes:

“What made Europeans finally decide that it was all right to let their dissenting compatriots risk eternal damnation and, by their bad example, lure others to that fate? Perhaps they were exhausted by the Wars of Religion, but it’s not clear why it took thirty years to exhaust hem rather than ten or twenty. One gets the sense that people started to place a higher value on human life. Part of the newfound appreciation was an emotional change, a habit of identifying with the pains and pleasures of others. And another part was an intellectual and moral change: a shift from valuing souls to valuing lives. The doctrine of the sacredness of the soul sounds vaguely uplifting, but in fact is highly malignant. It discounts life on earth as just a temporary phase that people pass through, indeed, an infinitesimal fraction of their existence. Death becomes a mere rite of passage, like puberty or a midlife crisis.

The gradual replacement of lives for souls as the locus of moral value was helped along by the ascendancy of skepticism and reason. No one can deny the difference between life and death or the existence of suffering, but it takes indoctrination to hold beliefs about what becomes of an immortal soul after it has parted company from the body. The 17th century is called the Age of Reason, an age when writers began to insist that beliefs be justified by experience and logic. That undermines dogmas about souls and salvation, and it undermines the policy of forcing people to believe unbelievable things at the point of sword (or a Juda’s Cradle).”  [Page 143]

 

Of course, Pinker is not the first to so describe the nature of religious doctrine concerning the immortal soul.  Decades ago (1950s), the American philosopher, Walter Kaufmann, remarked  in various books  that the other-worldly nature of Christian doctrine de-valued human life on this earth, or turned attention away from the brutality, suffering, death, and gross injustice that characterized most lives when the grand other-worldly religion dominated, with its dogma of the immortal soul.

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So my reply to my email colleague’s question  –  Why do I think ancient people adopted the belief in an immortal soul?  —  is that the ancients and medieval people were generally  indoctrinated to believe the dogma of an immortal soul, along with other dogma about the fate of the soul after death.  In the Christian period, when they were not so indoctrinated or resisted the indoctrination, they were terrorized into believing (or at least outward assent to the belief).

Thus, I reaffirm my conviction that belief in an immortal soul is just the product of particular religious cultures and ages, and has never been grounded on rational evidence.

Mulling about some puzzles on ‘objective reality’

Filed under: theory of knowledge — Tags: , — jbernal @ 12:42 pm

Juan Bernal

We occasionally hear what sound like daffy ideas from theoretical physicists when they unwisely encroach on hard philosophical problems: e.g., the notion that consciousness creates the universe, sometimes called  “biocentrism.”   Another is the  assertion that space-time is not an objective feature of the universe (world), but is something dependent on the cognitive faculties of the creatures like us.  This strikes some as being a bizarre claim.

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It seems that one could offer the following rebuttal:  It does not follow that that the spatial-temporal dimensions arise from the subject’s cognitive processing because we must presuppose the spatial-temporal dimensions to make sense of experience of the physical world.

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The starting point of our epistemological theories should not be a conscious subject isolated from the social, physical world. Ultimately this notion is an incoherent one.  The starting point should be a mindful, social and corporeal subject (a conscious animal), in a natural, social world, interacting with other like creatures and engaging in cause-effect interaction with the natural, social world.

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The epistemological tradition from Descartes through the classical empiricists — Locke, Berkeley, Hume — to Immanuel Kant is based on an erroneous idea that the possibility of knowledge of the external world (external to the subject) needs to be proven.

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There’s something terribly wrong with the claim that, for any ‘X’, we can say what ‘X’ really is only in terms of

  • a possible experience of ‘X’ (i.e., ‘X’ must be an object of phenomenal experience);  or
  • a description of ‘X’ in terms of (Kantian) categories of the understanding.

There something terribly wrong with the assertion that any question of the form [What is a real ‘X’?] has to be answered in terms of the notion of ‘X-in-itself, i.e., ‘X’ as other than an object of phenomenal experience.

Recall that for Kantian thought, ‘X as an object of possible phenomenal experience is an object describable in terms of

  •  the intuitions of space and time, and
  •  the categories of the understanding.

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Ordinarily when we try to say what ‘X’ really is we do not do so in terms of Kantian noumena, i.e., thing-in-itself.  Rather we state things carefully, after additional reflection, study, and investigation (after we carry on with empirical inquiry).

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The world of physical phenomena (objects, forces, energy) is a spatio-temporal world.

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According to Kant, our experience of the physical world is temporally and spatially ordered. The cognitive mind provides this spatial-temporal template by which our phenomenal world is ordered. The world independent of this ‘subjective’ ordering (i.e., noumena, world-in-itself) falls outside the scope of our knowledge.

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But there is nothing we can say about this putative world-in-itself. We cannot legitimately say it is the world-as-it-really-is.

At best, this notion of a noumenal world is a limiting concept.

To see noumena as the way things-really-are is to erroneously interpret a limiting concept as having metaphysical import.

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Insofar as we can coherently think or talk about it, the so called “phenomenal world” is the real world, i.e., the reality of human existence and human experience. We should not be confused by the fact that his notion of reality can be analyzed and refined.  Physicists, for example, can apply their theories and mathematical models to give us a refined, abstract picture of this world.  But that resulting picture (the scientific picture that science achieves) is a picture  (a model) of the world of experience.  It is not a picture of the world-in-itself.

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The world existed long before humans arrived on the scene. Can this be seen as the legitimate idea of the world-in-itself?

There is a world that humans inhabit and experience. When humans think about or conceptualize this world, they do so in terms of spatial extension, temporal dimension, and basic categories (concepts) like object, force, causal relations, etc. . .  (and in terms of transactions between the subject and the world).  We apply those basic intuitions and concepts to the world of experience in our conceptualization of that world.

That this is an appropriate application is something that flows from the nature of the real world, a nature characterized as a spatial, temporal, physical world.

 

Extra-Ordinary Claims & Miracles

Filed under: Notes and Remarks,theory of knowledge — Tags: , — jbernal @ 12:22 pm

Juan Bernal

To be credible someone making an extra-ordinary claim, e.g. my neighbor can levitate, we would ask for evidence sufficient to the claim.  It  wouldn’t do to go on mere hear-say or my sincere insistence that my claim is true.

Extra-ordinary claims call for extra-ordinary evidence, or as David Hume stated: “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.”

“Suppose .. that the fact which testimony endeavors to establish partakes of the extra-ordinary and the marvelous: in that the evidence resulting from the testimony admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact [purported ‘fact’] is more or less unusual.”

(David Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, “Section X  “Of Miracles,”  Part I”, 1748)

David Hume is regarded as  a classical empiricist.  Knowledge, if we have any, comes by way of experience.  Along with this is the assumption that there are regularities in experience and nature.

It is surprising to critical thinkers that anyone would question the principle that measures the status of a belief to the evidence supporting it.   The more extra-ordinary (marvelous, miraculous, magical) the purported event, the less weight carried by ordinary evidence (e.g., human testimony, reports, etc.).

It is not sufficient to well-grounded belief to affirm belief in miracles (e.g. a resurrection from death, or a feat of levitation) on testimony and reports of such events. Much more is called for if we’re to see such belief as rationally and empirically well-grounded.

Skepticism, not credulity, is the attitude of the rational person in the face of such extra-ordinary claims.

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What could possibly be a philosophical rebuttal to this position skeptical of miraculous claims?

Some might raise technicalities about Hume’s suggestion of an appropriate proportion of evidence to belief.  These would be questions as to the precise measured proportion: What objective standard could we apply to determine exact proportionality?

Some might object that supernatural possibilities that fall outside of human empirical knowledge are not judged in terms of evidence usually applicable only to ordinary events.

Some might bring up the fact that extra-ordinary claims in the sciences were not required to conform to a “proportionality of evidence” and were not rejected because of insufficient evidence for an extra-ordinary claim.

We can reply to each in turn.  First Hume did not propose an exact science (with precise method and measurement) for evaluating extra-ordinary claims.  Instead, he offered a practical, common sense guide for proceeding, i.e., a general “rule-of-thumb,” in a manner of speaking.

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Many events which are seen as miraculous can be shown to have natural explanation and may result from illusion or hallucination.  Those which cannot be readily explained do not automatically fall into the category of the miraculous.  On the one hand, they might be events that await further investigation.  On the other hand, they might be tagged (for now) as things we cannot presently explain.   But our inability to explain or understand the event does not imply that miracle or magical event has occurred.  All that is implied is that we do not presently have an explanation to give.

(Miracle:  The intervention of a supernatural being into a natural or social happening, many times a happening that is beneficial for humans.)

 

March 20, 2013

A Dialogue on the Limits of Science and Transcendent Possibilities

Filed under: critique of religion,science and philosophy,Science and Religion — Tags: , , — jbernal @ 2:14 pm

Juan Bernal

I had a long dialogue with a correspondent philosopher [“Otro”] on the issues of what we can know and the limits of scientific knowledge.  It started when I [“Moi”] tried to clarify our basic assumptions:

Moi:  Let me assume that all humans are physical, biological beings with a facility for intelligent language.  I suppose that this imposes limits on the possibilities; for example, it implies that you’re not a disembodied, eternal, spiritual being.  Am I safe in making those presuppositions, or should I leave open the possibility that I’m communicating with a transcendent spirit?

Am I safe in assuming that we’re just flesh-and-blood persons?  Are we in agreement here, or do you wish to think that you might very well be much more (oh so much more!) than a physical, biological being with an over-active brain?

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Otro:  I’m sorry that I did not explicitly answer your question. If you had left out the word “just,” I would be able to agree. I agree that we are flesh and blood persons etc. I do not agree that we are nothing more than that. A book by John Hick (The Fifth Dimension) spells out the alternative to that view, and I generally agree with the alternative as Hick describes it. The following quotation is from the first page of The Fifth Dimension. This might help you to understand the point of view from which I respond to your question. The book presents a more developed and nuanced understanding of what people like me and John Hick think about the idea that we’re just flesh and blood persons.

 We are finite, fallible, fragile fragments of the universe. But because we have an inbuilt need to find meaning we inhabit the universe in terms of a conception of its character – a big picture – either consciously adopted or unconsciously presupposed. In so doing, we are always, whether we realize it or not, living by faith, that is, moving in an immensely important area in which there is no certain knowledge and in which we cannot avoid the risk of being seriously mistaken.

To most of us within our highly technological western culture it has come to seem self-evident that a scientific account of anything and everything constitutes the full story, and that the supposed transcendent realities of which the religions speak must therefore be imaginary. Since at least the beginning of the twentieth century this naturalistic assumption has been an integral part of our culture, and any contrary hopes, dreams, intuitions, senses of transcendence, intimations of immortality, or mystical experiences have been overshadowed by its pervasive influence. But it is a fundamental error to think that the assumptions that our culture has instilled into us, and which we take for granted, are necessarily true. . . . The beginning of wisdom is to become aware of our own presuppositions as options that can be examined and questioned. Otherwise we are wearing mental blinkers without even being conscious of them.

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Moi:  Thanks, this does give an idea of what you guys believe, but there’s nothing here that is totally new to me. However,  I will point out some ideas that John Hick and others (including you?) often express  which are erroneous.

I don’t believe that naturalistic thinkers and most scientists claim that it “self-evident that a scientific account of anything and everything constitutes the full story.”

As I noted in another email to you, the work of science and empirical inquiry are works-in-progress.  Nobody who reflects carefully on things would say that science has given the “full story.”  This is part of the effort by people like Hick to set up a Strawman argument against science and naturalism.  But even the admission that science does not give the full story does not show the viability of any philosophy (theology?) that asserts those “transcendent realities” which Hick and you so much desire.  The work of science can go on indefinitely (gaining more and more information about the universe and ourselves) without ever showing one shred of evidence for “transcendent realities.”  So this reference to the “full story” and implication of an “incomplete story” is really a red herring.

Another mistake arises with the notion of necessary truth:  that my common-sense assumption is necessarily true.  I never said that it was a necessary truth that we are physical, biological beings; I said it was a presupposition that we all take for granted.  Denying that it is a necessary truth does not you’re your case for supernatural possibilities.  If we’re in a speculative mood and want to muse about transcendental possibilities, we can engage the exercise of “examining and questioning” such presuppositions.  Nobody prohibits such an exercise.  But remember that this is all that’s going on; we’re just indulging a speculative exercise about possibilities.  It has always seemed to me that this is all what  John Hick others like him do amounts to: speculation about possibilities.

Finally, I find it rather bizarre to read the assertion that our common-sense presupposition that we’re physical, biological beings existing in a physical world is a case of having “mental blinkers,” as if you idealists had already established the viability of the transcendental realm from which you could look on the merely physical world as a limited, obscure reality.   This is just the old practice of religious transcendence parading as critical philosophy!

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Otro:  John Hick wrote,

“To most of us within our highly technological western culture it has come to seem self-evident that a scientific account of anything and everything constitutes the full story, and that the supposed transcendent realities of which the religions speak must therefore be imaginary.”

He seems to say that because we think of the scientific account of everything is complete, we infer that “the supposed transcendent realities of which the religions speak must be imaginary.”

But which is the more likely interpretation of what he is saying about the scientific account? Is he saying that we have come to think of it as full in fact, or is he saying that we have come to think of it as full in principle?

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Moi:   My problem with  ”the supposed transcendent realities of which the religions speak ..”  has nothing to do with the belief that science does or does not provide a “complete story” of everything.  I don’t believe this but there no implication that follows which lends comfort to the supernaturalist.

So I find much of what you quote from John Hick to have little relevance.  As you point out it
is not even clear what is meant by the “complete story” given by science.

My skepticism concerning all claims of transcendent existence or transcendent, spiritual
aspect (essence?) of human reality arises from other considerations. It arises from the observation
that there are no objective, publicly verifiable grounds for concluding that there are such
transcendent realities.

Even if we allow, for the sake of argument, some of those claims as hypotheses, we would have a tough time selecting the candidates to select and likely find that they contradict each other. There are so
many and so varied! There are no obvious criteria (agreeable to all) for selecting good candidates.

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Otro:  I’m skeptical about your explanation of your skepticism. I think there are probably a lot of things you believe in even though you lack objective, publicly verifiable grounds for them. So other than the fact that it lacks objective, publicly verifiable grounds, there must be something else about the transcendent reality claim that provokes your skepticism.

Assuming as I do that empirical information is ambiguous, one reason why many people reject explanations of empirical data that involve the notion of a transcendent reality is that such explanations are not as effective as naturalistic explanations in stimulating or leading to further progress in science. You seem to put a very high value on science and scientific progress, so maybe that has something to do with your skepticism concerning all claims of transcendent existence.

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Moi:   So now you’re in the business of psycho-analysis, stating what my reasons can and cannot be for something I hold to be the case?

I stated briefly why I’m skeptical about your claims that transcendental realities should not be ruled out.  I stand by those reasons and have little to do with my recognition of the progress brought about by the sciences.  It has more to do with the fact the sciences are by far the best instrument for gaining knowledge of our world that humans have.  It also has much to do with the completely incoherent world that results when we allow that your transcendental possibilities might be real along with the thousands of alternative transcendental possibilities that others dream up.

Of course, there’s much that I believe for which I don’t have objectively, verifiable grounds (as do all people).  But these are very different from belief in a transcendental realm of transcendental beings beyond the reach of science and empirical experience.

Mostly what I hear from you is reminder of possibilities that remain after we consider the limited knowledge that the sciences provide.  I hear from you and people like the Hick the refrain that since the sciences are do not explain everything (are not the full story), the possibility remains that your preferred fantasies of the supernatural can be fact.  Again, that is just relying on rather questionable notions of possibilities to hold on to that which is dear to you.  (Allow me to do some psycho-analysis of the motives for your views.)

——————————————–

Otro:   May I take this as an admission that the knowledge that science provides is limited, and beyond that knowledge lie possibilities which have yet to be explored? If so, do you similarly admit that

  1. science does not at present offer a theory of reality,
  2. and may never do so, since
  3. there may be realities that are forever inaccessible to the methods of science?

Among the realities that could be forever inaccessible to science, one is human reality. The evidence I presented in my previous email about Dr. Parnia’s research on after-death experience suggests mind-body dualism. But, given the inevitable ambiguity of empirical evidence, it may be beyond the ability of science to clinch the case for or against mind-body dualism. Nevertheless, the issue has practical importance. What we believe about it makes a difference to how we live our lives. Either we do or do not live with some sort of expectation of a life after death. So people in effect make a decision about it whether consciously or unconsciously by living their lives in one way or the other. The decision they make could be described as “a preferred fantasy of the supernatural.” Your preferred fantasy of the supernatural portrays the supernatural as empty of anything real. But what right do you have to consider your fantasy better than its alternatives? Is that a conclusion you can support with presupposition-less logic?

————————————–

Moi:   You ask whether I admit that “the knowledge that science provides is limited, and that beyond that knowledge lie possibilities which have yet to be explored?”   Of course, I said as much.  My quarrel with you concerns that inference that you draw from this notion of an incomplete science.

Let me use the analogy of human high jumping.  Although the height that human high jumpers have achieved has risen dramatically in recent decades (now over 8 feet), there is a limit (a physical limit to how high a human can jump).  So possibilities of yet higher jumps remain.  But the book is not wide open on these possibilities, as long as we’re talking about human physiology.  You won’t see anyone ever high jumping 50 feet!  But maybe someone will someday achieve a jump of 9-10 feet.  The same thinking applies to the limits and possibilities of scientific knowledge.  Yes, scientific knowledge is not a completed story.  Yes, more remains to be told (discovered).  But what remains, when it is disclosed, will come under the category of nature as we now know it.  There is no reason for claiming that among those possibilities not yet disclosed are supernatural realities (the sort you yearn for).  That would be like claiming that because human high jumpers are still setting new records, one will eventually jump over a 100 foot barrier unaided!

You also ask whether I admit that

  1. science does not at present offer a theory of reality,
  2. and may never do so, since
  3. there may be realities that are forever inaccessible to the methods of science?

The sciences are not in the business of advancing “a theory of reality.”   Even the scientific theorist is concerned only with proposing specific theories of some aspect of nature (e.g. theories in physics, chemistry, biology, paleoanthropology) and having those theories tested by practicing scientists, who devise experiments to test the theory.  If anyone is in the business of presenting “a theory of reality,” it is the philosopher, or someone taking on that function of philosophy.  But some of those philosophers can offer a theory of reality based on the work and knowledge gotten by the sciences.  I don’t see any reason for supposing that a theory of reality based on scientific knowledge can never happen, since it happens already.

Your third item (“realities forever inaccessible to the methods of science”) just asks for a bit of speculation.  Who knows?  Who cares?  This question may be of interest to someone inclined to imagine a transcendental perspective on reality (a god’s eye view). But for the humanist perspective, which science represents, this question is limited interest.  An affirmative answer (“Yes, Lyle, there such entities forever inaccessible …”) does not have the cash value you imagine it to have.

With regard to your final paragraph, I don’t even know what it means to say that “science clinches the case for or against mind-body dualism.”  Are asking for a deductive proof?   Science has built a very strong case (and continues to do so) against that dualism.  Despite the dualist grasping for straws (a desperate search for anything that might save dualism), there isn’t any established scientific basis for positing a spiritual-mental entity that operates alongside (independently of) the human organism.

Of course the issue has practical importance for many people, in and outside of religious faith, who believe in such non-corporeal existence.  But the fact that people base their lives on that belief and religions carry on their business in terms of that belief does nothing to show that the belief is scientifically (or even rationally) viable.

I don’t think that my flat-footed belief that humans are evolved biological creatures, animals with a large brain, is a “preferred fantasy,” unless you dismiss (as well you might) all the biological-genetic sciences as “preferred fantasies.”

You see as my preferred fantasy of “the supernatural portrays the supernatural as empty of anything real.”  You’re making too hasty a jump here by assuming we can even talk intelligently and coherent of a supernatural realm that may or may not contain real entities.  As usual, you help yourself to the reality of fantastic realm (“SUPERNATURAL REALM”!) and then challenge your interlocutor to prove there’s nothing in it. (?!)   This sounds like one of those ineffectual games which traditional students of metaphysical philosophy love.

With regard to your last question:  What in the world is ” pre-suppositionless” logic unless it is just logic as a formal system?  I could outline the “logic” by which I reach my conclusions, but they surely involve some presuppositions (I have been referring to one of them in this long discussion).  All human arguments do, including those which you concoct based on presuppositions regarding highly questionable (even fantastic) possibilities.

 

February 28, 2013

Opposing views on issues of knowledge, truth, and reality

Filed under: metaphysics,the mind-body problem,theory of knowledge — Tags: , — jbernal @ 12:17 pm

Juan Bernal

Recently an email correspondence  stimulated interest in an old epistemological-metaphysical  issues.

This fellow traveler (in philosophy) wrote:

“Given that mind-body dualism was given such bad reviews in the 20th century, it shouldn’t be too hard to imagine that the distinction between the subjective and the objective has no metaphysical significance. Instead, it is an artifice and a convention. It is useful within limits, but not useful for metaphysical purposes. What we have instead is “pure experience” as in the philosophies of the pragmatists (i.e. James and Dewey). All the elements of pure experience are potentially useful in framing a metaphysical philosophy. Thus those elements that are rejected from the point of view of objective thought can be considered important from the point of view of an up-to-date monism like that of James (see his 1904 essay, “Does Consciousness Exist?”).  Feelings may be considered to be as much an indication of what is real as perceptions.”

My reply:

In the modern age it may not be “hard to imagine” that the subjective/objective distinction has no “metaphysical significance,” but it surely does not follow from a philosophical rejection of the mind-body dualism.   Rejecting mind-body dualism, with its implication of mind as entity apart from body, does have metaphysical implications; but this is distinct from questions regarding the significance of the distinction between subjective experience and objective reality.  I don’t see any reason for dropping that distinction as important and significant, especially with regard to epistemological issues.  It is as simple as saying that what you feel about something (an event, a person) must be kept distinct from an honest, scientific-like assessment of that event or person.  For example, I feel very strongly that OJ Simpson killed his wife; but I realize that I cannot prove it (in a legal sense).  My strong feelings (even passion) about the event does not establish the nature of the event.  If you drop such a distinction as significant, then you open the gates to chaos based on subjective feelings and opinions.

I also question your comments about “pure experience” in the philosophy of a pragmatist like John Dewey.  Did Dewey propose that “elements of pure experience are potentially useful in framing a metaphysical philosophy”?  Your remarks suggest this. However, as far as I recall, Dewey (like Darwin, Reid, L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle, and DW Hamlyn) reject the Cartesian notion (do we throw Husserl in here too?) that we start with purely subjective experience and frame a metaphysical knowledge of the world.   Let me add that recently I have expressed great skepticism of this notion of pure experience, questioning just what exactly the purity of experience is supposed to be.  My view is that it is another notion that some people throw around without ever having examined what exactly they’re saying.

You state that part of the issue is whether or not feelings are real.  Of course people have feelings or feel strongly about things.  But this surely does not imply what you seem to think is implied when you state:  “Feelings may be considered to be as much an indication of what is real as perceptions.”  You state that “feelings are an indication of what is real.”  Surely you’re just playing with words here.  An indication of what is real is a public matter (like a knowledge claim) in the sense that if you claim that S indicates the reality of R, you’re obligated to show others that this is so.  You cannot simply say “I feel that it is so.”  Our (another friend in the discussion) was surely right to point out that your feeling that X is R merely indicates something about you, and most likely nothing about  X.

———————–

To which the fellow traveler replied:  

You wanted to make the point that the distinction remains useful even for people who reject mind-body dualism. I agree. However, when we use those terms it’s hard to avoid dualistic connotations. It’s hard to avoid thinking in terms of “what goes on in my mind” and what goes on in a “world out there.” Once we drop dualism, we have some options. We can become radical empiricists, believing that the distinction between subject and object arises within experience. Or we can drop one of the two categories, becoming either pure subjectivists or pure objectivists depending on which one we drop.

I intended my denial that the subjective/objective distinction has metaphysical significance to entail a claim that neither the combination of them nor either of them taken separately names an independent reality. If they exist at all, they exist only as properties of an underlying reality.

 In support of the view that the subjective/objective distinction is still useful for non-dualists, you wrote, “One’s strong feeling that something is true does not make it true.”

 But now the non-dualist faces the problem of determining what makes something true. For dualists truth is a matter of correspondence between what’s in one’s mind and what’s out there in objective reality. If the non-dualist wants to retain a correspondence theory of truth, how does he adapt it to a non-dualist theory?

 If you can figure out how to do it, let us know. If you can’t, then what do you mean when you say, “One’s strong feeling that something is true does not make it true.” How do you know what makes a statement true?

You asked whether Dewey proposed that elements of pure experience are potentially useful in framing a metaphysical philosophy. In the preface to “Experience and Nature” he says his aim throughout the book is to replace “the traditional separation of nature and experience” with the idea of continuity. If nature and experience are separated, they are two different things/substances. If there is a continuity between them, they are both real, but they are not two different things/substances. They are distinguishable properties or aspects of one thing/substance. What is that one thing/substance?

On the issue of whether feelings can be as much an indication of what is real as perceptions, it all depends on how we look at it. If we bring one set of assumptions, we get one answer. If we bring another set of assumptions, we get another answer. For example, if we reason from the perspective of dualism, we can understand sensation as information from the external world, we can base perception on sensation, and we can explain feelings as purely internal responses that tell us nothing about what is “out there.” This line of thinking leads us to the conclusion that empirical science, based on information received through our senses about the external world, is our most reliable, indeed our only source of knowledge about the real (i.e. external) world. And that leads to the conclusion, as you put it, that “an indication of what is real is a public matter.” But, if we assume with Dewey that experience and nature are related to each other like right and left or up and down, then anything that belongs to that one reality of which experience and nature are aspects can tell us something about the fundamental nature of that reality. An indication of reality would not have to be a public matter.
——————-

In reply I stated the following:

Human beings (persons, which I assume we are) are biological beings capable of thought and feelings.

Sometimes when we think or feel that something is the case, our thought and/or feelings are reliable; other times they are not.  This is a simple fact, a truism about our ordinary experience. [It is hard to imagine anyone disputing this.]

Whether our thoughts are reliable or not can be determined by experience and inter-personal confirmation.  [E.G., I'm lost in the woods and come to a fork in the path, path A and path B.  I have reason for thinking that path A will lead me out of the woods.  I take path A and find that it does take me to safety.  My thought was reliable in that case; and its reliability was confirmed by experience.  There is absolutely no need to become puzzled by the notion of a correspondence between my thought and the objective fact!]

None of this requires that we implicitly assume any kind of dualism between mind and matter, or any philosopher’s dualism between experience and the object experienced.  Any talk of mind or thoughts or feelings can be restated as talk about the person (biological being with big brain and conditioned by culture) thinking or feeling in a particular way.  There is no need to become mystified by the notion of mind existing as an entity in its own right or even as a mysterious attachment to the biological organism (which is all we are).

None of this requires that we assume (or explain) any correspondence ( lack of it) between our thoughts and material reality, or between experience and the world.

When I say (or think) that X is A, my statement that “X is A” is true if and only if X in fact is A.   There is no mention of correspondence here.
That X is A in fact can be confirmed by scientific means or by ordinary empirical investigation (I confirm that X is A by checking and double-checking; and by having others confirm that X is A.)

When Dewey proposes that we replace “the traditional separation of nature and experience” with the idea of continuity, his proposal goes along the lines outlined above.  He surely was not proposing a metaphysics in which nature and experience are “distinguishable properties or aspects of one thing/substance.”  He is merely pointing out that our experience is continuous with nature, both our nature and objective nature (i.e., the world, our environment). The question “What is that substance?” is  the wrong question.  Asking that question attempts to get us into a metaphysical mode which a good pragmatist like Dewey would surely (and appropriately) avoid.  Avoiding or ignoring any assumptions that gets us into that mode is likely a very good way to go in philosophy today.

 

January 15, 2013

Over-reaching when we promote philosophy

Filed under: Critique of philosophy,Political Philosophy,Social Philosophy — jbernal @ 2:50 pm

by Juan Bernal

Over-reach:

When I was a mere neophyte in my humanities studies (late 1960s), some professors in my Literature and History courses would complain that too often people in philosophy talked as if only philosophers were the real thinkers (supposedly historians and literary scholars were not real thinkers) and complain also that philosopher all too often claimed credit for many beneficial developments in history, as if only philosophers had made major contributions to social progress and humanitarian development.  They must have had good reasons for complaining since I remember walking away from introductory classes in philosophy thinking that philosophy was where the real thinking took place and philosophy contributed a great deal to the development of civilization.  (I did not know any better!)

We hear the same prejudice expressed today when enthusiasts of philosophy claim that critical thinking is taught mainly, if not exclusively, in philosophy courses, ignoring the fact that students learn critical thinking in a variety of disciplines and courses of study.

———————————–

 We invented everything of worth! 

Some of your older readers might recall that during the Cold War between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union representatives of the USSR (e.g. Nikita Krushchev) would claim that scientists in the USSR had invented such things as electrical power and the telephone, contrary to conventional claims that Western scientists and engineers actually invented and developed those technologies.  Sometimes we even heard that the USSR invented democracy and equal rights for women.  Of course, any cursory look at historical accounts of how these things and institutions arose quickly refuted those fantastic claims by spokesmen for the Soviet Union.  The Soviets were simply exaggerating their role in historical developments and “puffing themselves up” so as to bigger than they really were.

Do we have a similar situation with the claims as to all that has originated from the work of philosophy by some enthusiasts of philosophy?  Don’t we often hear that the roots of science, democracy, and all progressive social developments are found in the work and rational arguments of some philosophers?

———————————–

Philosophers as Major Players in the Demise of Slavery – Another case of Over-Reach?   

At one of his musical performances, Yanni (piano-keyboards-band leader) declares that “everything good that has happened to people begin with just one idea in the mind of one person.”  Like many things that people say, this sounds good but probably will not hold up when applied to what has really happened in histories of societies and cultures.

In similar fashion, Rebecca Goldstein (“Speaking Prose All Our Lives,” Humanist, Jan-Feb 2013 volume) declares that

“all humanitarian developments started out as theoretical moral arguments.” (p. 19)

She states this in the process of arguing that rational moral arguments, like those offered by Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, inspired the social movements against slavery and also against the long-standing denial of women’s rights.  She cites John Locke as offering the “first abstract argument against slavery and includes a passage by Locke:

“Freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, …. a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where that rule prescribes not; and not be be subject to the inconstant  , uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man, as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.”

Is this an “abstract argument against slavery”?  Goldstein is correct to say that Locke’s reasoning can be applied against slavery, but it is just as likely that John Locke did not have slavery in mind at all, but was arguing for the liberty of Englishmen against the threat of a tyrannical authority (King or dictator).  At any rate, according to Goldstein,  Locke  makes a strong statement against the institution of slavery.  She would offer this an example of what she calls the

“provenance of the moral “intuitions” harbored within moral philosophy.” (see page 20)

But are these claims of the significance of philosophical arguments in the development of humanitarianism and the anti-slavery movement really credible?  How do they measure up to the historical events and social processes from which a more conscientious humanitarianism arose, and gave basis for the movements to eradicate the institution of slavery?  When you look, even cursorily, at the historical events and social developments that led to progress in these areas you find that philosophers – with their rational arguments – did not play the major role that Goldstein insinuates.   A cursory look at the history of anti-slavery and abolitionists discloses the involvement a variety of persons and the play of social-economic forces.

It is true that some philosophers, such as those associated with the Enlightenment who wrote of the rights of all people in the face of Royalist tyranny and others who emphasized the importance of human freedom, played a role in changing some peoples’ thinking on the status of some human beings as mere property of the slave owners.   But probably a greater role was played by political movements such as the French Revolution and by religious leaders who seriously questioned the compatibility of Christian values and the institution of slavery.  In England where the anti-slavery movement started we hear of the activism of Quakers (e.g., Anthony Benezet, a Quaker whose family moved to America in the late eighteenth century) and people like Thomas Clarkson, who was a great early organizer of abolitionists.  Neither of these men were philosophers and we don’t have reason for thinking they were inspired by abstract, philosophical arguments to take up the cause of anti-slavery.

In both England and America, many of the early abolitionists had religious motivation for their stand against slavery.  It would be hard to find philosophical abstract arguments motivating an abolitionist like John Brown and his followers, who resorted to violence to fight slavery.  And we cannot overlook the role that victims of slavery themselves played in bringing about changes that inspired society to oppose slavery:  the Haitian slaves’ insurrection of the 18th century, for example.  The writings and activism of former slaves like Frederick Douglas and the example of Nat Turner, who led a slave rebellion in Virginia in 1831.  These people were not acting because of “abstract moral arguments” by some distant philosophers, but acting from the horrors and suffering that the institution of slavery brought to them and others like them.

Moreover, most probably economic forces and social change (having nothing to do with philosophy) played a big role in bringing about an atmosphere (in thinking, values, and political processes) that led to the end of slavery as an accepted institution.  When commerce and manufacturing resulted in a decrease in the profitable use of human slavery in some advanced societies, the entrenched thinking and ideologies that had supported institutionalize slavery for many centuries begin to weaken.  You don’t have to be a Marxist to recognize that economic forces and commercial interests play a greater role in changing the direction of societies than do the abstract moral arguments of philosophers, not to mention the role that religious faith play in shaping peoples beliefs and values.

Consequently, it seems that Goldstein over-reaches on behalf of the relevance and effectiveness of rational argument and the role that philosophers – with their rational arguments –  played in bringing about an end to slavery and the plight of women (regarded as second-class members of society).  Like with Yanni’s grand statement, so with Goldstein’s declaration of rational philosophy being the starting point of humanitarian developments, when we test the grand statement against the actual social and historical developments we find much reason for doubting and rejecting them.

The humanitarian movements that have helped to bring about the end of the institution of slavery have included social, historical, and economic forces not at all philosophical in nature; and have been executed by different people of different backgrounds, most of whom were not inspired by the “theoretical moral arguments” of some philosopher or other.

December 27, 2012

We Find Discrimination Everywhere!

Filed under: ethics,humor,Irony — Tags: , — jbernal @ 8:31 am

by Juan Bernal

Before the passage of civil rights and voting rights legislation in the 1960s and 70s, many southern states required that voters answer questions meant to show their qualification for voting.  White people would get some softball question like “How many eggs in a dozen?”; whereas, blacks would be hit with questions about relativity physics or quantum physics: “Explain the Copenhagen version of quantum phenomena.”   Who do you suppose was qualified to vote?

 The Joke 

In his latest book for the non-scientific layman, Leonard Mlodinow  (See* below) recounts a joke in his discussion of the stereo-typing and categorization of people.  As Mlodinow tells it, three gentlemen (a white Catholic, a white Jew, and a poor black man) die and head for the gate of heaven where the Lord will question them to determine their qualifications for entry.

(I’m not sure why Mlodinow puts the Lord performing the function normally assigned to St. Peter; maybe it has something to do with Leonard’s Jewish background.)

What follows is paraphrase of the joke.  I have altered Mlodinow’s words slightly.

At any rate, the first man, a white Catholic, comes to the gate and stands before the Lord who asks that he state his qualifications for entry into heaven.  The Catholic answers: “Lord, I followed all the rules of the church, regularly attended mass, and was kind to my fellow humans, even if others were biased against me because of my Catholicism.”  The Lord says fine, but before I let you enter you must correctly spell a word.  “What word, Lord?” the Catholic asks.  “God”, says the Lord.  The Catholic easily spells G-O-D  and is granted entry.

Next, the Jewish gentleman comes to the gate and stands before the Lord who asks this fellow the same question: what are his qualifications for entry into heaven.  The Jewish man answers: “Lord, I followed your commandments, studied and revered the Torah, and treated all people as I wanted them to treat me, despite all the anti-Semitism directed against me.”  The Lord says fine, but before I let you enter you must correctly spell a word.  “What word, Lord?” the Jew asks.  The word is “God”, says the Lord.  The Jew easily spells G-O-D  and is granted entry.

Finally, the poor old black man, comes to the gate and stands before the Lord who asks the same question as with the other two. The black man answers: “Lord, I despite all the racist discrimination that I had to endure I never became bitter but always tried to follow your teaching, and I always tried to treat every one kindly and fairly, regardless of the color of their skin.”  The Lord smiles and says that’s good,  but before I let you enter you must correctly spell a word.  “What word, Lord?” the black man asks.  “Czechoslovokia,”  says the Lord. …

(Some things never change!)

(No people.  This is not a racist joke!)

————————-

An Elaboration on this instructive joke.

According to an anonymous reviewer of Mlodinow’s book, the joke was read to a conference of community college philosophy instructors (Western States, including California), 650 of whom were given a questionnaire to get their interpretation of the joke.  (I have not been able to confirm that this survey really did take place, but simply describe what was reported to me.)

The respondents distributed as follows:

32% correctly read the joke as commentary on the universality of racial prejudice and hypocrisy (even the Lord..)

16% correctly noted that the joke said something about our ideas of justice and fair play

12% did not even see the point of the joke at all, asking lame questions like, “Why Czechoslovakia?”

(These are philosophy instructors, you must understand their limitations.)

8% were bothered by the story’s placing God and not St. Peter as heaven’s gate keeper, and could not get past that bit of incongruity to answer other questions.

10% were Christian theists who objected strongly to the way the joke characterized the Lord as being unjust to the black man.  Why, God would never do that!

12% did not understand why Mlodinow would include the joke in a chapter on our unconscious stereo-typing and categorization.

5% were offended by what they mistook as a racist joke.

The remaining 5% were black philosophy instructors who just laughed, asked “So what’s new?” and went about their conference business.

——————————————-

* Subliminal, How your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior. Mlodinow is a physicist at Caltech who co-authored The Grand Design, with Stephen Hawkin; and had an earlier, very entertaining book, The Drunkard’s Walk – How Randomness Rules our Lives

December 2, 2012

Is torture of a person ever morally justified?

Filed under: ethics — Tags: — jbernal @ 11:00 am

By Juan Bernal

A corresponding philosopher, call him “John,”  posed the following example of “justified torture”, and followed with a few questions:

Suppose that a kid-napper has taken a child, and holds it for ransom. The kid-napper buries the child in an underground vault with limited air supply. The police capture the kid-napper who refuses to divulge the whereabouts of the vault.

Would Dirty Harry, the detective, be morally justified in using torture, since there is not sufficient time to obtain truth serum, or any other means of obtaining  the information needed to save the child’s life?

Do you believe that the example shows that torture is sometimes justified if done with a good will?

Or is torture always wrong?

Or is torture only justified if the actual results (not the intended results) are good?

———————————

I replied with the following remarks:  John, I cannot imagine too many real-world case in which torture of a human being (with or without a good will) would be morally justified.  So, I’m inclined to say that torturing of a human being is not morally justifiable; although it is not always an inhumane or criminal act. 

How’s that for hedging?!

In your example, we have to buy into the premise that torturing the kidnapper will result in the information necessary to save the child.  Then the question is whether this means of extracting the information (torture) is morally justifiable, if it will save the victim, the kidnapped child.  Likely, most of us are inclined to say that  such torture is morally justified; but we’re inclined to do so because of the way the case is presented: The criminal is at the receiving end of the torture; he probably deserves it; and this is the only way of saving the kidnapped child.  What rational, morally conscientious person would ever trade the well-being of the kidnapper for the sure death of the child?  Not many, if any.  But this is a made-up case, probably only good as a classroom example for discussion. It is not the type of case that people are likely to confront.

In the real world, nobody knows at the outset of the torture session that it will result in the life-saving information.  Nobody can even be certain that the child is still alive. In many real-world cases, we often don’t know that the person being tortured is really a criminal or bad person deserving such intense pain. With reference to a real-world case, let’s ask your question again: Is torture of the kidnapper morally justified?  Here the answer is not so clear.  Here we have to make a ‘judgement call’ which may or may not be correct.  Here we cannot be certain that we would be doing the morally right thing, either by torturing the alleged Kidnapper or refusing to torture.

A similar dilemma arises concerning the CIA’s use of waterboarding to try to get information from suspected terrorists.  Is such torture justifiable when the information can only be gotten from that individual?  Is it justifiable when other sources might be available?  Is it justifiable when the information might prevent another deadly terrorist attack?

Of course, philosophers are fond of imagining crazy cases in which one might be inclined to affirm that torture of a person (even of an innocent child) is morally justified.  For example, if by allowing such torture, the suffering of millions would cease and be replaced by great well being for all (a paradise on earth; millions of children no longer suffer sickness, hunger, and cruelty).  Then the questioner, maybe a Utilitarian, will press the issue by pointing out how great the ratio of happiness is gained over the suffering of the one victim, 200 million / one.  Then how could any rational, morally attentive person deny the moral justification of the torture?


Plug in your own answer; but it probably won’t say much about real-world moral dilemma that people often face.

So I will go out on the limb and declare that torturing people in attempts to extract crucial information is not a morally justifiable act.  It might turn out to be a prudent or utilitarian act, one that yields some desirable result.   But in the end, the torturer (if he/she is honest) might have to admit to gaining a desirable result through immoral means.  It is similar to the acts in a war in which our warriors have to kill enemy soldiers.  Is the killing of human beings morally justified?   Or is it merely the prudent, practical thing that must be done when one is a soldier and the nation is at war, with no implication that it is the morally justifiable thing to do?  Or probably a better example is the case of Israeli secret service agents tracking down and killing suspected anti-Israeli terrorists.  They get very good at this and probably do something that reduces the terrorist threat against Israel.  But do they do something that is morally justifiable?  It is likely that some of them conclude that in hunting down the suspected terrorist they (Israeli agents) have had to become terrorists themselves.   That is not a case of moral justification.

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