Daily Archives: April 20, 2010

More Mad Men and Philosophers – Illusions and Delusions of Freedom

ILLUSION IN ORDINARY LIFE:

Alberto and Ben are walking the Mojave Desert. They’re thirsty and eager to find water. In the distance they see what appears to be an oasis and body of water. Alberto thinks it is real and soon their thirst will be satisfied. Ben wonders if the vision is just an illusion. Only when they get closer will they discover who is right.

ILLUSION ONLY FOR MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS

Alberto and Ben finally reach the oasis and the pool of fresh, cool water. As they slake their thirst, Alberto wonders whether this water which he drinks is really water, or just the appearance (sense datum, sensation in the mind) of water, which might not exist as water-in-itself. He wonders if the oasis that shades him and the water that he drinks are not just elaborate illusions synthesized by his mind.

A VIABLE CASE OF THE “ILLUSION OF FREEDOM”

Truman has lived his entire life in a gigantic bowl (with transparent walls) made to look like an ordinary environment of hills, forests, meadows, rivers, and mountains. Truman has always believed that there are no barriers to his world, and that, if he chooses, he can travel beyond his familiar surroundings and explore the world beyond. In reality, his world is enclosed and he cannot travel beyond its periphery. However, he never tries to pass beyond; and so lives his entire life with the illusion of freedom to wander.

ILLUSION OF FREEDOM ONLY FOR MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS

Alberto and Ben have the freedom and resources to travel the world. So they take advantage of their privileged circumstances and travel to far and exotic places. Alberto revels in his freedom and fully enjoys his travels. Ben worries that it is all just one elaborate illusion. He’s afraid that they really haven’t freely traveled, since, as a metaphysically inclined student, he believes that everything (including their decision and actions) is determined.

A CLEAR CASE OF PEOPLE LACKING AND DESIRING FREEDOM

People who are enslaved (or imprisoned) yearn for a freedom they do not possess; when they see the opportunity, they risk life and limb in an attempt at gaining that freedom.

A CASE IN WHICH ONLY MAD MEN AND PHILOSOPHERS YEARN FOR FREEDOM

Pangloss, who has never been enslaved or imprisoned and who is free to do as he likes, nevertheless yearns for a metaphysical freedom. He yearns to be a spirit who acts in isolation from all material factors that condition his actions.

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Commentary

Shawley asked: When we talk about free will we are talking about the mind? Is it is free to think?

Me: I share your perplexity, Shawley, which is why I issued these semi-comical, semi-jocular suggestions that philosophers’ worries often resemble the delusions of madmen. In reply to your question, I would say that the freedom “worth worrying about and worth talking about” (Dennett) is primarily freedom of choice and freedom of action. Even when stated in the old fashioned language of “freedom of will,” the problem concerns real choices and actions, not merely the freedom to think or imagine possible action. Of course, there is a real-world problem of ‘freedom of thought.’ But essentially it refers to freedom to express your ideas and beliefs without fear of persecution, not the mere ability to entertain thought

Shawley: Juan, then you seem to be saying that the average person in the U.S. has more free will than the average in, say, Dafur? Perhaps one has more of the exercise of free will here than there. To me ” w.o. fear of persecution” becomes merely a question in politics. .

Me: Yes, this is why our friend’s reply (Paul’s reply) to one of my examples is puzzling. Referring to my example of Truman, who thought he could move beyond his enclosed world when he really could not, he writes:

You end by saying he lives his entire life with the illusion of freedom to wander. Well, yes and no. Yes in the sense that he can’t wander outside of the bowl for he is permanently enclosed (as is the man in the locked room). However, he can deliberate as to whether he should leave the bowl and wander about as the man in the locked room can deliberate about whether or not to get up and walk out of the room. In this sense the man DOES have free will; for all the factors involved in free will are in order. He has the ability to deliberate albeit he does not know that the option to leave is really not open to him.

Me: So, according to Paul, one has freedom of will when (a) one can deliberate about going to Shangri-La, (b) one mistakenly thinks he can get to Shangri-La, and (c) in fact cannot ever go to that fabled place. Accordingly, one type of ‘Freedom-of-will,’ is simply the freedom to think about doing something which one cannot do but about which one is uninformed.
On these points, I’m with Shawley, namely, very confused. Paul claims a freedom-of-will when the subject has NO REAL CHOICE and lacks the freedom to act. In other words, if I have the delusion that I can run a marathon in one hour, can entertain the thought of of doing this (although it is physically impossible for me ever to do this), I surely don’t have the ‘free-will’ to run such a marathon! Could I correctly say that I am free to run such a marathon? As my boys would say, THAT DOESN’T COMPUTE, DAD!
This does not strike me as any kind of ‘freedom’ worth worrying about or worth having.

Shawley: Juan, I understand what you’re saying; but to me ‘free will’ argues that, despite genetics and environmental factors, humans have a measure of choices which they can freely consider. Freedom of action is a different beastie than freedom of thought. I realize this verges on existentialism, but that is not my point. If a god knows the future, or if I am genetically programmed in many ways, or I live in a constrained environment – I still have free will. You argue that a Roman Emperor had free will; but an uneducated Gaulish, or Jewish, peasant who was “tied” to the land – was essentially devoid of free will. No, I say his freedom of action was quite limited. It seems that you would see most people in history as mere puppets, manipulated by kings & genetics (etc.), with their minds devoid of choices. If I win the lottery do I suddenly have “more” free will in my mind? My answer is no.
Freedom of action does not equal free will.
For me, free will is a function of the mind (perhaps the brain) – not a measure of degrees of freedom of action.

Me: Shawley, I prefer to avoid the term “free will” because it suggests some mysterious faculty of mind which operates independently of genetic and environmental factors. I don’t think there is such a thing; and it seems to be a mistaken turn in discussions of problems of freedom and determinism.
I prefer to talk about freedom in relation to choice and actions that humans do. I don’t know what it means to talk about a ‘free will’ which does not result in some degree of freedom in deciding between alternative actions, and in sometimes being able to do what we desire to do, or what we judge to be in our best interest. This is the ‘freedom’ that interests me. (Maybe “autonomy” is a better term.) By a person having “free will” I understand a person with some ability to make choices and act according, i.e., a person having some autonomy.
As to the notion of ‘free will’ which is an aspect of mind or thought, I simply don’t know what that would be. I suspect there’s some confusion here. I have never thought of the ability to engage in free thought, free association and creative imagination as expressions of free will. Traditionally “will” referred to volition to act, and could be understood only in reference to overt action and choice (it seems to me).
I don’t know whether this answers the questions you raise, but it is a quick attempt to sort through some of these confusing concepts.

P.S. In reply to one of your questions: if you win the lottery you don’t thereby gain more “free will”; but you do gain more options, thus more freedom to do things you might not have previously been able to do. (I haven’t the least idea what “gaining more free will” means.)

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Postscript: If having freedom of will is like having a soul, then scientific materialists would deny that human beings have freedom of will. For there is no faculty in the brain (mind) which can be identified as ‘will’ and which is free of all the conditions to which the brain and nervous system are subject. Just as the search for a soul occupying some part of the human constitution will not turn up any such ‘thing,’ so the search for that elusive faculty, the ‘free will,’ will not disclose anything. There is no such thing. Humans are physical, biological beings subject to all physical, chemical, genetic conditions to which all biological creatures are subject. Despite our aspirations, imaginings, and fondest wishes, we cannot float above our physical and biological limits. We are not free in this sense, as we are not spiritual beings in the sense that an eternal soul defining our spirituality could be identified and located somewhere intimately tied to our earthly being.

But if we deny free will in this sense, what have we denied about human existence? Have we denied that humans lack all freedom of action and choice? Have we denied the reality of ‘freedom’ in any significant sense of the word? Many of us argue that we have not denied real freedom. Any freedom worth having is still something we can achieve. Talk of being free to choose to ‘compete in a 10K run’ or merely go as a spectator still makes sense and represents real freedom of choice.

Question to the determinist: What am I unable to do (what capability have I lost?) if your position is correct, that I have no free will?

Knowledge and Consciousness, and other philosophical errors

I once argued that knowledge is not a state of consciousness before a group of philosophical acquaintances; but I must admit that my argument did not persuade many of my philosophical friends.

But it is fairly easy to show that there isn’t any significant relationship between consciousness and knowledge, in the sense that knowledge does not require any specific conscious state and any specific conscious state and that these mental states alone are not sufficient for knowledge.

Undoubtedly when we affirm the proposition that any person [e.g., Roberto] knows P (e.g. Roberto knows that Obama is the US President) we’re presupposing an intelligent individual who is minimally aware of his environment, e.g., we presuppose that Roberto is a conscious, mindful agent. But this does not imply that knowledge equals some state of consciousness or some mental act.

Here is my version of such an argument for the contrary thesis that
Knowledge does not imply and is not implied by any state of consciousness or any mental act.

Let ‘Roberto’ represent any person capable of knowledge:
The fact that Roberto experiences any specific state of consciousness [“C”] or performs any specific mental act [“M”] is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for correctly ascribing some knowledge to Roberto [e.g., Roberto knows that Alaska is the biggest state in the union or Roberto knows how to ride a bicycle].

Affirm that
Specific state of consciousness not sufficient for knowledge:

Neither C nor M is sufficient for the truth of ‘Roberto knows P’ (alternatively, the truth of ‘Roberto knows how to S’);
because whenever we correctly ascribe knowledge to Roberto we implicitly affirm that an objective state of affairs holds or that an objective event has taken place.

(E.G. Robert knows that GWB is US president in 2007 requires that in fact GWB is US president in 2007.)

[Examples relating to ‘know how’ are easy. Knowing how to ride a bicycle requires that in fact one can do that, namely, ride a bike.]

In short, being in a particular state of mind is not sufficient for knowing something. This is true regardless of how extra-ordinary or spectacular that state of consciousness might be.

Affirm that
Specific state of consciousness not necessary for knowledge:

• ‘Roberto knows P’ can be true when Roberto does not experience any state of consciousness or perform a mental act (specific to his knowing P). [E.G., Two minutes ago Roberto knew that María is his great-grandmother, but he was not thinking about that (two minutes ago) and had not thought about it for years.]

• ‘Roberto knows how to S’ when Roberto can demonstrate the ability to do S. [This will be an overt, public act, not a state of consciousness or mental act. In our example above, riding a bike.]

• Many (most?) cases of ‘knowing that’ can be reduced to cases of ‘knowing how’.

• It is at least arguable that most cases of ‘knowing that’ are verifiable only in terms of the subject’s disposition or ability to perform some overt act.

Caveat: There may be a sub-class [a residue] of cases in which knowledge intimately involves a special state of consciousness or special experience. Examples could be cases in which we talk of knowledge by acquaintance, i. e., only someone who has done such & such can know what it is like to do such & such. For example, only someone who has loved and lost, knows what a painful experience that is!
[Other examples are easy to find. E.g., Only someone who has climbed Everest knows what that experience really is like. Only soldiers who have been in combat know what they’re talking about when combat experience is the subject.]

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More examples to buttress my case:
First, knowledge that ordinarily we know but do not hold in active consciousness:
Raul (just about anyone) knows that he has maternal grandparents; ..the earth existed 200 years ago; that he has a brain inside his skull;
..that if Henry’s head is cut off, Henry will die; that if Jenny’s arm is cut off, it won’t grow again;
..that automobiles don’t grow out of the earth (like plants);
.. that cats don’t grow on trees.

I know (but likely you don’t) that Ojo Feliz, NM has an abandoned morada.
I know what a morada is (related to the Penitente cult).

We knew in 1950 that nobody (from earth) had been on the moon. In 1970 we knew the contrary. We knew in August of 2001 that WTC twin towers were the tallest buildings in NYC. But in 2002 we knew that the Empire State bldg was the tallest building in NYC.
[What I know relates to what the facts are, relates to how the world is; and can be contingent on changing events.]

You might think that the following examples involve specific mental content or state of consciousness:
I know what ‘A <--> B’ signifies. He knows what R=MC2 signifies.
He knows that sub-atomic particles behave like waves and like individual particles!
[However, it can certainly be true that I know that those propositions are true, but had not thought about them for years. I had not thought about them recently; but if asked, I could reply with a statement (or demonstration) of the relevant knowledge.]

Second, a few examples of ‘know how’ which surely support my case.

He knows how to perform a successful retinal surgery.

He knows the way to Kansas City. He knows how to pitch to Mickey Mantle. He knows how to run a marathon. He knows the best route to the summit of Mt. Everest, meaning he knows how to take the best route.

He knows how the theory of structured programming works in program coding.
He knows how to code, test, and implement a batch program.

[He knows theory, but lacks the practical knowledge (experience)]
He has completed the required courses and attained the degrees and certification, but he lacks the experience of applying all that theory in the real world of data processing.

Third, other ‘knowing’ situations that might lead you to think that knowledge is equivalent to some mental state or state of consciousness:

Secret: I know where the scrolls are, but I don’t tell anyone.
I know who killed OJ’s wife and Eric Goldman, but I keep it to myself.
I know how to solve the puzzle, but I never show anyone.

But even in these cases it is not clear that the knowledge at issue is identical to a state of consciousness. For in each case, there is a crucial connection to the something (an object, an act) in world apart from the subject’s mental state.
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Related Reflections and observations:

Admittedly these are affirmed by someone impressed by a Rylean, Wittgensteinian approach to problems of mind and knowledge.

Knowing other person’s mind: We learn about other ‘minds’ by observing other person’s behavior, expression, capabilities, etc. In short, what other people say (orally, in writing) and do (relevant intelligent behavior) tell us much about their ‘minds.’ Just like the sciences, philosophies, literature, art, engineering feats, architecture, political and economic institutions of a society reveal an advanced culture, so the behavior and creativity of a person reveals that person’s mind, both the intellectual and creative ‘mind.’

We learn what a person knows by observing that person’s behavior and disposition to behave in specific ways. When that person displays particular ‘know-how’, skills, dispositions, and capabilities, we have reason for ascribing knowledge to him. We don’t have to inquire as to any specific state of consciousness or any specific mental act taking place ‘behind the scenes.” [See argument above.]

Although people can say things in sotto voce and keep secrets they never reveal to others, we do not have to become mystified over what happens in other peoples’ heads, or in some mysterious, ghostly place called “the mind.”

Despite the brilliant work of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and Edmund Husserl and arguments to the contrary, the fact remains that we do not learn much (anything?) about other persons’ minds by meditating on our subjective consciousness and attempting to describe the ‘structures’ of consciousness. We must turn our attention to the world, and to social and natural phenomena.

We commit the ‘Category Mistake’ when we speak of ‘the mind’ as an entity in the same category as our body and other material things, but distinct from our body and hidden to all but the immediate subjective consciousness. The mind is not an entity hidden behind the scenes, so to speak. When we refer to a person’s mind we are simply referring to the mindful behavior of that individual, one who is capable of intelligent behavior and aware of his environment.

None of this should be understood as denying that people often keep what they’re thinking and what they know to themselves. We cannot always learn what another person thinks or knows. People are capable of keeping secrets from the rest of us. People are capable of pretense, deception, and great acting, dissimulating what they really don’t feel or think.
Actors, salesmen, and politicians (among many others) often deceive us concerning what they really think and feel. We could say that we cannot always decipher their ‘minds.’ But this is the exception. Much of our culture and way-of-life rests on the ability to ‘read’ each other’s minds quite well.

Recommended reading for someone interested in this approach to problems of knowledge and philosophy of mind:

The Concept of Mind, by Gilbert Ryle

Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature, by Richard Rorty

The Mind’s I, collection of essays edited by Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter

Discovering The Mind, by Walter Kaufmann

The Theory of Knowledge, by D.W. Hamlyn

Consciousness Explained, by Daniel Dennett

On Certainty, by Ludwig Wittgenstein.