In a recent short article titled, “Can Data Determine Moral Values?” (January 2011 issue of Scientific American) Michael Shermer briefly discusses the issue of whether science can resolve questions of morality. He starts by pointing to the insistence by many philosophers dealing with ethics that fact and value are separate matters; this is often stated in terms of the “naturalistic fallacy.” Shermer writes:
“Ever since the rise of modern science, an almost impregnable wall separating it from religion, morality and human values have been raised to the heights. The “naturalistic fallacy,” sometimes rendered as the “is-ought problem”—the way something “is” does not mean that is the way it “ought” to be—has for centuries been piously parroted from its leading proponents, philosophers David Hume and G. E. Moore, as if pronouncing it closes the door to further scientific inquiry.”
Shermer then asserts that
“we should be skeptical of this divide. If morals and values should not be based on the way things are—reality—then on what should they be based? All moral values must ultimately be grounded in human nature,..”
This facile dismissal of the naturalistic fallacy is typical of writers who have a partial understanding of the problems with which ethical philosophers have long grappled. Of course, any viable ethical philosophy should take into account the way things are and the relevant aspects of human nature. But it is one thing to say this and another altogether to state that moral values are “ultimately grounded in human nature.” The latter statement is either trivial or false. It is trivial in the sense that moral values arise from moral behavior which certainly can be the subject of scientific research. But it is false in the sense that an adequate, scientific account of human nature would give us a clear map for stating what values people should uphold. Human nature results in a variety of moral behaviors and a variety of moral values. The answer to the question of the basis for moral values is that humans have based and continue to base values on a variety of things: religion, experience, reason, economics, political ideology, desires, fears, etc. Some moral values will ultimately be grounded in some aspect of human nature; but some will be grounded on something altogether distinct, such as religious or political ideology. Shermer displays his ignorance by telling us that those who make reference to the naturalistic fallacy are merely “piously parroting” it as a form of dogma. The naturalistic fallacy —- the fallacy of confusing the way things are with the way they should be — points to a genuine problem in ethical philosophy, regardless of the somewhat naïve, facile dismissal by the likes of Shermer.
Shermer then touts the recent work of Sam Harris (The Moral Landscape) as knocking down the divide between ‘is’ and ‘ought’:
“Harris’s is a first-principle argument, backed by copious empirical evidence woven through a tightly reasoned narrative. The first principle is the well-being of conscious creatures, from which we can build a science-based system of moral values by quantifying whether or not X increases or decreases well-being…”
This is risible. Shermer writes as if Harris has discovered something new and revolutionary, when in fact this “first principle” by Harris is merely another version of ethical utilitarianism, which has been around at least since the eighteenth century when the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham first developed this type of ethical philosophy. What Harris offers and impresses Shermer is nothing new. There is much to be said in favor of a system of utilitarian ethics; but this philosophy, like other similar ethical philosophies, does not resolve the issue of confusing a matter of fact (people desire pleasure) with an affirmation of value (pleasure is a moral good).
Further down his short article, Michael Shermer brings up the issue of the morality of taxes:
“Harris’s program of a science-based morality is a courageous one that I wholeheartedly endorse, but how do we resolve conflicts over such hotly contested issues as taxes?”
Supposedly, the question concerns the dispute between those who argue that taxes are a good thing and those (Libertarians?) who argue the opposite. Shermer seems to favor the side of those who oppose taxes, as we read in this remark:
“…what happens when the majority of residents … pass laws that force those in the minority …. to help pay for their programs of social wellbeing for everyone? More scientific data are unlikely to eliminate the conflict.”
Shermer quotes Harris as replying along these lines:
“To say that ‘more scientific data are unlikely to eliminate the conflict’ is simply to say that nothing will: because the only alternative is to argue without recourse to facts. I agree that we find ourselves in this situation from time to time, often on economic questions, but this says nothing about whether right answers to such questions exist.”
This shows Harris at his best, making invalid inferences. It does not follow that, because we note that more scientific data are not likely to resolve an issue, nothing will; nor does it follow that “the only alternative is to argue without recourse to facts.” Nothing prevents us from working out some resolution to an issue by reasoned argument or by diplomacy, and in the process make reference to relevant facts. Apparently Shermer does not detect this piece of muddled thinking by Mr. Harris. Instead Shermer hastens to state his agreement with Harris:
“Just because we cannot yet think of how science might resolve this or that moral conflict does not mean that the problem is an insoluble one. Science is the art of the soluble, and we should apply it where we can.”
Shermer is stroking a non-existent problem here. Philosophers who argue more scientific data cannot resolve many difficult moral issues are not claiming that such problems are insoluble. Of course, we should apply the relevant science to resolving problems where the science applies. This is pretty much a truism.
But the tough moral questions and moral dilemmas, those which involve choices and value judgments, cannot be resolved by any science, since in many cases the issue is not a factual issue, but one of values. Centuries ago David Hume pointed out the categorical difference between fact (‘is’ questions) and value (‘ought’ questions). Nothing that science and subsequent ethical philosophies have done since then have eliminated this difference.
And nothing that the sciences have done nor that modern ethical philosophies have done subsequent to Hume have shown how knowledge of the facts could resolve a large class of moral dilemmas such as those involving the morality of war, or differing notions of justice, or those conflicts arising from economic and class distinctions, and, more significantly, those cases in which there are limited benefits to be distributed among almost unlimited numbers of people needing those benefits: e.g. Who gets the organ transplant? Who gets the life-saving medical procedure when medical resources are limited? Who gets rescued first when twenty need rescue and the boat holds only five? Who, among equally qualified candidates, gets the desirable position? Add to this that often we must make moral choices without knowing whether we are really making the right choice (scientific knowledge will not help); as Sidney Hook wrote decades ago,
“every genuine experience of moral doubt and perplexity in which we ask, “What should I do?” takes place in as in a situation where good conflicts with good. If we already know what is evil the moral inquiry is over, or it never really begins.”
In other words, with many of the tough moral situations that people face the applicable knowledge (scientific or otherwise) which would guide people to making the right choice is simply not available. To argue otherwise, as Shermer and Harris do, is to indulge in something akin to wishful thinking or ‘hand waving’ — something more associated with an inferior type of philosophy than with critical thought of a scientific writer.
Science can help in some moral situations; but its applicability is of limited value in the really tough moral situations. It is true that the more we acquire knowledge about ‘human nature’ the more we know and can predict about human behavior and human thinking. And it is true that this will be helpful in dealing with some ethical issues. The more we know the better we can negotiate our way through life. But this rather obvious point should not obscure the actual problems of the moral sphere.
To argue, as Shermer does, that the naturalistic fallacy is merely a pious pronouncement of philosophers ignorant of scientific solutions betrays a fundamental ignorance of the issues and problems with which ethical philosophers have long dealt. And to say, as Shermer and Harris do, that our inability to find a scientific solution to a tough moral problem leaves us without any possibility of resolving the issue seems to me a bit of sophistry. It betrays a fundamental ignorance of moral dilemmas and assumes falsely that the only possible solution to a moral problem is a scientific one.
It's naive to think that Harris, or anyone else, would say "our inability to find a scientific solution to a tough moral problem leaves us without any possibility of resolving the issue." Slow down when you do your reading/research – if you even do that.
Yes, it is surprising that anyone would say this (inability to find scientific solution = inablility to find any solution). But this is exactly what Shermer quotes Harris as saying; and apparently agrees with him. Having read carefully the work of Harris in the past (The End of Faith), I am not much surprised that Mr. Sam Harris would make such a groundless claim.
IMHO you’ve got the right asnwer!
Just another philosopher who thinks he's one-upped the competition with the centuries-old Hume's is-ought problem. Harris has addressed this on multiple occasions, as have I (my debate with Dr. Fincke) and about thirty other philosophers. I think you also fail to understand what Harris means when he says "science."
IF we want to be happy and pursue well-being, we OUGHT to do certain things. These questions are overtly scientific in nature. We usually leave the conditional part, because only "philosophers" like yourself would question whether happiness is a goal worth pursuing.
Kantians would argue that following principals, ideals, and fulfilling duties, even if this results in less pleasure, provides a moral and intellectual satisfaction that cannot be equated with pleasure, happiness, or well-being. Point being that you and Sam Harris cannot assume that simply seeking happiness and well-being like an animal is the universal ground for human morality.
Tom, thanks for the comment. I cannot speak for Harris, but I don't assume anything about a "universal ground for morality." A hedonist or a utilitarian might take the view you ascribe to Harris and me. Your claim that Kantian ethics (“following principles… provides a moral and intellectual satisfaction”) might have some merit; but I recall that for Kant any form of good feeling, pleasure or satisfaction was irrelevant to the question of the universality of categorical imperatives. I also seem to recall that for Kant the universality comes about because morality ultimately comes down to rational consistency; moral dictates are the dictates of reason-logic.
At any rate, my posting questioned the assumptions made by Harris and Shermer that the natural sciences can resolve those difficult moral issues with which philosophy has grappled. I did not intend to presuppose a hedonist or utilitarian ground for my criticism.
Nicely said! I don't think they have a genuine agenda of making progress in these issues. They just want to say "Look how wonderful science is!". They will just ignore this kind of criticism and write another book.
Wow! That’s a raelly neat answer!
pt.1
Unfortunately, I cannot access the SA article.
However, I am familiar with Shermer, and more so with Harris,
I'm open to the possibility (which might be verified in black and white) that Shermer is naively dismissing the is/ought fallacy, but I consider that scenario much less likely than the possibility that Shermer was making a point in a much larger case, (I'm guessing this article was fairly short) – that the naturalistic fallacy is an often cited argument for the separation of science (facts) and religion (values) on questions of morality that – doesn't actually hold up under scrutiny. "Hume's argument was actually directed against religious apologists who sought to deduce morality from the existence of God. Ironically, however, his reasoning has since become one of the primary impediments to linking morality to the rest of human knowledge. " Link: http://richarddawkins.net/articles/5382-how-can-y…
pt. 2: I'm pretty sure neither Harris nor Shermer in any way intend to make facile dismissals of big ideas such as the naturalistic fallacy certainly not as any kind of affront to the efforts of moral philosophers. And whether or not this particular really started with Shermer's article, it.appears to me that you are the one poisoning the well by
A) dismissing Harris via Shermer via small article in Scientific American.
B) assuming with regards to the discussion of morality and ethics that H&S assume significant exclusion or compartmentalization of Science and Philosophy, disciplines which logically share the same values: understanding the universe, ourselves, & our place in it, respect for evidence, logical consistency, intellectual honesty and parsimony.
pt.3
C) "I cannot speak for Harris, but I don't assume anything about a "universal ground for morality." This strikes me as either an argument from or merely an admission of ignorance because Shermer's invocation of The Moral Landscape is a possible means to achieving a universal morality based on values : facts concerning the well-being of conscious creatures. Or at least perhaps, at the very least a more clear understanding the facts regarding why we can't have (universal morality).
D) Tacitly misunderstanding the context in which their views are being presented. This error is sadly typically rampant amongst intelligent detractors of Harris, The Moral Landscape, and probably Shermer too – if my theory is right that we're mostly on the same team, and still getting it together.
pt. 4
". And to say, as Shermer and Harris do, that our inability to find a scientific solution to a tough moral problem leaves us without any possibility of resolving the issue seems to me a bit of sophistry. It betrays a fundamental ignorance of moral dilemmas and assumes falsely that the only possible solution to a moral problem is a scientific one. " / “Yes, it is surprising that anyone would say this (inability to find scientific solution = inablility to find any solution).” |
That is not what Harris says at all. You are reading what was more or less (for Harris, at least) a rejection of the naturalistic fallacy as grounds an argument for :
1) theology as the basis for morality
2) the exclusion of science from the moral sphere (not just in academia but in our everyday life)
and I'm confident enough to propose a theory that you missed all of this because
1) you made several inferences about what was being presented without actually checking it out yourself beyond Scientific American (understandable, most of us skim the pages in the 21st century, information grazing is a bitch)
pt. 5
2) You failed to recognize that moral philosophers are not really the target of their criticism. Their targets are theologians, religious apologists and other charlatans who've essentially co-opted hume's argument against morality from religion and flipped it. It's not about nullifying or dismissing philosophy anymore than it is about making moral problems and human values solely the domain of science, it's about them working together! before [note: Harris got his PhD in Neuroscience, he got a degree in philosophy, which I don't think he "regrets" or dismisses as "naive" or useless.]
[Edit: after hours of typing this I finally caught a glitch: I was confusing Michael Shermer with Michael Specter, (what did I say, I said info-grazing was a bitch) - - But this is ap propos : because Specter is very much concerned with what Shermer and Harris are concerned with: http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/michael_specter... ]
I'm really glad I stumbled onto this page, and I appreciate your thoughts and criticism, and look forward to your response (if any).
However, I would highly recommend actually reading the Moral Landscape (reading end of faith right now). In lieu of that option, I would check out Harris' talk on fora.tv (for the hour + vers, + Q+A) or his talk on TED (20 minute version)… http://fora.tv/2010/11/10/Sam_Harris_Can_Science_… http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hj9oB4zpHww&fe…
Reply to Ellison: Thank you for your comments. You wrote much but I will only remark on a few things you wrote. You're right in pointing out who the 'targeted audience' for both Shermer and Harris are: theologians and other religionists. But Shermer and Harris touch on a philosophical topics, so one should expect workers in philosophy to have some input too. I also agree that philosophers must cooperate with the relevant sciences to deal with these difficult ethical problems. I just caution about overstating the degree to which science can resolve the issues, something that both Shermer and Harris seem to do.
When I have time I will read Harris's book, "The Moral Landscape." But having read his previous books and some of his other writing, I'm not optimistic that Mr. Harris has anything new or insightful to offer. But, of course, I could be wrong.
I feel your caution would be more warranted if it didn't seem to lead to discussing this subject, and science in exceedingly narrow terms. There are Sciences, then there is Science, then there are Scientific Values (that I mentioned above) which make them all possible, and part of the project that is to claim the territory of morality first by admitting that exists, and scientific values are the key to it's exploration. That said, I appreciate the caveat, but it's hard not to see such concerns as overly-cautious; however, I'd rather it be caution than some of the other motivations, I've found regarding criticism of The Moral Landscape.
It might surprise you how many brilliant people have written criticisms and posed objections to The Moral Landscape without even having read it, ranging from Deepak Chopra, to physicist Sean Carroll. It's not exactly a surprise to me that so much of the opposition I've read is essentially little more than misreading, hearsay, and prejudiced assumptions, but what I take a little a bit of offense to is that this dismissive attitude passes for legitimate evidence and argument.
Ellison, you're right. One should not criticize a book without having read it. I should have made clearer that I was not criticizing Harris's book, but rather criticizing summaries of Harris's arguments by Harris himself (in various sources, e.g.enterviews) and by Shermer. If you can find specific points in the book which refute or eliminate what I criticized as Harris's position, I would welcome it. The main point, as I saw it, was the overstated claim (by both Shermer and Harris) that the empirical sciences could resolve all problems connected with ethical problems and value judgments. I still await anything resembling a cogent argument for that conclusion. It is one thing to say that science can resolve many issues and be great help in dealing with the difficult issues. It is another thing altogether to make the puffed-up claim that the sciences have conclusiive answers to all moral and ethical eissues. If Harris has done this in his book, give me a summary; not just an assurance by Harris that he has done so..
Well, Phil, neither Harris nor Shermer make those claims, certainly not the way you frame them.
Harris’ proposal is that if you agree to the assumption that if “the worst possible misery, (the most suffering, for the longest time) for everyone” is bad, that if the word bad means anything it should mean that, then a constellation of possible places to be anywhere but there emerges: a continuum of facts exists that can be navigated to find ways to maximize human flourishing (liken well-being to health, hard to pin down, but indispensable) …it follows that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human flourishing, whether or not we will ever know them, that just because there no answers sometimes in practice, doesn’t mean there are no answers in principle.
1. “that empirical sciences could resolve all problems connected with ethical problems and value judgement.”
a point on empircism:
-I’m reading shermer’s “The Science of Good and Evil”, so far, breathtaking, point of note: Shermer has a really cool [idea] called Transcendental Empiricism, “In the same way that evolution transcends culture, morality and ethics transcend culture, because the latter are direct products of the former. Given this presupposition it seems reasonable to be both a transcendentalist and an empiricist. Transcendent empiricism avoids supernaturalism as an explanation of morality, and yet grounds morality on something other than pure relativism of culturally determined ethics. It has the added advantage of being a testable hypothesis in the same manner that any evolutionary trait might be subject to the scrutiny of empirical science.”
From “Transcendent Morality : Ennobling Evolutionary Ethics: A Moral Dilema Resolved.”
2 “ the puffed-up claim that the sciences have conclusive answers to all moral and ethical issues."
They didn’t say or imply, that science (already?) have conclusive answers. You overstated a claim they didn’t actually make.
My advice/ request (at the risk of partially repeating myself) is to read the moral landscape, but perhaps more importantly, if you like, read shermer's the science of good and evil first.
Also not to be a dick, but after this back and forth and reading your objection, and then our correspondence, I have to say I'm at a loss as to how the hell you could absorb all these interviews with harris and shermer and at minimum, not walking away knowing that they have both pointed out the difference between science having all the answers to questions of morality, and that most of, if not all of the answers actually exist, whether or not we will ever come to know them. [note: I don't know if you've read the end of faith (I would like to know what of Harris' you've actually read, and if you could recall for me, the interviews you mentioned, no big deal if not) but Harris makes a commendable effort to delineate the differences between utilitarianism, pragmatism, and realism in their approach to morality that speaks to this point.]
And this is probably going to sound accusatory, but hopefully not too harsh but I think you are poisoning the well and backhandedly insulting them by saying they have muddled views on Moral Philosophy, which is fine as an intellectual claim or challenge, but you actually have to back that up, and perhaps you were just citing SA as an example of this, and maybe I've missed your "big picture" but I think at least in shermer's case, and probably Harris' is too that you projected that stuff onto them. I don't just recommend these books because I think they're awesome. I think you should read them, esp. the moral landscape, because if you read it and think you have a knock down argument against it, SAM WANTS TO HEAR IT!!!! And once more, so do I! -godspeed.
Insofar as either Shermer or Harris claim that the sciences can resolve all moral dilemmas, they have overstated the case for scientific-based ethical theory. When all is said and done, when the evolutionary sciences and the cognitive sciences have discovered all that can discovered about human nature (assuming that can happen), you will still have the difference between matters of fact and matters of value. Humans will still make value judgments and face tough value choices that all the facts in the world (scientific or otherwise) cannot resolve for them.
I am generally a big proponent of the importance of the sciences for any adequate philosophy; but this does not imply that the sciences can resolve everything in such philosophical areas as practical ethics.
I only read Harris because a number of my secularists friends highly recommended his books to me. I carefully read his first book, "The End of Faith," and generally found the philosophy expressed there to be primitive. He is not at all careful, critical writer, especially when it concerns the very controversial points he wishes to promote. His grasp of history and religious thought are mostly juvenile. I also read his "Letter to Christians," and found nothing new or insightful there. I have not continued to studiy the works of Sam Harris; I have much better writers to study and much better things to do. But I did spend much time and compiled critical notes on his first book, since so many secular people were raving about it. If you're truly interested, I could make those available to you; but, frankly, arguing the merits or demerits of Sam Harris is the last thing I want to do. (It's mostly a waste of time.)
I stand by my original criticism of Shermer and Harris.
"To argue, as Shermer does, that the naturalistic fallacy is merely a pious pronouncement of philosophers ignorant of scientific solutions betrays a fundamental ignorance of the issues and problems with which ethical philosophers have long dealt. And to say, as Shermer and Harris do, that our inability to find a scientific solution to a tough moral problem leaves us without any possibility of resolving the issue seems to me a bit of sophistry. It betrays a fundamental ignorance of moral dilemmas and assumes falsely that the only possible solution to a moral problem is a scientific one. "
"assumes falsely that the only possible solution to a moral problem is a scientific one."
Not what they said at all.
here's how you can get an ought from an is… first link I posted here actually, turns out it was missing 7-9
thanks to conversational atheist http://conversationalatheist.com/2010/11/going-from-is-to-ought/” rel=”nofollow”>:http://conversationalatheist.com/2010/11/going-from-is-to-ought/
Getting from Is to Ought
by Sam Harris
FACT #1: There are behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which potentially lead to the worst possible misery for everyone. There are also behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which do not, and which, in fact, lead to states of wellbeing for many sentient creatures, to the degree that wellbeing is possible in this universe.
FACT #2: While it may often be difficult in practice, distinguishing between these two sets is possible in principle.
FACT #3: Our “values” are ways of thinking about this domain of possibilities. If we value liberty, privacy, benevolence, dignity, freedom of expression, honesty, good manners, the right to own property, etc.—we value these things only in so far as we judge them to be part of the second set of factors conducive to (someone’s) wellbeing.
FACT #4: Values, therefore, are (explicit or implicit) judgments about how the universe works and are themselves facts about our universe (i.e. states of the human brain). (Religious values, focusing on God’s will or the law of karma, are no exception: the reason to respect God’s will or the law of karma is to avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings).
FACT #5: It is possible to be confused or mistaken about how the universe works. It is, therefore, possible to have the wrong values (i.e. values which lead toward, rather than away from, the worst possible misery for everyone).
FACT #6: Given that the wellbeing of humans and animals must depend on states of the world and on states of their brains, and science represents our most systematic means of understanding these states, science can potentially help us avoid the worst possible misery for everyone.
FACT #7: In so far as our subsidiary values can be in conflict—e.g. individual rights vs. collective security; the right to privacy vs. freedom of expression—it may be possible to decide which priorities will most fully avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings. Science, therefore, can in principle (if not always in practice) determine and prioritize our subsidiary values (e.g. should we value “honor”? If so, when and how much?).
FACT #8: One cannot reasonably ask, “But why is the worst possible misery for everyone bad?”—for if the worst possible misery for everyone isn’t bad, the word “bad” has no meaning. (This would be like asking, “But why is a perfect circle round?” The question can be posed, but it expresses only confusion, not an intelligible basis for skeptical doubt.) Likewise, one cannot ask, “But why ought we avoid the worst possible misery for everyone?”—for if the term “ought” has any application at all, it is in urging us away from the worst possible misery for everyone.
FACT #9: One can, therefore, derive “ought” from “is”: for if there is a behavior, intention, cultural practice, etc. that seems likely to produce the worst possible misery for everyone, one ought not adopt it. (All lesser ethical concerns and obligations follow from this).
Pt. 1
Apparently, my summary only served to make harris less clear.
To attempt to answer to one of your original objections
"But it is one thing to say this and another altogether to state that moral values are “ultimately grounded in human nature.” The latter statement is either trivial or false."
From "The Science of Good and Evil"
"My Thesis is that morality exists outside the human mind in the sense of being not just a trait of individual humans, but a human trait; that is, a human universal. Think about it this way: evolution created moral sentiments and concomitant behaviors over hundreds of thousands of years, so that today even though we agree that humans created morality and ethics (and thus we are empiricists), it is not us who created the moral sentiments and behaviors, it was our paleolithic ancestors who did so in those long-gone millennia. We simply inherit them, fine-tune them and tweak them according to our cultural preferences, and apply them within our unique historical circumstances. In this sense, moral sentiments and behaviors exist beyond us, as products of an impersonal force called evolution." This paragraph preceded the last one I quoted from.
"The answer to the question of the basis for moral values is that humans have based and continue to base values on a variety of things: religion, experience, reason, economics, political ideology, desires, fears, etc. Some moral values will ultimately be grounded in some aspect of human nature; but some will be grounded on something altogether distinct, such as religious or political ideology. "
Wow. good answer, to echo another poster. Forgive my sarcasm, but this answer seems even more obviously trivial than your objection to that watered down summary of shermer's thesis. Important note: They are distinct, but not so that they are completely separate, because religious and political ideologies are aspects of human nature themselves.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/andrewbro…
Ellison: In January 13, 2008, Steven Pinker wrote a long essay for the NYTimes, "The Moral Instinct." (One can still access it : http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psyc… Here he discusses the various issues that Shermer and Harris bring up: the idea that much of our moral behavior, decisions and values can be explained in terms of our evolutionary nature. (Pinker, of course, is a big proponent of science in relation to morality.) In looking over the essay, my notes, and my correspondence with a few philosophers, I was reminded that for the most part I agreed with Pinker and defended the position that evolutionary sciences can explain much about our "moral nature." And I still do; however, I make some qualifications to this embrace of the scientific solution for human morality. This is what I tried to state in the blog posting which aroused a fair amount of discussion.
I think part of the problem results from the way the "Naturalistic Fallacy" has been traditionally stated: You can never derive an 'Ought' from an "Is" — meaning one can never determine what one ought to do based on a description of the facts. Evolutionary scientists like Pinker, Dawkins, and many others — along with writers like Daniel Dennett and Michael Shermer — have argued that you in many cases you can derive "ought" for "Is" insofar as you can work out an adequate scientific explanation of our moral choices and values. Yes, many of our values can be scientifically explained. In those cases in which human well being is clearly defined and identified, both the idea of human well being and the choice to realize it can be explained in terms of our evolutionary nature. I count myself among those who advocate this connection between science and morality. The upshot is that in some cases, the Naturalistic Fallacy does not apply: we can derive an 'ought' from the relevant facts.
But this still leaves the qualifier: a sense in which the Naturalistic Fallacy still applies: in some cases in which we face ethical or moral dilemma, or a genuine conflict between contending goods, all the scientific knowledge of our evolutionary nature will not resolve the issue. The sciences may be able to give complete explanation (in terms of evolutionary nature) as to why someone claims that use of armed drones is a morally good choice; and also give a complete explanation (in terms of evolutionary nature) as to why another person sees this choice a morally bad choice. But it is not all clear that the evolutionary explanations would tell us which is the correct value judgment. Likewise, science may fully account for the benefits of a heart transplant for a person with a diseased heart. But if there is only one compatible heart donor and five compatible recipients, and no basis for choosing one as more worthy than another, then all the scientific knowledge available will not tell those making the decision as to who should get the transplant what is the morally optimal decision. Sometimes a flip of the coin would resolve the issue just as well as the best knowledge of evolutionary nature and even evolutionary culture could offer. In this sense, the Naturalistic Fallacy still represents a challenge to our moral philosophy and social policy, a challenge that the sciences do not resolve.
"Yes, many of our values can be scientifically explained. In those cases in which human well being is clearly defined and identified,"
It isn't just that they may be explained, but they might actually be prescribed (or capable of being so)
From Harris' "Response to Critics" http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/response-…
It seems to me that there are three, distinct challenges put forward thus far:
1. There is no scientific basis to say that we should value well-being, our own or anyone else’s. (The Value Problem)
2. Hence, if someone does not care about well-being, or cares only about his own and not about the well-being of others, there is no way to argue that he is wrong from the point of view of science. (The Persuasion Problem)
3. Even if we did agree to grant “well-being” primacy in any discussion of morality, it is difficult or impossible to define it with rigor. It is, therefore, impossible to measure well-being scientifically. Thus, there can be no science of morality. (The Measurement Problem)
I believe all of these challenges are the product of philosophical confusion. The simplest way to see this is by analogy to medicine and the mysterious quantity we call “health.” Let’s swap “morality” for “medicine” and “well-being” for “health” and see how things look:
1. There is no scientific basis to say that we should value health, our own or anyone else’s. (The Value Problem)
2. Hence, if someone does not care about health, or cares only about his own and not about the health of others, there is no way to argue that he is wrong from the point of view of science. (The Persuasion Problem)
3. Even if we did agree to grant “health” primacy in any discussion of medicine, it is difficult or impossible to define it with rigor. It is, therefore, impossible to measure health scientifically. Thus, there can be no science of medicine. (The Measurement Problem)
While the analogy may not be perfect, I maintain that it is good enough to obviate these three criticisms. Is there a Value Problem, with respect to health? Is it unscientific to value health and seek to maximize it within the context of medicine? No. Clearly there are scientific truths to be known about health—and we can fail to know them, to our great detriment. This is a fact. And yet, it is possible for people to deny this fact, or to have perverse and even self-destructive ideas about how to live. Needless to say, it can be fruitless to argue with such people. Does this mean we have a Persuasion Problem with respect to medicine? No. Christian Scientists, homeopaths, voodoo priests, and the legions of the confused don’t get to vote on the principles of medicine. “Health” is also hard to define—and, what is more, the definition keeps changing. There is no clear “metric” by which we can measure it, and there may never be one—because “health” is a suitcase term for hundreds, if not thousands, of variables. Is an ability to “jump very high” one of them? That depends. What would my doctor think if I wanted a full neurological workup because I can only manage a 30-inch vertical leap? He would think I had lost my mind. However, if I were a professional basketball player who had enjoyed a 40-inch leap every day of his adult life, I would be reporting a sudden, 25 percent decline in my abilities—not a good sign. Do such contingencies give us a Measurement Problem with respect to health? Do they indicate that medicine will never be a proper science? No. “Health” is a loose concept that may always bend and stretch depending on the context—but there is no question that both it and its context exist within an underlying reality which we can understand, or fail to understand, with the tools of science.
I highly recommend reading the full response (that is if you haven't already).
"The sciences may be able to give complete explanation (in terms of evolutionary nature) as to why someone claims that use of armed drones is a morally good choice; and also give a complete explanation (in terms of evolutionary nature) as to why another person sees this choice a morally bad choice. But it is not all clear that the evolutionary explanations would tell us which is the correct value judgment."
In the intro to the moral landscape, harris points out that there are 3 distinct projects concerning an emerging science of morality, which I will now paraphrase,
1. is the study of the origins of morality from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, etc. However it should be noted that Dennet has pointed out that just because we have said moral intuition or moral precept hammered into us by natural and group selection for thousands of years, doesn't mean that is the be-all, end-all reason it exists, or even necessarily the only reason we have it today.
2. Using Science (Values, not just the "sciences") to find positive ways to maximize human flourishing.
3. Using these tools to convince people to abandon unhealthy beliefs.
Noting that while the research being done in area 1 is fascinating and important, is not the primary focus of the moral landscape, being the latter 2 (+3), and what's problematic is that it is now more or less the received opinion in science that all science has to say concerning questions of morality is confined totally to the first area.
Likewise, science may fully account for the benefits of a heart transplant for a person with a diseased heart. But if there is only one compatible heart donor and five compatible recipients, and no basis for choosing one as more worthy than another, then all the scientific knowledge available will not tell those making the decision as to who should get the transplant what is the morally optimal decision.
This link should take you right into his take on this kind of question concerning moral truth.
http://fora.tv/2010/11/10/Sam_Harris_Can_Science_…
Ellison, thanks for all you comments. You raise interesting questions and challenges, some of which I have struggled with for at least ten years. As I said before, I appreciate the contributions that the relevant sciences make to the moral issues and moral philosophy. I do not think, contrary to some of my fellow scholars in philosophy, that philosophy in general and ethics in particular are insulated from contributions and criticism from the sciences. But, as I have been arguing all along, this does not preclude my judgment that, just as the philosopher can overstate his case (for a philosophy free of science), so the enthusiast of the scientific approach can overstate his case for the degree to which science can resolve the tough issues in ethics. Nothing I have read or heard from the various proponents of the scientific approach to moral issues — and there are some very good ones: Dennett, Pinker, Hauser, Dawkins, Stenger, Shermer, etc. — has convinced me otherwise. I have presented simple challenges that ethicists, philosophers. writers and historians have long considered (moral problems and dilemma) that do not lend themselves to easy answers (some are mentioned in my original posting), and which may not even have correct answers at all. I don't see that Shermer or Harris or anyone has shown that science provides maps to clear solutions. This is not to say that the sciences cannot help. (But I repeat myself.) Again, thanks for your contribution. [I'll try to look at the rest of Harris's material when I have some extra time.]