On Representations: A Strange Philosophical View of Perceptual Experience
Consider the phrase: “…to be aware of objects in the world, I must form a representation of them “inside,”in my brain or in my mind.” The purported locations of the ‘representations’ are not at all equivalent or even in similar categories. “In the brain” is clear enough a locations and would be a clear reply to the question “Where is X located?” But “in the mind” is completely metaphorical and does not at all state an unambiguous location. “In my mind” simply means in my thoughts or alternatively, something about which I think. A lover who writes of his beloved, “I have you in my mind,” does not claim that the beloved inhabits his brain, rather than where ever she happens to be. He merely states that he has her in his thoughts or is thinking of her. “She is in my mind” does not at all answer the question “Where is she?” To think it does is tantamount to a category error.