Philosophy Lounge

October 4, 2011

Our Beloved Filo-Sofi’a – Is she Dulcinea or Aldonza?

Filed under: All,humor and philosophy,Irony — Tags: — jbernal @ 11:58 am

By Juan Bernal

Dulcinea: Don Quijote’s imagined damsel, a mythical lady of perfect virtue and beauty beyond description.

Aldonza: The actual woman that Quijote pursued, a poor, young woman who worked at the roadside inn frequented by mule-drivers and ruffians of all variety.

(Both ladies are characters in Miguel de Cervantes’ great novel, Don Quijote De La Mancha)

Elements of the Story:

As Miguel de Cervantes [1] described him, Don Quijote was an elderly “hidalgo” (Spanish nobleman) who read too many romantic novels and became deluded and partially insane as a result. He became obsessed with the idea that he was a knight of old, who would take up the mission of fighting evil and defending all that’s good and beautiful. Part of his romantic delusion required that he have a lady to whom he would dedicate all his knightly accomplishments, a lady of unsurpassed beauty and flawless virtue. He named her “Dulcinea” and in his feverish delusion somehow associated her with a young woman who worked at the roadside inn at a place called Toboso, a poor woman of questionable virtue named Aldonza, whom Quijote had not actually ever seen. So he was free to imagine what his “lady’ must be like. At one point in the story he had his faithful squire, Sancho Panza, make the long journey to Taboso and deliver a letter he had written to his ‘Dulcinea.’ [2]

After Sancho finds and talks with Aldonza at the Toboso, he returns and reports to his master. What follows is a hilarious and revealing dialogue between Quijote and his squire [3]:

Quijote: Tell me all about it. What did you say? What did she reply? Did you find her stringing pearls to send to her noble knight? Or bordering a clothed message with gold?
Sancho: Well, I found her husking several baskets of wheat in the corral.
Quijote: Tell me, did not the grains of wheat become pearls in her hands? Surely they were white grains of the highest quality?
Sancho: Nope, just regular, low-grade grains of wheat.
. . . .
Quijote: So tell me more. What charming conversations did you have with her? Did she ask much about me?
Sancho: She did not ask anything. I just told her about your dedication to her and all the penance and hardship that you endured for her, naked from the waist up in the frigid mountain as if you were a wild animal, going without food and sleeping on the floor, with beard uncombed, crying and bemoaning your fate.
Quijote: There you messed up, for I do not bemoan my fate. Instead I bless her and bless every day of my life for making me worthy of loving as grand and tall a lady as Dulcinea of Toboso!
Sancho: Tall she is not. She stands a bare micro inch taller than me! (Sancho is a very short fellow.)
Quijote: What? You measured yourself with her? How did that happen?
Sancho: Well I helped her to lift the sack of wheat onto a shelf and standing close to her I noticed that we were nearly the same height.
Quijote: Well, anyway I shall adorn her stature with millions of measures of gratitude from my soul. Now tell me, when you stood near to her, did you not perceive her fragrant, heavenly aroma, an aroma so sweet I lack the words to describe it?
Sancho: All I can say, Sire, is that I smelled a faint hint of masculine-like sweat; and it must have been because of all the work she had done, she was perspiring and wet with sweat.
Quijote: That can’t be! Your brains must have malfunctioned and you smelled yourself, because I know very well how sweet a rose smells, or the scent of a lily in the meadow, or the aroma of diluted amber.
Sancho: Yes, Sire, it could be true. I have often given off an odor and thought it came from another as from your lady Dulcinea. But it is not that much a mysterious happening, as much as the work of some little devil up to his tricks here and there.
Quijote: All right, all right, so she finished with the husking and put away the wheat. Then surely she read my letter. What did she say when she read it?
Sancho: She did not read it because she said she could neither read nor write. She tore up the letter into little pieces, saying that she did not want anyone to know her secrets, and asked that I just tell her what your wrote. So I told her about your love for her, all the brave deeds you do for her, and all the penance that you endure for her. Hearing all this she thought it was funny and said she would like to meet you sometime. But she laughed hilariously when I told her your title: the Knight of the Woeful Countenance.

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Commentary

Obviously Sancho’s earthly and realistic perception of “Dulcinea” is very different from Quijote’s illusory picture of the lady. Dulcinea is really Aldonza; and Aldonza is nothing to brag about. But reports from the real world do not have any effect on the mind of Quijote. He is completely dedicated and in a state of deep, Platonic love!

Now, what does all this have to do with philosophy? Maybe not much or maybe a great deal. Lately I have entertained the idea that many enthusiasts of philosophy appear somewhat ‘quixotic’ in their love and devotion to ‘philosophy,’ or what they perceive as philosophy. Granted that they do not actually think of philosophy as a nearly divine lady, but some of their praise for philosophy sounds similar in some respects to Quijote’s exaggerated praise and delusional love for his lady Dulcinea.
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Philosophy as a Divine Calling?

There is an ancient history behind the Romantic’s love and praise for philosophy, which in an exaggerated form sees the philosophy as a calling from the gods. We can find seeds of this attitude in Socrates’ defense of his practice of philosophy with the citizens of Athens in Plato’s dialogue, The Apology. In considering the possibility of pardon should he agree to stop his philosophical questioning and examining the beliefs of the people, Socrates rejects that possibility with the following statement of his commitment to philosophy:

“Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but can’t you hold hour tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less like to believe. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you.”

(Apology, The Dialogues of Plato, translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford University Press, 1952, page 210) [my emphasis]

Socrates characterizes his work in philosophy as a “calling of the God” and as the “greatest good of man,” and rejects a life without philosophy as a life not worth living. Given such statements of the value of philosophy, it is easy to understand the boundless praise and nearly divine status that many people apply to philosophy.
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Is there an Analogy?

Obviously the character Socrates is very different from the delusional Don Quijote. The ‘Socrates’ of Plato’s dialogues is an admirable, courageous, rational character, not given to romantic delusions. Don Quijote, while exhibiting an odd type of courage and commitment, is obviously out of touch with reality. Without his realistic, unimaginative companion, Sancho Panza, to look out for him, Quijote would have quickly fallen prey to the many predators of the Spanish countryside. But there is an interesting analogy between the quixotic illusion and the Socratic vision. Both envision a divine-like object to which they are completely devoted. Socrates saw philosophy (as he practiced it) as being a divine mission and the greatest good available to humanity. Quijote saw his lady as nearly divine in virtue and beauty. Socrates was willing to do anything, even accept a death sentence, for his philosophy. Quijote was prepared to undergo all trials and tribulation, all impossible struggles and hopeless combat, for his lady Dulcinea.

Suppose we take the perspective of a Sancho Panza – the realist who is not captivated by all this talk of divine status, greatest good to man, and incomparable beauty – and ask: Does the Socratic idea of a divinely-inspired philosophy also need the remedial shock treatment that the real, flesh-and-blood Aldonza brings to the mythical Dulcinea? Is philosophy as envisioned by Socrates and all the Romantics who followed somewhat like the mythical Dulcinea, i.e., a rather pretentious calling but not one that actually takes place in real life? On the other hand, is philosophy as actually practiced by real, fallible humans, more like the poor, uneducated Aldonza? (It can be of some assistance to the sciences, to governance, and the business of living; but it is folly to see it as a divine calling, as searching for a deep Truth, or as being the greatest benefit to humanity.)

Philosophy is not a noble, lady of highest culture. Philosophy is more the working woman who is very much a human being and subject to human limitations. Philosophy is not a divine calling; it is not the “Queen of the Sciences,” nor “the greatest good of humanity.” Philosophy is just hard, piecemeal work. Much of it is the natural preserve of the academics (they manage to clarify a few things); some of it is the work of ordinary people trying to get some understanding of a range of human problems. Much of it goes on without notice or appreciation by the world at large. Much of it is like poor Aldonza, busy in the corral of the roadside inn, just preparing a batch of wheat for the next baking of bread.
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[1] Spanish author Miguel de Cervantes is one of the greatest novelists of the Spanish language. His masterpiece, Don Quixote (1605), is one of the most important and influential books in the history of the novel. Cervantes lived from 1547 to 1616. He and Shakespeare died on the same day, Died: April 23, 1616. Cervantes’ stature in Spanish literature is equal to Shakespeare’s in the English language.

[2] Likely most contemporary readers are familiar with Quijote, Sancho Panza, Aldonza, and the confused antics of the “Knight of the Woeful Countenance” by way the “Man of La Mancha” a 1965 a very successful Musical by Dale Wasserman.

[3] This is my attempt at translating the dialogue between Quijote and Sancho Panza from Spanish to English. For those interested and motivated enough, there are surely much better English translations of the novel and of this particular dialogue, as a number of excellent translations of Cervantes’ work are readily available.

June 1, 2011

A Case of Mild Insanity? Physics & Philosophy

“We create history by our observation, rather than history creating us.”

(Steven Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design)

I read a statement like this one and I ask: who has gone insane, the great physicists or me? But it is not just the theoretical physicists and cosmologists who try my sanity of late. The philosophers also have their role in this mad comedy.

Below I list some statements that most of us accept without hesitation.

Why should anyone have to argue for any of these propositions? Aren’t they obviously true, something any sane person can easily affirm?

But in my studies of philosophy and an overview of some the sciences (primarily physics and cosmology), many experts reject each of these common-place propositions.

Consider that most of us affirm

….that we exist as persons among other persons with whom we communicate and interact.

…..that these other persons are mindful beings much like oneself.

….that our reality includes a natural and social environment.

….that we perceive and have knowledge of animals, plants, hills, and other people in these environments.

….that many of us enjoy significant degrees of freedom and self-determination.

….that our past differs from our present and future in being closed and beyond alteration, whereas our present and future are relatively open.

….that the world we inhabit is one world and not an infinity of worlds.

….that the world exists independently of our experience of it.

….that much in our environment (especially our natural environment) was there long before we came on the scene.

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But, much to surprise of many of us, we actually have to affirm and argue for these propositions because brilliant people — e.g., scientists, philosophers — have argued and currently argue the contrary.

Let us take them one by one, and briefly state the challenge.

We exist as persons among other persons with whom we communicate and interact.
Believe it or not, a good part of Western epistemology has consisted of the effort to deal with the skeptical view which declares that all I really know is that I (the conscious individual) exist as a thinking being (see Rene Descartes); I cannot even be sure I am a corporeal being. Any belief concerning all ‘things’ external to the immediate content of the individual mind is in question and must be defended by rational argumentation.

Other people are mindful beings much like myself.
Another problem that philosophers in the West have grappled with is that of showing that there are other minds besides one’s own.
“Yes, those creatures out there look, act, and speak as if they had minds similar to mine; but that is only something I infer from their outward behavior. I really don’t know that they have minds.”
Can you believe that this has been taken as a serious problem in philosophy?

Our reality consists of a natural and social environment.
A close analysis of our experience and the workings of our brain indicates that all we really experience is a model concocted by our brain’s reception of signals from the external world, but we cannot be identify, much less describe, the reality external to the workings of the brain. Hence, we cannot be sure about that the nature of that reality.
In their recent book, The Grand Design, Steven Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow suggest this skepticism regarding our ordinary notions of ‘reality’:

“Model-dependent realism: … our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world.” “Realism: the idea that there’s a world with particular properties that exists independently of the observer. (418, Kindle) – Modern physics makes it difficult to defend realism, e.g. refer to problems of QM (423, Kindle)

We perceive and have knowledge of animals, plants, hills, and other people in our environments.
Traditional Western philosophers tend to adopt theories of perception which deny that we ever directly perceive ordinary things (animals, trees, people, dogs) in our environment. Instead that claim is that all we directly perceive are the immediate sense data or impressions in the mind; hence, our putative knowledge of ordinary things in the external environment is thrown in doubt. Oddly, some modern physicists and psychologists have also taken this skeptical view concerning knowledge.

Many of us enjoy significant degrees of freedom and self-determination.
Historically, the free will / determinism problem with which Western philosophers have grappled throws into question our ordinary belief that we have a degree of autonomy, freedom and self-determination. Allegedly, once we understand the real workings of the world we should recognize that everything we do is pre-determined by conditions over which we have no control. Again, surprisingly a number of modern scientists (mainly psychologists and physicists) have taken this position which denies autonomy to persons.
Hawking and Mlodinow:

“we are no more than biological machines and free will is just an illusion.”

Our past differs from our present and future in being closed and beyond alteration; whereas our present and future are relatively open.
This is one that most sane persons never question; but surprisingly, theoretical physicists draw the contrary conclusion when they apply the paradoxes and puzzles of quantum physics to the macro-world. Again, a recent example is the Hawking-Mlodinow book, The Grand Design, where they state the following:

“Quantum physics tells us that no matter how thorough our observation of the present, the (unobserved) past, like the future is indefinite and exists only as a spectrum of possibilities. The universe, according to quantum physics, has no single past, or history. The fact that the past takes no definite form means that observations you make on a system in the present affect its past.” (802 on my Kindle counter)

The world we inhabit is one world and not an infinity of worlds.
The contrary view is taken by a number of scientific cosmologists; for example, Hawking-Mlodinow, in The Grand Design, have stated:

“The universe appeared spontaneously, starting off in every possible way. (1384-90 Kindle counter) Most of those correspond to other universes …. Many universes exist with many different sets of physical laws.” (1394-96 Kindle counter)
“The universe does not have a just a single existence or history, but rather every possible version of the universe exists simultaneously in what is called quantum super-position. (582, Kindle)

The world exists independently of our experience of it.
Again some theoretical physicists have argued the contrary. Again I give quotes from The Grand Design:

“There is no way to remove the observer – us – from our perception of the world, which is created through our sensory processing and through the way we think and reason..” (228 Kindle) “Realism: the idea that there’s a world with particular properties that exists independently of the observer. (-418 Kindle) – Modern physics makes it difficult to defend realism, e.g. refer to problems of QM (-423 Kindle) “

Much in our environment (especially our natural environment) was there long before we came on the scene.
Consider the natural scene: animals, plants, oceans, continents, mountains, canyons (e.g. The Grand Canyon of Arizona). Surely, unless you inhabit an insane asylum and suffer from a specific delusion, you will agree that these things were there long before humans arrived on the scene. Yet, again, some theoretical physicists have suggested a view of physical reality which states the contrary. For example, again from The Grand Design:

“We create history by our observation, rather than history creating us.” (1416-22, Kindle)

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Of course, in my many blog postings I argue for the common-sense view of things with regard to these and other issues. My working hypothesis is I’m not the one suffering a mild degree of insanity. But, of course, I could be wrong.

September 22, 2010

Our Premature Jump to the New Millennium

Filed under: humor,humor and philosophy — Tags: — jbernal @ 1:05 pm

Most people took the transition from 1999 – 2000 as the transition to new millennium.
Most people took the transition from 1899 – 1900 as the transition to new century.
Most people took the transition from 2009 – 2010 as the transition to 2nd decade.
They were wrong!

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There are many topics which provoke debate and even hostility, such as politics and religion. Wise barbers and taxi drivers avoid such topics for fear annoying or disturbing their customers. Better to stay with talk about the weather or sports, but even talk about football or baseball can be sensitive subjects. In this blog I don’t avoid topics which can be minefields of controversy such as subjects of political thought, economic theory, religion and philosophy. Hopefully readers will find much to stimulate thought and even find some discussions to be educational. Readers will also find much that will disturb their ordinary ideas and even provoke angry responses. That is fine as long as we keep the discussion civil; I welcome disagreement. It challenges me to clarify and improve my philosophical expression.

The Puzzle of New Millennia, New Century, and New Decade:

Contrary to political and religious topics which are important and controversial, there are some which, although somewhat trivial, provoke much dispute. One of this was the question that some of us posed before the turn of the century: When does the new millennium really begin? As most of you recall, the world in general celebrated the start of the new millennium on January 1, 2000. But this bothered a few of us. We took on the role of spoil sports and pointed out that the world was premature in their celebration by one year. The new millennium did not start until January 1, 2001, we argued. People were annoyed, even irritated, by this reasonable dissent to the popular opinion. Personally I annoyed and irritated a few friends and colleagues by arguing that the transition to the new millennium was the transition from the year 2000 to 2001, not the transition from 1999 to year 2000, as most people thought. Along with other knit-pickers like myself, I argued that when we count decades (or ten of any countable items, e.g., coins in my pocket, beans in a bag, people in a room) we start with the first item and recite “one,” add 1 for each year, and finish with the tenth year (tenth item) and recite “ten.” In other words, the decade runs from 1 through 10, the century runs from 1 through 100, and the millennium runs from 1 through 1000. So, 10, 100, and 1000 are the numbers that indicate the end of the decade, century, and millennium respectively (not the numbers 9, 99, and 999 respectively). The logical conclusion is that years 11, 101, and 1001 mark the start of the succeeding decade, century, or millennium. From which it follows logically that year 2001, not year 2000, was the start of the new millennium ten years ago. The new millennium should have been celebrated on January 1, 2001!

But notwithstanding the logical validity of these arguments, the world celebrated the new millennium on January 1, 2000. My analytical, logical friends and I marveled at what appeared to us as a nearly universal confusion. Was this general confusion just a phenomenon connected with the excitement of the new millennium? Added to this great anticipation of the imminent new millennium was the general apprehension, even fear, about how our computer systems would handle the change of year designation from ‘1999’ to ‘2000.’ People feared that computer systems would crash and many vital functions disrupted. But, as most will recall, computer specialists prepared early for the transition and things went smoothly for most companies and government agencies. The world as we know it did not end on January 1, 2000! But getting back to the premature observance and celebration of the new millennium, let’s ask again: Was this error one that was unique to the transition to the new millennium?

After some reflection and brief study, I found that this general error and confusion was not limited to the transition to a new millennium at years 1999-2000-2001. It has occurred also with respect to transitions between centuries and decades. Newspaper and history book accounts from the year 1899 indicated that folks back then also celebrated the transition to the new century prematurely, on January 1, 1900. They did not wait for the correct start of the twentieth century, January 1, 1901. Were they simply too impatient? Likewise, most people think that this current year of 2010 marks the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century (as indicated by my informal, unscientific polling of relatives, friends and neighbors). But when we apply the logical arguments stated above, we see that the start of the second decade does not happen until the year 2011. Our high school graduating class of 1960 recently held a reunion. Most of my old classmates held that our graduating class was the first of the 1960 decade. But, again, simple logic shows that 1960 was the final year of the 1950 decade, not the start of the 1960s.

Grouping numbers with other numbers that look the same.

So what is happening here? Surely people are not that illogical. Are they simply too impatient and prematurely mark transitions from one decade, century, or millennium to the next, mistaking the transition from 1999 to 2000 for the correct transition from 2000 to 2001? My initial diagnosis relies on simple folk psychology: People tend to group numbers with sets of numbers that look the same, rather than consider what those numbers signify. For example, the year 1960 looks like the years 1961 – 1969. These are the sixties, after all! The year 2010 looks like the years 2011 – 2019, and therefore belongs with that group. And the year 1900 looks like the years 1901 through 1999, and belongs with that group. Finally, anyone can see that year 2000 resembles years 2001 through 2999, and therefore belongs with the new millennium! Most people are prone to this natural way of thinking; and are not too impressed by logical arguments that demonstrate that our natural inclination to group numbers by appearance results in error. Most of those friends and colleagues that I approached on this question of the correct transition time, either laughed at me or expressed annoyance that I spent any time on such a trivial topic. The transition to the new millennium happens when the world agrees that it happens, and we don’t have time for the technical dissent (on a triviality) of a few mathematicians and logicians!

Yes, they’re surely correct. This is surely not a crucial issue which can affect what happens in our world. People observe and celebrate transitions when they think it appropriate. “Let us move on to more interesting and important issues,” seems to be the prevailing attitude. I agree; there are more interesting and interesting issues to discuss. But before wrapping this one up, let me see whether we can find a significant philosophical point behind all this disputation about the start of the next decade, century or millennium. Hopefully the reader will exercise a little more forbearance and stay with me for a few more paragraphs.

Numbers as Labels Versus Numbers as Counting Numbers:

A curious fact about our use of numbers is that we use them in two very different ways, often without noticing this difference. A number can function as a label or name for something; and a number can function as a member of series of numbers. Examples of the use of numbers as labels or names are easy to find: the street number ‘15’ may be used to identify a particular city street; the number ‘2502’ may identify a specific property; or the number “18” a particular floor in a high-rise building. In each case, the fact that the street may not really be the fifteenth street in the city (there are only fourteen streets), or that there aren’t 2501 properties lined up prior to property 2502, or that the high-rise building omits the thirteenth floor, going from floor 12 to floor 14, does not affect the identification of 15th street, or address 2502, or the identification of floor 18 on our high-rise. Here the numbers function as labels or names; they are simply identifiers. They could just as well be names using only alphabetical characters. The number ‘15’ for our street functions the same as the name “Elm” in identifying a specific Avenue. The number ‘2501’ functions the same as a name — e.g. the James place — would work to identify a specific property. This use of numbers (as labels or identifiers only) can apply to our telephone or cell phone numbers, to our social security numbers and other numbers that are assigned to us at various stages of our lives. In earlier years of the telephone, telephone identifiers included words or letters along with numbers. The numbers were not counting numbers.

With the second use of numbers, the function of the number is not limited to identifying the item at issue. If I tell you correctly that the new Chevrolet parked outside my house is the eighth car I have owned, the number ‘8’ could identify the car as car number 8. But the number ‘8’ also tells you that if you count the number of cars I have owned starting with my first as ‘1’, the Chevrolet would be number ‘8’; in other words ‘8’ is part of a series of numbers (counting numbers) representing a series of cars that I have owned.
Along the same line, if I tell that I was the fourth child born to my parents, I not simply labeling myself as the “fourth child,” although this label would be accurate enough. I would also be telling that, counting each child from the first to me, assigning a number to each, you would arrive at the number ‘4’. Child number 4 indicates ‘4’ as a usable label, but more importantly, it indicates my birth as occurring fourth in line. In short, ‘4’ functions as a member of a counting series of numbers. Likewise, if I tell you correctly that this year marked my 41st wedding anniversary, I’m not simply naming or labeling this year as marriage number ‘41’; I’m telling you that 41 years have passed since my wife and I were wed. Count them, one by one, starting with year 1969, and you get ‘41’. The same is true for the use of numbers to indicate our age. This year I am 50 identifies this year as year ‘50’ for me; but it also tells you that if you count the years from my birth starting with ‘1’ and adding ‘1’ for each year until the current year, you will derive my age. The number ‘50’ is part of a series of counting numbers, 1 through 50.

Now let us apply this distinction between numbers as labels and as counting numbers to the question of new millennia, centuries, and decades. The number 2010 is not just a label for the current year; it also functions as a counting number (count the number of years since the start of the decade at year 2001, adding ‘1’ for each year and the total is ‘10’ and you arrive at number ‘2010.’ Hence, 2010 marks the end of the first decade. The number 1900 is not just a label assigned to a specific year. It represents a number in a counting series; in principle, were you to count years from 1 through 1900, adding ‘1’ for each year, after 1900 additions you would arrive at year 1900. But 1900 divided by 100 yields 19. So ‘1900’ marked the end of 19 centuries, with the year 1901 marking the start of the 20th century. Likewise, the year 2000 was not just a label for that year ten years ago. It also indicated that 2000 years had passed since our conventional start of the Julian calendar at year ‘1’. Now when we divide 2000 by 100 we get the answer ‘20’; so 2000 marked the end of 20 centuries, year 2001 as the start of the new twenty-first century. The case for correct identification of the new millennium is easier. Divide 2000 by 1000 and you get ‘2’ with no remainder. So the year ‘2000’ marked the end of the second millennium, with year ‘2001’ marking the start of the new millennium. Hence, when we take into account the use of the numbers ‘2000’ and ‘2001’ as counting numbers, and not simply labels, it follows that January 1, 2001 was the start of the new millennium, and the general observance of the new millennium on January 1, 2000 was an error. Observing the new millennium at the start of year 2000 betrayed a general failure to distinguish between two distinct functions of numbers. This is moderately offensive to anyone who likes to see things done rationally and cleanly.

Does this matter to anyone besides people like me who dwell on these oddities? Maybe not or maybe it could. One could imagine the confusion that might arise when a person on floor fifteen needs emergency attention and the paramedics are sent to floor fourteen instead because someone did not see the difference between ‘15’ used as name or label and its use as part of counting series, a straight count of floors from 1 to 15. Or imagine a stranded soldier who is told that the third platoon will rescue him, but counts only two platoons passing his position and fails to signal his presence and is not rescued. The second platoon passing by was really the ‘third’ platoon. Does this ever happen? I imagine that it does happen and has happened in the past.

May 30, 2010

Philosophical Jokes and Embellishments

Filed under: humor and philosophy — Tags: — jbernal @ 11:44 am

Most people are surprised to hear there’s such a thing as philosophical humor, since most philosophy and philosophers, with a few exceptions, seem humorless. Well, it may just be a way of keeping their sanity, but some people in philosophy do have a sense of humor and can poke fun at themselves. Here I offer a few examples of philosophical humor, with some embellishment to bring out the more subtle points of each joke. (These are jokes that have been floating around the philosophy-blogosphere; their original authorship is mostly unknown.)

I do not suggest that most readers of this blog need help understanding the point of the joke. I’m sure that most of you do not. But I feel that even philosophical jokes have multiple levels of meaning and can be instructive. (Hopefully this is not a case of someone elaborating a joke to make it humorless!)
Look for the bracketed commentary: [xx]

First I have a set of fairly obvious jokes that don’t require much elaboration. But being an incurable elaborator, I shall elaborate a little.

Easy & Obvious Jokes:

Dean, to the physics department: “Why do I always have to give you guys so much money, for laboratories and expensive equipment and stuff? Why couldn’t you be like the math department? All they need is money for pencils, paper and waste-paper baskets? Or even better, why aren’t you like the philosophy department? All they need are pencils and paper.”

[In Mathematics they keep only that work which passes muster, theorems which can be proved. The rest is thrown in the waste basket. But in philosophy everything is kept; nothing is rejected as unworthy of attention. Nothing is thrown away, so there’s no need for waste baskets.
Actually this is a bit unfair to the discipline of philosophy. All ideas and theories might be discussed; but some are rejected in favor of others which stand the tests of logic, reason, and evidence better. But it is true that philosophy lacks the clear criteria of proof that’s found in mathematics and the general methodology of the sciences; and too much attention is devoted to ideas and theories which should have been discarded.]
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The First Law of Philosophy: For every philosopher, there exists an equal and opposite philosopher.
The Second Law of Philosophy: They’re both wrong.

[This plays on the principle of dynamic physics that each action has an equal reaction, and pokes fun at the fact that for every philosophical proposition one can find a contrary proposition, and for every philosophical theory and equal, opposing theory. Philosophical disagreements seem without end; and most often there are no clear and objective criteria for evaluating those competing theories. In so far as philosophical consensus is lacking, all philosophical theories are wrong, but philosophers never seem to stop talking. This is often the criticism that scientists bring against philosophy. There’s some truth to it; but it tends to over-simply the issues. Consensus among scientific and mathematical professionals is not as pure and complete as they like to believe; and philosophers are not completely lost in a maze of competing ideas and theories. Philosophers actually manage to reach some agreement, make some progress on specific issues, and make positive contributions to a number of other disciplines, including science and mathematics.]

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What is Mind? It does not matter.
What is Matter? Never mind.

[Bertrand Russell attributed this one to his grandmother, in his autobiography. It’s a good rejoinder to the classical metaphysical propositions asserting the dual nature of reality: mental and material. Much time, effort, and print have been expended by philosophers in trying to state the nature of matter and mind, and the relation between the two realms. This is a problem best left to the relevant sciences, which have made great progress in providing meaningful answers. On the contrary, metaphysical speculation seems to go nowhere. Hence, many of us are inclined to repeat the response to the metaphysical question: it doesn’t matter and never mind!]
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The second set is a little more demanding. My exposition might have a point here.

Moderate Difficulty:

A man was walking in the mountains just enjoying the scenery when he stepped too close to the edge of the mountain and started to fall. In desperation he reached out and grabbed a limb of a gnarly old tree hanging onto the side of the cliff. Full of fear he assessed his situation. He was about 100 feet down a shear cliff and about 900 feet from the floor of the canyon below. If he should slip again he’d plummet to his death.

Full of fear, he cries out, “Help me!”

But there was no answer. Again and again he cried out but to no avail.

Finally he yelled, “Is anybody up there?”

A deep voice replied, “Yes, I’m up here.”
“Who is it?”
“It’s the Lord”
“Can you help me?”
“Yes, I can help.”
“Help me!”
“Let go.”
Looking around the man became full of panic. “What?!?!”
“Let go. I will catch you.”

“Uh… Is there anybody else up there?

[Here we have the “test of faith.” In this case, the desperate man was not sure that should he let go he would be saved from sure death by the Lord. He may not even have been sure that the voice which responded to his cry for help was that of the Lord. The man lacks faith in the Lord, or at least in the presence of the Lord. Like many of us, he wants some empirical evidence of an effective rescuer. He could be a rational skeptic, unlike the man of faith who is prepared to make Kierkegaard’s leap of faith despite it’s having no rational grounds at all. Do we let go and trust in God or do we ask whether there’s “anybody else up there”? Most of us secular-minded types would continue yelling for help.]
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A very religious man lived right next door to an atheist. While the religious man prayed day in, day out, and was constantly on his knees in communion with his Lord, the atheist never even looked twice at a church. However, the atheist’s life was good, he had a well-paying job and a beautiful wife, and his children were healthy and good-natured, whereas the pious man’s job was strenuous and his wages were low, his wife was getting fatter every day and his kids wouldn’t give him the time of the day.

So one day, deep in prayer as usual, he raised his eyes towards heaven and asked, “Oh God, I honor you every day, I ask your advice for every problem and confess to you my every sin. Yet my neighbor, who doesn’t even believe in you and certainly never prays, seems blessed with every happiness, while I go poor and suffer many an indignity. Why is this?”

And a great voice was heard from above,
BECAUSE HE DOESN’T BOTHER ME ALL THE TIME!”

[The heathen and non-believers among us love this one. People of religions faith, not so much. But the joke also oversimplifies the faith of religious folks. Many of them do not see their faith as a prudent one which will yield good material results in this life. This is not why they value their faith in God. But some do. I have occasionally joked that if God exists, he would prefer skeptics and atheists to the pious folks. The latter tend to bother him with their petitions and adorations. On the other hand, the skeptics and non-believers tend to be more interesting and entertaining for Him. He prefers a good game of chess to the constant “hosanna” from the pious believers. After all, eternity is a long, long time; and things can get boring even for God.]

———————————————–

When I was young I badly wanted a new, red, Schwinn bicycle in the local store window. But my parents were poor and could not afford to buy it for me. So, being a good Catholic, I recited special prayers each night for that bicycle. After months of diligent praying and not getting my bike, I set aside my prayers and thought long and hard on the problem. Finally I realized that God doesn’t work that way. I had to get the bicycle myself. So after carefully planning my move so as not to get caught, I stole that beautiful, Schwinn bicycle. Then I prayed to God for forgiveness.

[Are prayers answered? It depends on the prayer. How does God work? In mysterious ways, of course. Because of my history of poverty and longing for shiny, new bicycles -- which I never got -- I really enjoyed this one. I was a Catholic kid, but not able to improvise as the boy in this story. It was only after seeing this joke that I really understood that old bumper sticker that many Christians had on their cars: “CHRISTIANS ARE NOT PERFECT, JUST FORGIVEN.” Part of Christian teaching is that the redemptive work of Christ is necessary because humans are weak and cannot avoid sin. Humans need the grace that comes from Christ in order to be saved. Good works alone are insufficient; you need faith, grace, and forgiveness from God. The boy in the story realized this quite well, and got his bicycle in the bargain!]
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Overheard outside the lecture hall: I passed my ethics exam today. I cheated!

[Cheating on an ethics exam? Isn’t that a paradox? Didn’t the course teach that student anything? These are questions that we raise when we think of a course in ethics as providing some moral training, or at least raising the moral consciousness of the students. Seeing an ethics course in this light, we would not expect a student to cheat on his exam. But this assumes too much. A course in ethics most often is a course in ethical theories and principles. The exercises of the course are intellectual ones; not ones in moral training. If students gain in moral consciousness, it is a side product of their primary lessons. Likely, those students who do well in the exam demonstrate only some intellectual progress, and not necessarily moral progress. But most people continue to think that an academic course in ethics does involve some form of moral training or moral awakening. Hence, the statement above sounds funny and paradoxical.]
—————————————–

A philosophy professor walks in to give his class their final. Placing his chair on his desk the professor instructs the class, “Using every applicable thing you’ve learned in this course, prove to me that this chair DOES NOT EXIST.”
So, pencils are writing and erasers are erasing, students are preparing to embark on novels proving that this chair doesn’t exist, except for one student. He spends thirty seconds writing his answer, then quickly turns in his final to the astonishment of his peers.
Time goes by, and the day comes when all the students get their final grades…and to the amazement of the class, the student who only wrote for thirty seconds gets the highest grade in the class.
His answer to the question: “What chair?”

[This is a clever one. How do you prove that something, like the chair on the desk, does not exist? Simply asking “what chair?” does not prove anything. So there’s more going on here.
All philosophy students know that one way to question ordinary existence of something is to focus on the meaning of “exists.” What do we mean when we affirm that X exists? Well, if X is there before me, and I can see and touch it, it exists. But what if I don’t perceive it? Most of us would reply, well you need to get your perceptual faculties checked; because the chair is there on the professor’s desk, whether you see it or not. But some philosophers have argued in favor of the counter-intuitive proposition that “to be is to be perceived” (Bishop Berkeley: esse est percipi). “To exist” is defined as “to be perceived.” The bright and quick student was probably applying this Berkeleian principle in his answer: What chair? I see no chair; therefore it does not exist. This was an exercise in Berkeley’s Idealism.]
——————————————————————

The jokes in the third set are such that you must be familiar with some of what philosophers say and do to get the full implication of the joke.

For the sophisticated:

A boy is about to go on his first date, and is nervous about what to talk about. He asks his father for advice. The father replies: “My son, there are three subjects that always work. These are food, family, and philosophy.”
The boy picks up his date and they go to a soda fountain. Ice cream sodas in front of them, they stare at each other for a long time, as the boy’s nervousness builds. He remembers his father’s advice, and chooses the first topic. He asks the girl: “Do you like potato pancakes?” She says “No,” and the silence returns.
After a few more uncomfortable minutes, the boy thinks of his father’s suggestion and turns to the second item on the list. He asks, “Do you have a brother?” Again, the girl says “No” and there is silence once again.
The boy then plays his last card. He thinks of his father’s advice and asks the girl the following question:
“If you had a brother, would he like potato pancakes?”

[It is hard to say whether the young man impressed his date. Likely not, and if she agreed to see him again, he would be advised to abandon the philosophical tactic. But his hypothetical statement about a hypothetical brother directs attention to the way that philosophers and writers often proceed. In order to explore an issue they often set up hypothetical situations and try to learn the implications: if Jesus did return and tried to help the poor, downtrodden people, what would religious leaders do? (Dostoevsky takes up this hypothetical in his great novel, The Brothers Karamazov, and concludes that Jesus would be imprisoned as a troublemaker.)

Bertrand Russell and G. Frege present the following hypothetical: Suppose there’s a barber in the village who shaves every man who does not shave himself. Does the barber shave himself? Yes, then he does not. No, then he does. This is a little puzzle in formal logic.

By analogy, does the non-existent brother like potato pancakes? We can excuse the girl if she ended that first date early.

Philosophers dealing with the logic of language often assert counter-factuals (contrary to fact situations) and try to draw the relevant implications. A recent example of the statement: “The current king of France is bald.” Do we say that this statement is false or true? If false, then it follows that the king has a full head of hair, which in turn implies the false statement that he exists. If we say that it is true, then the false statement follows that a bald fellow exists and is currently the king of France. The original statement is a coherent one which is either true or false; but either evaluating it as true or as false entails a falsehood. So we’re stuck and don’t know what to say about that perfectly coherent proposition: “The king of France is bald.” Hence, the paradox of the counter-factual proposition.]

——————————————————————-

Descartes is sitting in a bar, having a drink. The bartender asks him if he would like another. “I think not,” he says and vanishes in a puff of logic.

[Most students of philosophy recognized this one as playing on Descartes famous Cogito, ergo sum argument: I think, therefore I am. In other words, given that I have some conscious thought (even a state of doubt), I exist as a thinking being. Then if you deny the antecedent, denial of the consequent seems to follow. I do not think, thus I do not exist. However, this is a logical fallacy, as anyone who has had a basic course in logic knows; and it is not clear that Descartes ever asserted denial of the antecedent of his Cogito argument. The joke is good in that it stimulates some thinking about Descartes’ tactics in his famous work.]
________________________________________

The French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre was in a café working at his craft when a waitress approached him: “Can I get you something to drink, Monsieur Sartre?”

Sartre replied, “Yes, I’d like a cup of coffee with sugar, but no cream”.

Nodding agreement, the waitress walked off to fill the order and Sartre returned to his writing. A few minutes later, however, the waitress returned and said, “I’m sorry, Monsieur Sartre, we are all out of cream — how about with no milk?”

[This is a subtle one, folks. It requires reference to one theme of Sartre’s philosophy, that of the concept of ‘nothing’ in his work Being and Nothingness. Sartre, along with some of the Germans, e.g. Martin Heidegger, often wrote of nothing as if it were a something. If you delve into certain styles of metaphysics and theology, you will find the writer talking about nothingness as if it constituted a special category of reality. It is in this spirit that we should interpret the waitresses question: “We’re out of cream, how about coffee with no milk?”
We ordinary mortals might think that coffee without cream is exactly the same as coffee without milk: namely, black coffee. However, those philosophers who probe deep reality will argue that ‘no cream’ signifies a different reality from ‘no milk.’ Maybe the joke is on them.

With apologies to Lewis Carroll: Nobody unlocked the doors to the office this morning. Nobody must have the keys to the office. How did he get them? That person, nobody, surely gets around! ---- Maybe I’m missing something about the Heideggerian-Sartrean style of metaphysics!]
——————————————————————-

April 20, 2010

More Mad Men and Philosophers – Illusions and Delusions of Freedom

ILLUSION IN ORDINARY LIFE:

Alberto and Ben are walking the Mojave Desert. They’re thirsty and eager to find water. In the distance they see what appears to be an oasis and body of water. Alberto thinks it is real and soon their thirst will be satisfied. Ben wonders if the vision is just an illusion. Only when they get closer will they discover who is right.

ILLUSION ONLY FOR MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS

Alberto and Ben finally reach the oasis and the pool of fresh, cool water. As they slake their thirst, Alberto wonders whether this water which he drinks is really water, or just the appearance (sense datum, sensation in the mind) of water, which might not exist as water-in-itself. He wonders if the oasis that shades him and the water that he drinks are not just elaborate illusions synthesized by his mind.

A VIABLE CASE OF THE “ILLUSION OF FREEDOM”

Truman has lived his entire life in a gigantic bowl (with transparent walls) made to look like an ordinary environment of hills, forests, meadows, rivers, and mountains. Truman has always believed that there are no barriers to his world, and that, if he chooses, he can travel beyond his familiar surroundings and explore the world beyond. In reality, his world is enclosed and he cannot travel beyond its periphery. However, he never tries to pass beyond; and so lives his entire life with the illusion of freedom to wander.

ILLUSION OF FREEDOM ONLY FOR MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS

Alberto and Ben have the freedom and resources to travel the world. So they take advantage of their privileged circumstances and travel to far and exotic places. Alberto revels in his freedom and fully enjoys his travels. Ben worries that it is all just one elaborate illusion. He’s afraid that they really haven’t freely traveled, since, as a metaphysically inclined student, he believes that everything (including their decision and actions) is determined.

A CLEAR CASE OF PEOPLE LACKING AND DESIRING FREEDOM

People who are enslaved (or imprisoned) yearn for a freedom they do not possess; when they see the opportunity, they risk life and limb in an attempt at gaining that freedom.

A CASE IN WHICH ONLY MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS YEARN FOR FREEDOM

Pangloss, who has never been enslaved or imprisoned and who is free to do as he likes, nevertheless yearns for a metaphysical freedom. He yearns to be a spirit who acts in isolation from all material factors that condition his actions.

**********************************************
Commentary

Shawley asked: When we talk about free will we are talking about the mind? Is it is free to think?

Me: I share your perplexity, Shawley, which is why I issued these semi-comical, semi-jocular suggestions that philosophers’ worries often resemble the delusions of madmen. In reply to your question, I would say that the freedom “worth worrying about and worth talking about” (Dennett) is primarily freedom of choice and freedom of action. Even when stated in the old fashioned language of “freedom of will,” the problem concerns real choices and actions, not merely the freedom to think or imagine possible action. Of course, there is a real-world problem of ‘freedom of thought.’ But essentially it refers to freedom to express your ideas and beliefs without fear of persecution, not the mere ability to entertain thought

Shawley: Juan, then you seem to be saying that the average person in the U.S. has more free will than the average in, say, Dafur? Perhaps one has more of the exercise of free will here than there. To me ” w.o. fear of persecution” becomes merely a question in politics. .

Me: Yes, this is why our friend’s reply (Paul’s reply) to one of my examples is puzzling. Referring to my example of Truman, who thought he could move beyond his enclosed world when he really could not, he writes:

You end by saying he lives his entire life with the illusion of freedom to wander. Well, yes and no. Yes in the sense that he can’t wander outside of the bowl for he is permanently enclosed (as is the man in the locked room). However, he can deliberate as to whether he should leave the bowl and wander about as the man in the locked room can deliberate about whether or not to get up and walk out of the room. In this sense the man DOES have free will; for all the factors involved in free will are in order. He has the ability to deliberate albeit he does not know that the option to leave is really not open to him.

Me: So, according to Paul, one has freedom of will when (a) one can deliberate about going to Shangri-La, (b) one mistakenly thinks he can get to Shangri-La, and (c) in fact cannot ever go to that fabled place. Accordingly, one type of ‘Freedom-of-will,’ is simply the freedom to think about doing something which one cannot do but about which one is uninformed.
On these points, I’m with Shawley, namely, very confused. Paul claims a freedom-of-will when the subject has NO REAL CHOICE and lacks the freedom to act. In other words, if I have the delusion that I can run a marathon in one hour, can entertain the thought of of doing this (although it is physically impossible for me ever to do this), I surely don’t have the ‘free-will’ to run such a marathon! Could I correctly say that I am free to run such a marathon? As my boys would say, THAT DOESN’T COMPUTE, DAD!
This does not strike me as any kind of ‘freedom’ worth worrying about or worth having.

Shawley: Juan, I understand what you’re saying; but to me ‘free will’ argues that, despite genetics and environmental factors, humans have a measure of choices which they can freely consider. Freedom of action is a different beastie than freedom of thought. I realize this verges on existentialism, but that is not my point. If a god knows the future, or if I am genetically programmed in many ways, or I live in a constrained environment – I still have free will. You argue that a Roman Emperor had free will; but an uneducated Gaulish, or Jewish, peasant who was “tied” to the land – was essentially devoid of free will. No, I say his freedom of action was quite limited. It seems that you would see most people in history as mere puppets, manipulated by kings & genetics (etc.), with their minds devoid of choices. If I win the lottery do I suddenly have “more” free will in my mind? My answer is no.
Freedom of action does not equal free will.
For me, free will is a function of the mind (perhaps the brain) – not a measure of degrees of freedom of action.

Me: Shawley, I prefer to avoid the term “free will” because it suggests some mysterious faculty of mind which operates independently of genetic and environmental factors. I don’t think there is such a thing; and it seems to be a mistaken turn in discussions of problems of freedom and determinism.
I prefer to talk about freedom in relation to choice and actions that humans do. I don’t know what it means to talk about a ‘free will’ which does not result in some degree of freedom in deciding between alternative actions, and in sometimes being able to do what we desire to do, or what we judge to be in our best interest. This is the ‘freedom’ that interests me. (Maybe “autonomy” is a better term.) By a person having “free will” I understand a person with some ability to make choices and act according, i.e., a person having some autonomy.
As to the notion of ‘free will’ which is an aspect of mind or thought, I simply don’t know what that would be. I suspect there’s some confusion here. I have never thought of the ability to engage in free thought, free association and creative imagination as expressions of free will. Traditionally “will” referred to volition to act, and could be understood only in reference to overt action and choice (it seems to me).
I don’t know whether this answers the questions you raise, but it is a quick attempt to sort through some of these confusing concepts.

P.S. In reply to one of your questions: if you win the lottery you don’t thereby gain more “free will”; but you do gain more options, thus more freedom to do things you might not have previously been able to do. (I haven’t the least idea what “gaining more free will” means.)

————————————————————-

Postscript: If having freedom of will is like having a soul, then scientific materialists would deny that human beings have freedom of will. For there is no faculty in the brain (mind) which can be identified as ‘will’ and which is free of all the conditions to which the brain and nervous system are subject. Just as the search for a soul occupying some part of the human constitution will not turn up any such ‘thing,’ so the search for that elusive faculty, the ‘free will,’ will not disclose anything. There is no such thing. Humans are physical, biological beings subject to all physical, chemical, genetic conditions to which all biological creatures are subject. Despite our aspirations, imaginings, and fondest wishes, we cannot float above our physical and biological limits. We are not free in this sense, as we are not spiritual beings in the sense that an eternal soul defining our spirituality could be identified and located somewhere intimately tied to our earthly being.

But if we deny free will in this sense, what have we denied about human existence? Have we denied that humans lack all freedom of action and choice? Have we denied the reality of ‘freedom’ in any significant sense of the word? Many of us argue that we have not denied real freedom. Any freedom worth having is still something we can achieve. Talk of being free to choose to ‘compete in a 10K run’ or merely go as a spectator still makes sense and represents real freedom of choice.

Question to the determinist: What am I unable to do (what capability have I lost?) if your position is correct, that I have no free will?

March 9, 2010

The Expansion of Brooklyn and Puzzles about Physics

Filed under: All,humor and philosophy,science and philosophy — Tags: , — jbernal @ 12:11 pm

Recently I heard an exchange concerning some of the mysteries of theoretical physics. Two friends, Raul and Samuel, exchanged views on one of the paradoxes of QM found in an article, “The quantum world,” which appeared in Newsweek a few years ago.

Raul: …. how on earth can the electrons go through the slits and THEN have the blinds opened? The time for that to occur is in nanoseconds I would imagine. Can physicists really “fool” the electrons in the way described? Is it possible that the future could effect the present? That would mean the future is really already here in some sense. At any rate, it boggles the mind!

Samuel: Not only do we have a wave-particle duality, but we also have the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (uncertain what that is?). I have tried to argue with you that — with Special & General Relativity, superstrings, higher dimensions, & brane theory — the future exists (as well as ‘will exist’); I went on to argue that a Transcendent Super-Entity that existed in higher dimensions could sense the future as well as the past and thus sense/detect what ‘will’ happen & thus It knows our Future. But the future can never influence the present – otherwise, causality is destroyed!

Raul and Samuel left me in a state of bewilderment. “Higher Dimensions,” “brane theory,” and “the future already existing”?! Add this to the idea that the future can affect the present and we’re really lost?! My head was spinning!

Then I recalled Alvy’s mother and decided it was time to consult with her.

Remember her, from the Woody Allen movie “Annie Hall”?

Below is the text from the opening scene in Annie Hall when the mother has taken the young Alvy Singer to the family doctor:

——————–
MOTHER: He’s been depressed. All of a sudden he can’t do anything.

DOCTOR: Why are you depressed, Alvie?

MOTHER: Tell Dr. Flicker. [Answers for him.] It’s something he read.

DOCTOR: Something he read, huh?

ALVY: [Head down.] The universe is expanding.

DOCTOR: The universe is expanding?

ALVY: Well, the universe is everything, and if it’s expanding, someday it will break apart and that will be the end of everything!

MOTHER: What, is that your business? [Then, to the doctor.] He stopped doing his homework.

ALVY: What’s the point?
….
MOTHER: What has the universe to do with it? You’re here in Brooklyn, and Brooklyn is not expanding!

——————————————–
I like Alvy’s mother. She tells it like it is. BROOKLYN IS NOT EXPANDING and THE FUTURE DOES NOT INFLUENCE THE PAST!
So stop worrying and do your homework!

In all seriousness, admittedly quantum physics presents us with tough paradoxes. But it is a mistake to translate the language and formulations of the world of sub-atomic particles (where the arrow of time is irrelevant) to the world of macro-size objects. Our evolved brains/minds, our natural languages, and our intuitive concepts do not apply to the quantum world. Any attempt to apply them results in paradoxes and nonsense.

But this shouldn’t surprise or alarm anyone, right? Listen to Alvy’s mother!

February 1, 2010

Mad men and philosophers – Kant’s Unfortunate Legacy

Walt Kaufmann once faulted the great Immanuel Kant for persuading generations of philosophers (primarily Germans) that serious and important philosophy must be written in the obscure, difficult style of The Critique of Pure Reason. Many years ago I studied Kant’s great work and can attest to its mind- numbing, difficult style. I used the standard translations, which cleaned up Kant’s prose significantly; but even with this help, comprehending what Kant was saying was a gargantuan task. You walked away thinking that you needed a translation of the translation; and you did. These were provided by large numbers of secondary commentaries and studies of the Critique. Even then, the results were alternative interpretations with rival schools of thought promoting one interpretation over another, and nobody really clear on what they were saying.

Anyone who reads the continental philosophers following Kant knows that Kaufmann was correct. Many of them, primarily German and French (with some notable exceptions, e.g. Frederick. Nietzsche, Albert Camus), imitate Kant in producing the type of obscure writing that surely has caused many students headaches and sleepless nights! I give you Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre (in his philosophical works where he imitates the Germans).  Can anyone really render clear, coherent interpretations of what these people are saying?

Lately I’ve had occasion to delve into another of these German obscurantist. E-mail correspondence with a retired LB City College philosophy instructor and with a group of philosophical enthusiasts (Santa Ana Meet-up) about phenomenology have moved me to open Edmund Husserl’s work, Cartesian Meditations – An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion Cairns. This is a challenge indeed, and I can only take small doses at a time. After having struggled with the first two meditations I only get vague glimmers of what Husserl propounds as his “genuine philosophy”; something to the effect that a Cartesian-like meditation, which brings about a transcendental shift in attitude (the “epoché”) and allows examination of the structures of consciousness, is the only approach to genuine philosophy and an indubitable base for the sciences. This is what he seems to say, but don’t hold me to it!

I quote some gems of Husserliana (taken out of context, of course) to give you an idea of his far-from-transparent writing style. (Of course the English is supplied by Cairns, but I’ll bet you the German is even more obscure.)

“Owing to the instability and ambiguity of common language and it’s much too great complacency about completeness of expression, we require, even where we use its means of expression, a new legitimation of significations by orienting them according to accrued insights, and a fixing of words as expressing the significations thus legitimated. That too we account as part of our normative principle of evidence, which we shall apply consistently from now on.” (Pp.13-14)

“An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as “objectless”, empty. Furthermore the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the evidence of the unimaginableness of what is presented with evident certainty. And the same is true of every critical reflection at a higher level.” (Pp. 15-16)

“With that, another fundamental trait of intentionality is indicated. Every subjective process has a process “horizon”, which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow —an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself.” (P. 44)

Had enough? Yes, these are taken out of context. But even when read in their proper context they will be not any easier to understand, believe me! This is a really bad philosophical malady, believe me!

Dr. Bernal’s prescription: Read Gilbert Ryle’s classic work, The Concept of Mind. Try at least 10-20 pages per day. If the patient persists in using such aberrant terms as “noesis,” “noematica,” “epoché,” and “transcendental ego,” increase dose to one chapter of Ryle’s cleansing treatment per day. Patient’s thinking and language should clear up in 5-10 days, and he should be able to resume his work in sane, comprehensible philosophy.

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